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SOCIAL DISCOVERY 


AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY 
OF FUNCTIONAL GROUPS 


WITH AN INTRODUCTION 
BY eso ERBERT | (CRO 


BY 
EDUARD CGC. LINDEMAN 


NEW YORK 
| REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY 
1925 


Copyright, 1924, by 
REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, Inc. 


First Printing, May, 1924 
Second Printing, January, 1925 


Printed in the U.S.A. 


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PREFACE 


An essay which is focused upon the problem of 
methodology in the social sciences must, perforce, draw 
its materials from wide and varied sources. An ade- 
quate preface should reveal the chief sources and 
geneses of the involved ideas, facts and illustrations. 
But who knows by what precise processes of stimula- 
tion and reénforcement ideas come into their fruition? 
I have earnestly endeavored to indicate by content and 
reference those individuals to whom I am chiefly in- 
debted for releasing responses—not overlooking the 
fact of my obligation to those with whose conclu- 
sions I find myself in disagreement. ‘To these hidden 
sources which lie buried in half-remembered pages 
and discussions, and to which I am equally beholden, 
I can refer only with this vague acknowledgment. 

If, as William James was wont to attest, certain 
minds act as triggers to other minds, I must be more 
than vague in my acknowledgments to Mary P. 
Follett. The New State came into my hands during 
that perplexing post-war period when J, like so many 
others who had hoped to bring a gift to life and were 
bafled with purposes out of harmony with prevailing 
force and coercion, sought expression in some creative 
channel. Miss Follett’s challenge to the atmosphere 
of fatigued futility of that period set off the “trigger” 


V 


which gave new direction and new hope to researches 
already partially conceived. A memorable week at 
Putney enlivened by the participation of Professor and 
Mrs. Alfred Dwight Sheffield, frequent conferences in 
Boston and New York, and a continuing exchange of 
materials have followed to bring our two approaches 
to similar problems into codperative relationship. 
How far these approaches have interpenetrated as the 
result of diverse methods will be apparent to all who 
read her latest work called Creative Experience. 

With characteristic self-effacement, Herbert Croly 
succeeds in his Introduction in concealing his contri- 
bution to my thought and effort. His mind, at once 
so fertile, so critical and so fair, has been my constant 
refuge throughout the preparation of this volume. 
Without his initial encouragement, the study could 
not have been undertaken, and without his unfailing 
support it could not have been brought to its present 
phase of completion. 

The usual division between the creative and the 
mechanical details of book-writing do not apply to the 
present undertaking; Martha Anderson, upon whom 
devolved the laborious task of copying, correcting and 
verifying, has brought to her efforts so fine a sense of 
understanding and participation as to make differen- 
tiations impossible. 


If further precursory remarks were proper, I should 
divide them equally between my undaunted faith in 
the possibilities of applying scientific methods to the 
study of human nature in its collective aspects and 
my recognition of the very slight contribution which 
I have been able to make in this direction after so 
much study and effort While engaged in the pleasant 

vl 


task of writing a report upon my tentative conclusions, 
I frequently felt that I was revealing new horizons 
for the social sciences. Now I know that I was merely 
clearing away obstructions; the horizon itself is only 
becoming visible. 

ELC, B. 
GREYSTONE, 
HicH Brincg, N. J. 
March, 1924. 


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INTRODUCTION ~ 


In this book Mr. E. C. Lindeman advances a 
hazardous claim on behalf of his own results. They 
are, he says, more in the nature of science and, con- 
sequently, a nearer approximation to the truth than 
are the ventures of previous invaders of the disorderly 
realm of social theory. ‘The claim is as familiar as it 
is hazardous. For more than one hundred years phi- 
losophers have written books on human nature in its 
social and political manitestations which pretended, as 
compared with previous essays in the same region, to 
the virtue of being demonstrably scientific. Yet their 
successors have almost always denied the pretension. 
‘The new social science persistently has condemned the 
formulas of its predecessors as mere pseudo-science. 
The Forum of the social sciences is encumbered with 
the débris of ambitious structures whose grandiose 
ruins fascinate the attention of innocent tourists, and 
whose value will consist thiefly in providing frag- 
mentary material out of which really human habita- 
tions can be built. Yet undeterred by the ill-success of 
their predecessors, subsequent social scientists bravely 
flourish the same pretension. ‘Their vision of the truth 
about society is alleged to be true in a sense and to 
an extent that the version of their predecessors was 
not true. 

Is Mr. Lindeman in advancing this claim treading 
on safer ground than that of his predecessors? I be- 

1X 


lieve he is. Hazardous as the claim may be, it is in- 
separable from knowing as distinguished from merely 
believing something about social processes; but while 
he accepts the risk as part of his task, he adopts every 
reasonable precaution to diminish its amount. He is 
exploring, as he is well aware, a land in which remote 
and unattainable heights frequently wear a deceptive 
appearance of proximity and in which human hunger 
and thirst breed hallucinations which for the moment 
are almost indistinguishable from realities. He has, 
consequently, provided himself with a special equip- 
ment which consists primarily in taking little or noth- 
ing for granted and in being extremely wary. He may 
_ be more successful, because he is more disinterested, 
circumspect and modest. 

‘The earlier social theory such as the “laws” of the 
first English economists, the economic determinism of 
Karl Marx and the arid mountain range of Herbert 
Spencer’s sociology consisted of magnificent generaliza- 
tions about the way in which man in society had to 
behave. Some of them enjoyed a considerable success 
as the theoretical spear-head of capitalist or revolu- 
tionary activities, but the more concrete their applica- 
tion and the more successful they were in winning 
converts, the more opposition they provoked. If they 
were comprehensive and non-contentious, as in the case 
of Herbert Spencer’s law of social development, they 
were sterile as a clue to particular social processes. 
If they were successful in accounting for particular 
processes of great importance, as in the case of 
Ricardo and Karl Marx, their failure in accounting 
for other processes which were different but also par- 
ticular and imposing was not less conspicuous. ‘There 
was something wrong about the assumptions and the 

x 


method on which these philosophers and social econo- 
mists were working. ‘They were setting themselves 
up as law-givers whose formulas determined the future 
behavior of man in society, but the formulas which 
pretended to express necessary human behavior really 
vindicated some important but special human activity 
which was itself steadily undergoing modification. 
These formulas were not, consequently, being satisfac- 
torily verified in experience. ‘The suspicion grew that 
they were being imposed upon credulous opinion as 
actual science, not because they were capable of veri- 
fication but in order to hide a dogma or an interest 
behind the screen of scientific authority. 

As soon as it became apparent that pretentious gen- 
eral formulations of the necessary conduct of man in 
society were thoroughly unscientific, social philosophers 
began to look in a different direction for an adequate 
account of what societies were and how they came 
into existence. ‘They now began to conceive the be- 
havior of man in society, not as determined by external 
forces in the same sense that the behavior of physical 
bodies are determined, but as an evolving process to 
which the purposes and the needs of individual human 
animals contributed essential sources of variation. 
They began to emphasize the freedom of man in 
society to determine his own destiny rather than the 
“laws” which circumscribed his behavior. “The science 
of society was concerned with values as well as with 
facts and processes, and society itself was the product 
fundamentally of human contrivance and volition. 
This general attitude has dominated American think- 
ing about social processes from the appearance of 
Lester Ward’s Dynamic Sociology until recently. It 
conceived the truth about society as something which 

X1 


existed and would increase as the result of envisaging 
ideals, communicating them to others and inventing 
effective means to realize them. Its better future 
would derive from the beneficent ‘activities of expert 
social engineers who would bring to the service of 
social ideals all the technical resources which research 
could discover and ingenuity could devise. 

‘This approach to the social science was a substantial 
improvement on its predecessors. Its authors conceived 
society not as an achieved mechanism operated accord- 
ing to a formula but as a group of developing human 
activities undertaken to accomplish definable but 
adaptable human purposes. They proposed, conse- 
quently, to do away with the arbitrary dogmatism and 
the raw determinism of their predecessors, and to 
substitute a sociology which described social conduct 
in terms of its resident human values. In spite, how- 
ever, of these improvements the new social dynamics 
still lacked the sceptical modesty of science. It ex- 
pressed a vision of the life of man under social con- 
ditions which for the first time comprehended most 
of the essential and the peculiar facts and processes, 
but it had not achieved a method of dealing with this 
material which safeguarded it against intellectual and 
moral presumption. Conscious though the social phi- 
losophers were of what social conduct meant, they 
were still insufficiently wary of the limits of their own 
function in explaining this conduct and what relation 
their explanation and valuations could and should 
bear to the future conduct of man in society. 

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish the generali- 
zations of the dynamic sociologists from the speculative 
guesses about what society is and should be which has 
always been a favorite pastime of the philosopher. 

X11 


The new sociologists compared their guesses with a 
larger collection of facts than had the philosophers, 
but what they called their science still remained their 
reasoned and plausible guesses about what other people 
did. They collected facts in order to verify or not to 
verify their own theories. What they should have 
done was to collect facts in order to obtain light on 
the operation of those purposes which social agents 
were trying to realize. The values which these scien- 
tists read into the social process were not hypotheses 
which social behavior was actually verifying or failing 
to verify. “They were only more or less imaginative, 
disinterested and well-considered speculations about 
social behavior which in spite of necessarily inade- 
quate verification their authors still proposed as au- 
thoritative sign-posts. 

Thus the new sociology did not escape a remnant 
of the subjectivism and dogmatism of its predecessors. 
It still erected formulas which were usually deter- 
mined by the general social outlook and interests or 
environment of the thinker into orders which ought 
to determine social behavior. Its hero and factor, the 
social engineer, tended to become in practice a revised 
edition of the traditional law-giver who knew what 
was possible and good for other people and who pro- 
posed to mold them according to his ideas. ‘The engi- 
neer was, indeed, theoretically a democrat, but his 
democracy took the form of attempting by legislation 
or by expert direction to improve the conditions under 
which the less fortunate members of society lived. No 
doubt many social reforms have been and will be 
‘accomplished in this way, but for the most part they 
redistribute social energy rather than economize it. 
The process of socialization comes thereafter to depend 

X11 


chiefly upon placing at the disposal of social engineers 
a machinery of economic, social or legal coercion. 
These experts do not know enough and should not 
pretend to know enough to justify them in the assump- 
tion of a responsibility so grave and yet so vicarious. 
Even though they acted in the name of a state whose 
decisions were supposed to be made righteous by popu- 
lar consent, the consent would in the case of the great 
majority of the ordered individuals be fictitious. It 
would not be born of their active and intelligent par- 
ticipation. 

Mr. Lindeman has, I think, succeeded in avoiding 
this pitfall. He is not examining and reconstructing 
society in the light of his particular guesses about what 
social values are and how they get realized. His 
hypotheses about social conduct are capable of objec- 
tive verification because he confines them to an expla- 
nation of activities which human beings are actually 
carrying on. He does not propose to call the result 
science except in so far as the activities themselves are 
the product of understanding and are moving in the 
direction of order. His book contains little which 
measures up to his own standard of science. It is an 
anteroom rather than a room in which people will 
linger and live. Its value depends upon its success in 
explaining and illustrating a method. He sees the 
need of performing for the social sciences a task 
analogous to that which Francis Bacon proposed to 
perform for the physical sciences in publishing the 
Novum Organum. He tries to clear away some of 
the mythology and astrology which interfere with the 
ability of educated human beings to consider what the 
behavior of man in society really amounts to. He 
indicates as method that which will in his opinion 

X1V 


help them to penetrate a land which has proved to be 
so deceptive to so many previous travelers. He illus- 
trates that method by some investigations which he 
has recently made into cases of social conflict and 
social codperation. “The net result is not grandiose 
but, such as it is, it is trustworthy. It is not only 
trustworthy; it is, I think, exciting. 

Its consequences, if true, make it exciting. In so far 
as it is accepted it implies a re-survey of the great 
traditional types of human associations such as the 
church, the state, the industry, the guild and the 
family, in order to discover, if possible, what needs 
they satisfied, how well they did their work, under 
what conditions they did it well or ill, what conflicts 
they provoked and why, and what in the light of their 
past behavior can be said about their present condition 
and future survival. ‘These new surveys would form 
the indispensable background to a continuing study of 
their present operation and of the way in which the 
more experimental modern essays in social groupings, 
such as political parties, labor unions, industrial trusts 
and consumers’ or producers’ corporations also operate. 
The social scientist would help the people who par- 
ticipated in social activities to become conscious of 
what they were about, of what object or objects they 
sought to accomplish, of the nature and strength of 
the obstacles and how well their methods were adapted 
to their purpose. “The only way his science could be 
used to help them to better social achievement would 
be by stimulating them to a completer and more candid 
recognition of what they proposed to do. The com- 
pleter consciousness of what they were doing might 
result in more control over their behavior in so far as 
control was equivalent to self-control. 

XV 


The social science which would result from this 
conception would not consist of a group of specula- 
tions tied together by a logical bond and rendered 
more or less plausible by a comparison with facts. It 
would consist of a perpetual audit of social activities 
by participating agents who were also observers. It 
would consist of the method which these agents would 
use in order to discover the significance of social activi- 
ties and in the partial insights which the application 
of the method at any one time to the activity of the 
particular social groups would produce. ‘These re- 
sults would, so far as they went, be objectively scien- 
tific. “They would be scientific partly for the negative 
reason that they would not pretend to explain or pre- 
dict any more than they were entitled to explain and 
predict, and partly for the positive reasons that in so far 
as they were trustworthy they created states of mind 
which would lead to further achievements of the same 
kind. The trustworthy knowledge of social processes 
would never as the result of future growth assume a 
form which would justify the social scientist in calling 
himself a law-giver. He would remain an observer 
who imaginatively or actually participated in the ac- 
tivities which he observed. 

Social science would consist, that is, in a body ne 
recorded interpreted social practice which would be 
taught in the form of a method rather than in the 
form of a social encyclopedia. It would become the 
articulate and methodical conscience of individuals 
participating in a society—the reflection of the steady 
and discriminating attention which human beings had 
achieved with respect to their own social activities. 
The fruits of this attention would be gathered in part 
in historical or in statistical records, but indispensable 

, XV1 


as such records would be, the authentic social science 
of any period would consist essentially in the whole 
collection of social projects which were then being 
undertaken and of the means which were being used 
to achieve their success but only in so far as human 
beings who shared these projects were conscious of 
what they were doing. It would be handed down 
from one generation to another rather as an art is 
handed down than a science. The ability of any one 
generation to possess the science would depend upon 
their ability to practice the art and to know how they 
practiced it. 

The opportunity to gain knowledge of this kind is 
inexhaustible. ‘The social projects in which the human 
beings of any one generation are actively interested are 
usually ill-defined and frequently headstrong and 
doubtful ventures. “They involve conflicts between 
smaller groups or within larger groups which for the 
most part cannot be waged successfully unless the indi- 
vidual is sacrificed to the group. ‘These conflicts form 
the subject matter which the social discoverer of any 
one generation must share, examine, understand and 
manipulate in order to improve the practice of his art. 
It is not his business merely to quiet the conflict. If 
it were, he would be engaged in the familiar job of 
imposing by persuasion, cajolery or coercion a way out 
of difficulties upon people who are incapable of finding 
a way out for themselves. He is not, that is, engaged 
in substituting codperation for conflict on the theory 
that cooperation is always liberation and conflict is 
always frustration. Codperation also means frustra- 
tion when it demands the abandonment by one of 
the conflicting groups of some important need of the 
lives of their participating individuals. Codperation 

XVi1 


of that kind is merely the perpetuation of the conflict 
under some more or less comely exterior but with th 
certainty that eventually it will be resumed. ‘The pri- 
mary function of the social discoverer is to understand 
In relation to action it must always be expressed in 
alternatives rather than in some absolute objective. 
He is not engaged in doing any one thing. He i 
engaged in doing one thing or the other. But no 
matter what he does, he must know what the alter- 
natives are and what each of them is likely to cost. 
He is never seeking or expecting a consummation. H 
is always seeking additional discovery. 

For this reason it can be truthfully said that social 
science unlike other science has enemies to fight. Its 
enemy is any human being or collection of human 
beings who insist that human behavior in its individual 
or social aspect is something which can be consum- 
mated. If these people are right, there exists some- 
where in the world but presumably in their own minds. 
the knowledge of some final form into which indi- 
vidual and social behavior can and should fit, and it. 
is the business of the wise and the good whom they 
identify with themselves to find out what that form 
is and then fit inferior people into it. ‘This is the. 
conception of social science which, as I have already 
tried to explain, converts the scientist either into the 
accomplice of vested interests or into their dogmatic 
opponents. But it is a conception which will not 
disappear merely because its inadequacy is explained. 
It is the inevitable refuge of human beings who for 
reasons of their own seek to deprive other human 
beings of the opportunity for education and growth, 
Their social and psychological theories are arrogant 
and imperious because the people themselves are not 

XVIII t 


disinterested. They declare that human nature is 
necessarily corrupt or that socialization is the job of 
engineers who are chiefly policemen because, if these 
allegations were not true, they would have no reason- 
able excuse for apotheosizing the obstacle which their 
interest offers to increasing human liberation. ‘Their 
anthropological or social science is the rationalization 
of special interests or particular projects which seem 
likely to be modified or defeated whenever the life of 
the human beings who participate in these activities is 
released for fulfillment. 

If this conception of social science is true, human 
beings cannot learn much that is trustworthy about 
their own conduct or that of the society in which they 
live unless they come to envisage other human beings 
as personalities capable of realization and growth. 
The disinterested pursuit of truth, which is always the 
task of the scientist, brings with it in the case of the 
sciences of human conduct a paradoxical result. ‘The 
social psychologist cannot properly interfere with or 
dictate to the subject of his research. He cannot 
attribute truth to his own discoveries unless what he 
s discovering concerns the way in which human beings 
zet themselves fulfilled. The authenticity of his 
cnowledge of the conduct of other human beings de- 
sends chiefly upon their own knowledge of themselves; 
ind they cannot know themselves truly unless they 
mow themselves as engaged in activities which are 
naking for the fulfillment of a self. In so far as their 
ictivities are being frustrated or their personality is 
yeing disintegrated or the success of their projects de- 
nands the frustration of other human activities or 
ives, any knowledge which they think they have about 
these cases of human conduct is largely illusory. It 

X1X 


consists at best of fragments which ignore their own 
limitations, of members which look to themselves like 
a whole body. Life is such that even these ignorant 
and distorted ‘fragments continue to grow, but they 
grow more distorted and more ignorant. ‘They can- 
not grow more real or more completely themselves 
until they are consciously fitting themselves for a 
career of self-fulfillment in the light of the best. 
available knowleage. What we know about human 
conduct increases as human conduct moves in the 
direction of conscious self-unfolding. If not it is sheer 
and dangerous illusion—illusion which is the more 
dangerous because it cannot survive without the forced 
draught of headstrong conviction and it cannot be 
enlightened without the shock of suffering and re- 
pentance, 


HERBERT CROLY. 


5 


CONTENTS 


PREFACE , . ; ; . . . ° 
INTRODUCTION BY HERBERT CROLY , ° 


PART I 
A Brief Review of the Methods Employed 


in Social Discovery 


I. scIENCE AS METHOD 

Science and Experience 

Facts Tentative. . 

Ineffectiveness of Social Research 

Knowledge Increased by New Method 

Science, a Method of Solving Problems . 

The Sphere and the Problem of the Social 
Sciences 

The Scientist as Artist , 

Science a “‘Perpetual Tentativeness” 


ee te wipe ett ete, 


gos 


II. HISTORICAL AND ANALOGICAL 
METHODS 


1. The Criteria of Science Me the Cree i: 
Philosophy 


The Historical Method 


2. History as Past Experience; Scientifically 
Valid - ° b ° e ° a) 
XX1 


31 


8) 


- W 


ON 


OW on 


. Predictability; the Aim of Science 
. Historical Methodology 


a. Selection of Significant Events 

b. Accurate Description of Events 

c. Discovery of Cause-and-E ffect Rela- 
tions . ° 

d. Prediction of F uture Events 

History; Unreliable for Prediction 


The Analogical Method 


. The Effectiveness of Similes, Metaphors 


and Analogies . 


: Analogies ; Similes with Meaning ‘ 
. Analogy in the Aristotelian Sense 

. Analogy as Distinct Method . 

. The Fruitful Use of Analogy 


LOGICAL METHOD . ° ° ° . 


. Logic, Science and Jurisprudence 
. Why Logic Cannot Be an Independent 


Science 


. Logic as Rationalization of eeperience 


Logic Dependent upon the Habit Category 


. Possibility of Creativeness in Conclusions 


Logic and Social Analysis . 
More than One Conclusion Pusahle aea 
Interests Are at Stake P 


. Unreliability and Inertia of Universals 
. Logic as an Instrument for Group Discus- 


sion si y ¢ : i ‘ 


STATISTICAL METHOD 


. Uncritical Acceptance of Statistical ateth: 


od by Social Scientists 


. The Validity of the Average 


. Correspondences and Correlations 


XXxil 


Correspondences and Correlations as Anal- 
ogies 
Conclusions of Statistics Comparable to the 
Conclusions of Logic : 
Statistics; a Check upon Discovery, not 
Discovery 
7. Important Distinctions Involved in Rela- 
tions Escape Statistical Method , 
8. The Validity of Dispersion no Greater than 
the Validity of the Average . . 


Dy oS 


POSTSCRIPT: FOOTNOTE TO PARTI . ° 
Synthesis of Method. 


PART II 


A Proposed Step Toward the Improvement 
of Methods of Social Discovery 


VY. PSYCHOLOGY AND THE URGENCY OF 
NEW METHOD 
1, The Social Group; Beeenon Possible 
Only in Psychological Terms 
2. The Utility of Subjective and Tnerospee: 


tive Ideas . 
3. Psychological Approaches to Social and 
Economic Problems 3 : 


The Social Group; a New Guat 
The Activity of the Group; Description 
Inadequate by Use of the Historical, 
Logical or Analogical Method ; 
6. The Group as a New Series of Relations; 
Description Impossible unless New Cate- 
gories Are Invented 
7, New Categories of Information, Not Fur- 
nished by Individual and Social Ber: 


ogy ° ° ° ° ° 
"xxiii 


ot 


PAGE 
93 
95 
97 


100 
103 


105 


III 
112 
114 
117 


11g 
122 


125 


128 


VII. 


4. 
5. 


The Group a Means, Not anEnd . 


GROUP CONFLICT AS THE LABORA- 
TORY 

The Group; a Renresneation a eats 

Conflict and Co6peration; Parts of the 
Same Process of Adjustment . 

The Group Adjusting Itself to Other 
Groups . 

The Behavior of the Gioopae an Adjust- 
ment to the Total Environment . : 

‘Theories of Conflict 

The Significant Aspects of ena Re 
havior; Revealed When the Group is in 
Conflict , 

Group Conflict; Not Necessarily a Form 
of Deacmton . ‘ : : 


THE NEW INFORMATIONAL CATE- 
GORIES 


The Language Dithenlty . 

The Categories of Social Psychology . : 

The Inadequacies of the Categories of So- 
cial Psychology 

Conventions, Customs, Leadership, Wins 
and Morals; Valid for Group ae 

How Does the Group Behave? . 


VIII. OBSERVATION AND THE PARTICI- 


ie 


2. 


3. 


PANT OBSERVER 


The Behavior of the Group as a Sette: 
Response Relation . 

The Fallacy of the “Yes-or-No” ‘Answer in 
Social Investigation . 

The Behaviorist’s Position on Asking 

Questions d ; : 2 ; ; 
XXIV 


PAGE 


135 


139 
139 
142 
144 
147 
150 


152 


155 


161 
163 


IX. 


NO 


Observation; a Form of Asking Questions 

The Study of Behavior Involves What the 
Person (or Group) Is Doing Plus What 
He (or It) Thinks He (or It) Is Doing 

The Answer to the Question: “What Is 
the Group Doing?” Must Come from 
Both the Inside and the Outside 

The Function of the Participant Observer 

Group Purpose Revealed ‘Through the Par- 
ticipant Observer 

Integrating the Conclusions of the Ob- 
server and the Participant Observer; a 
Logical and Psychological Process. . 


CATEGORIES AND TERMS RE-DE- 
FINED 
The Rules of Detinidon . 
Statement of Terms and Categories : 
Definitions of Terms in Category I . 
a. Method of Definition Illustrated: Defi- 
nition of the Term “Group” 
b. Leader Pawn 
c. Expert . : ‘ s 
d. i. Observer 
ii. Participant Orci 
Definitions of Terms in Categorv ray 
SPUD ODITATION fe. Sic ohh’ cay souk tae 


Group Stimuli ; 
CTA CSDOUSEE 0 Wiel) se tts 
Representation ye 
REBEL Ter ty reas athe Gs Carne 


Discussion . ; : : 

The Use of Facts . , : 2 

Interests : ( , - é 

Point-of-View : ; : A ; 

‘ene Use. of Languaget. Sy ice as -s 
xXXV 


TSN TP ao op 


PAGE 


183 


187 


189 
191 


5 


197 


201 


201 
204. 
207 


207 
pp 
223 
224 
224 
226 
226 
226 
227 
rap dy | 
228 
229 
230 
230 
231 
232 


5. 


k. Power . , 
Definitions of Terms ii in n Category III 
Customs 
Mores 
Traditions ‘ 
Attitudes : . Me ‘ : : 
Ethics ane . H : : ‘ . 
The Law : : : : x < 
Public Opinion . SA puns sana 


Rime ao oP 


X. THE GROUP, THE LEADER, THE EX- 


RD 


XI. 


BY n 


PERT AND THE OBSERVERS 


Observations and Conclusions Regarding 
the Groups 


. Observations and Conclusions Regarding 


Leaders 
Conclusions Regarding the Expert 
Humanizing the Expert . 
Conclusions peea aie Observers and Ob- 
servation nati) fo) nthe 


GROUP SITUATIONS, GROUP STIM- 
ULI, GROUP RESPONSES, REPRE- 
SENTATION AND CONSENT ° . 


Group Stimuli 

Group Responses . 

Representation . 

Representation Psychological, Not Mathe- 
matical . 


‘The Brouienn of aneene 


XII. DISCUSSION, USE OF FACTS, POINTS- 


OF-VIEW, USE OF LANGUAGE AND 
POWER . : . . : 
XXV1 


PAGS 


233 
234 
235 
236 
237 
239 
239 
241 
242 


2d 
248 
257 
262 
267 


27% 


275 


277 
280 
282 


286 
289 


300 


ee 


ee ee ee ee eee 


. Discussion as Joint or Group Deliberation 


The Use and the Misuse of Facts 

Points-of-View as Activities Influencing 
Group Responses 

The Use of Language as a Group Response 


. The Use of Power as a Group Response . 


Power Over versus Power With 


XIII. GROUP BEHAVIOR AND CUSTOM- 


ARY MODES OF RESPONSE 


Attitudes as Conditions to Customary Re- 
sponses. 

Ethical Norms as Customary Modes of Re- 
sponse. 

The Law as a Customary Mode of Re- 
sponse 

Public Opinion as a @uetomary Mode of 
Response . ; : : , ; 


XIV. EMPIRICAL SOCIAL THEORY 


I, 


The Direction of Social Research 


2. Postulates of Empirical Social Theory 
3. Social Ethics and Social Philosophy . 


INDEX OF REFERENCES . 


GENERAL INDEX 


XxVii 


PAGE 
302 
308 


317 
321 


324 
327 


330 
336 
339 
342 
346 


353 


357 
359 
364 


365 
367 


a Le “an é 
PUT Mb te OTE Wis! APLAR 
besa Be EN Wie ar ase 


’ 


is 
7 ne: 2 
re 


Raed bh Wer 

5 ‘ a)", 

; a Hy 

iy . * ' i 
Pal tie ako Diane Lea tal 
NYS WP ON RR 


fe, AdIOM | 


“| 


Mew 4-¢ baty 
i ‘ ah FP . rs 
TROBE Gey 


i 


iv ; 
ped id 
Lag eno 


4 é wes 
ee We a CL ATE ' 
phe te f 


“Tt may be that this seeking will leave 
you dark, puzzled, uncertain; but bet- 
ter the unrest of judgment suspended 
than the dream-like peace of faith un- 
founded.”—Edgar A. Singer in Mod- 
ern Thinkers and Present Problems. 


Me 


PART I 


A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE METHODS EMPLOYED 
| IN SOCIAL DISCOVERY 


CHAPTER I 
SCIENCE AS METHOD 
1. Science and Experience 


THE various distinctions between so-called 
‘pure’ science and applied science, theoretical 
science and practical science, are confusing. In 
a sense experience and science are identical. 
Propositions and hypotheses which cannot be 
acted upon or tested are insofar without value. 
The scientist and the practical man of action are 
at one in their skepticism of mere theory. To 
state that a theory is sound but will not work is 
paradoxical rhetoric. Unworkable theories 
are not theories at all, but mere suppositions. 
The essence of science is the assurance that 
its propositions may be acted upon. From this 
viewpoint science consists of hypotheses, prin- 
ciples, propositions, and theories whose conse- 
quences in activity may be foretold. This is, 
obviously, experience, and this viewpoint carried 
to extremes makes of science an explanation of 
concrete experiences. It is this but it is also 
much more. 


S 


A rational explanation of experience may at 
the same time be unscientific. Experiences 
may be explained only in terms of what is 
known, and that is dependent upon science, 
not as a body of known facts, but as a method. 
In other words, the validity of an explanation 
of experience depends entirely upon the method 
according to which the known factors in the 
explanation have been discovered. ‘The con- 
tention here is that the social sciences—politics, 
education, sociology, economics, social service 
—can give no fruitful explanations of the col- 
lective experiences of man for the reason that 
these sciences have no adequate method for dis- 
covering the pertinent facts; hence the so-called 
facts of these sciences have no scientific in- 
tegrity.* 


2. Facts Tentative 


Science as a body of fact and science as a 
method of discovery are not opposing concepts, 
although much energy has been wasted in 
the attempt to make them appear in this 
light. Facts are merely tentative and rela- 
tively opportune stopping-places along the path- 
way of discovery. Human beings, who have 


1“The social scientist will acquire his dignity and 
his strength when he has worked out his method.” 
Public Opinion, Walter Lippman, p. 373. 


4 


long lived under social systems of one or an- 
other form of authoritarianism, are prone to 
regard these tentative facts as abiding places. 
But none is so wary of facts as the scientist. 
He rejoices when the opportune moments of 
testing and experimentation arrive, but if he is 
a real scientist he will soon be driven back to 
his searching, frequently by the provoking na- 
ture of the facts themselves. Only the intel- 
lectually lazy place halos of eternity around 
facts. Both the finding out and the use of facts 
may be scientific, may become integral parts of 
the scientific process. ‘The social scientists pro- 
duce few valid facts because they have no valid 
method of locating facts, therefore emphasis 
must now be placed upon method. 


3. Ineffectiveness of Social Research 


The statement that social research is inef- 
fective invariably precipitates debate. Those 
who insist that the social scientists are already 
leaning so heavily in the direction of investiga- 
tion that the community is unable to secure any 
practical applications of their researches have 
some justification for this viewpoint. Govern- 
mental departments, universities and colleges, 
foundations, social agencies and numerous in- 
dividuals are garnering continuously and in- 
creasingly the heavy fruits of minute social 


5 


studies. Surveys and studies and researches 
have come to be the order of the day.” The 
files of governmental offices at Washington are 
bursting with the accumulated reports of. inves- 
tigation commissions. What happens to these 
innumerable reports? The most palpable fact 
concerning most of them is that they are not 
only not used but that they are unusable. 
Those who are aware of this circumstance often 
attempt to account for the ineffectiveness of so- 
cial investigations on the basis of governmental 
lethargy; that is, they believe in the investiga- 
tions and their findings but they affirm that gov- 
_ ernmental machinery moves so slowly that by 
the time the discovered facts are collated 
and distributed, the particular situation has 
changed, public opinion can no longer be ar- 
rested by the facts, and hence the period for 
legislative action has passed. This is, no doubt, 
a difficulty incident to governmental fact-find- 
ing, but it does not account for the non-usability 
of social investigations in general. The real 
difficulty lies much deeper and must be traced 
in several directions, only one of which may be 
followed here. 

Much of the so-called social research of the 
present is analogous to the case of the house- 
wife who employed six successive maids to dust 


2 It was recently reported that one rural county in — 
the South had been surveyed on seven different occa- 
sions and by seven different agencies. 


6 


a room. Each used the same method and in 
the end the room was in no way better dusted 
than it was after the first person had finished. 
They had all covered the same ground in iden- 
tically the same way and the dust which number 
one did not discover was still undiscovered after 
number six had passed by. The room was 
finally thoroughly dusted by the introduction of 
a new method, a joint method, the result of two 
processes: first, the housewife’s ability to de- 
termine that the room had not been thoroughly 
dusted; and second, the initiation of a new 
method which the seventh maid could utilize. 
This is slightly more than an analogy. There 
is, for example, the record of the sociological 
investigator who devised a method for studying 
certain aspects of local community life. He 
later rose to a position of power and influence 
and was able to employ other investigators to 
make similar studies. All went well until one 
youthful and creative investigator produced re- 
sults which were quite the opposite of those 
found in previous studies. He was not only 
placed in a doubtful position in relation to his 
employer but the members of the investigating 


‘craft were unanimously prepared to discredit all 
‘that he had done. They were complacent about 
having the “room dusted” in the traditional 


way. Nay, they were enraged at the thought 
of the possibility of the existence of another 
way. So sacrosanct may even science, or rather 


7 


what often goes by the name of science, become. 
The non-utility of most sociological investiga- 
tions is not due to untrained research specialists 
nor to an unwillingness on the part of the public 
to accept the social scientist’s findings, but to the 
method of investigation. ‘True, this is only one 
of a number of difficulties which lie in the path- 
way of fact-finding for public purposes, but it 
is the problem which is to occupy our attention 
in this volume. 


4. Knowledge Increased by New Method 


Knowledge is pushed to a wider horizon by 
new method. ‘The aim of science is not merely 
to seek knowledge wherever it may be found 
but to discover new ways of searching. New 
social advances do not occur during the pe- 
riods of accumulating facts but in the periods of 
discovery of new methods which open the way 
for sets of new facts. These are the periods of 
creative social advance or of mental release— 
minds released to search for important and 
troubling facts hitherto concealed for lack of 
an adequate mode of detection. The accumu- 
lation of additional facts under the same 
method and the utilitarian application of these 
facts to the materials of the earth and of 
life mark periods of tremendous material 
and economic advance accompanied by in- 


8 


tellectual stagnation.* They are the periods 
of classified knowledge, mechanical inven- 
tions, rapid increase of productive proc- 
esses and abundant faith in science. If this 
description is too neatly accommodating to the 
latter part of the Nineteenth Century and the 
first part of the Twentieth, the reader may 
make his own historical allowances. 

Periods of enlightenment are those of mak- 
ing known through new methods. Periods of 
aggrandizement are those of making use of 
discovered facts. ‘The latter cycle is static in 
its inner life and dynamic in its outer life. 
The former cycle is creative, fluid, revolution- 
ary. 

Exploitation on the one hand, revelation on 
the other! 


5. Science, a Method of Solving Problems 


This leads to a functional view of science, 
a pragmatic view, and it is difficult to see how 
the two aspects of science may have an even 
and concurrent flow under any other view. 
Science is a method of solving problems. It 

8“Taking steps along old lines aids in perfecting 
principles and methods already established, but they 
never initiate the great steps in human _ progress. 
These always come by finding a new method of attack 
upon the problem.” John Dewey in The Christian 
Century for October 18, 1923. 


9 


is an orderly method, a time-saving method, 
and one which may be repeated by all other 
scientists dealing with the same general class 
of materials or phenomena. Science verifies 
experience but it also creates new experience. 
The search for facts and the use of facts are 
both scientific approaches to life. One is nei- 
ther more nor less scientific than the other, 
provided that neither method nor application 
become rooted in a form of traditionalism 
which impedes the development of new ways 
of making known. ‘The advocates and de- 
fenders of so-called ‘pure’ science are of- 
fended by this functional view. To connect 
science with problems is to them very much 
like asking a priest to dig ditches. Science, 
they insist, can be kept pure only by keeping it- 
self free from the raw and uncouth problem 
solvers; it must stand in disinterested aloof- 
ness, far from the influence of the crass utili- 
tarians. The most that can be said for this 
viewpoint is that such scientists are fortu- 
nately rare and that ditch-digging priests 
should cause no expressions of horror. Sci- 
ence and life, with all its conflicts and ensuing 
problems, must somehow get on together. 
Any form of separation leads to mischief and 
confusion. 

One need but analyse the scientific method- 
ology as it proceeds under actual conditions in 
order to see that science is fundamentally an 

1g@) 


adjustment to problems. The very first step 
of a scientist’s investigation is to delirnit his 
field of inquiry.* The next step is to make a 
specific determination of the problem to be in- 
vestigated. (These two steps are frequently 
reversed in order and this procedure adds 
weight to the view of science as adjustment to 
problems.) ‘This is not to deny that numerous 
and noteworthy discoveries of scientific value 
have not been the result of accident. However, 


#A personal experience in this connection is the 
basis of the analysis. As a student of the noted 
botanist, Dr. W. J. Beal, the writer enrolled for a 
course in ecology; it happened that he was the only 
student pursuing this particular course. ‘The basic 
inquiry of ecology is to determine how and why cer- 
tain flora appear in definite areas of the earth’s 
surface. His first assignment was to study a 
vine which grew at the corner of a near-by barn. 
After six hours he returned to the professor’s office 
with a note-book filled with drawings and tabulated 
descriptions of the structural elements of the plant. 
He will never forget the smile of contempt which 
greeted him. He was sent back time after time to 
find out more about the plant, but none of his dis- 
coveries pleased the scientist. Obviously, the diff- 
culty was that he had delimited his field of inquiry 
but had not determined the problems to be studied. 
Like Micawber, he was “waiting for something to 
turn up,” and nothing of any importance turned up. 
Only when a real problem was stated did this study 
begin to reveal anything vital about the habitat and 
the habits of the vine. Ecology became really scien- 
tific when its aim was to solve a problem rather than 
to furnish description. 

II 


all accidental discoveries must ultimately be 
verified by the scientific process. Accidents, 
like other forms of fortune, may lead to posi- 
tive results, but science is not dependent upon 
accident. In fact, one of its by-products is a 
gradual delimitation of the accident concept. 
Scientists do not, Micawber-like, go about with 
microscopes, test-tubes and micrometers in the 
hope that some fortunate set of circumstances 
will furnish them with something to discover. 
On the contrary, the whole tendency of modern 
science is to delimit its sphere and devote its 
attention to specific problems which are parts 
of some larger ‘‘whole” situation. And a newer 
aspect of science is the spectacle of practical 
persons coming to the scientist with problems 
to be solved. Assuredly there can be nothing 
degrading about this process. All of life is ad- 
justment, and the failures or successes are rep- 
resentations of progressive or retrogressive ad- 
justments. Science, as a part of the adjusting 
process, is now the focusing lens which envis- 
ages the total situation, and again the magnify- 
ing lens which indicates the parts. It further 
becomes the symbol of faith in the possibility 
of understanding the relations of parts to parts, 
and of parts to the whole. Science is then the 
ally of the adjusting, evolving life. This is not 
an argument for the acceptance of this view of 
science; it is rather an attempt to indicate what 
is actually happening to science under the com- 
I2 


pulsions of its modern environment. Science is 
being regarded and used as a part of adjust- 
ment, at times in the interest of the ill uses of 
warfare and at times in the interest of improy- 
ing human relations. If appeal there be in the 
foregoing, it is patently the appeal to extend 
this use of science to the social sphere.** 


6. The Sphere and the Problem of the 


Social Sciences 


Numerous proposals have been put forth to 
explain the disparity between the evolution of 
the physical sciences and of the social sciences. 
Korzybski accounts for the fact (which he as- 
sumes) that the physical sciences proceed ac- 
cording to the laws of geometric progression 
and that the social sciences crawl onward ac- 
cording to the laws of arithmetic progression, 
on the grounds that we have been foolishly 
blind to the apparent knowledge that man dif- 
fers from other animals by reason of his 
unique “time-binding”’ capacity.© Others have 
attempted to explain the dynamic character of 

48 A stimulating emphasis of the values involved in 
concentration upon method rather than upon laws is 
contained in the monograph entitled: “Scientific 
Method in Philosophy,’ Bertrand Russell. “It is not 
results, but methods that can be transferred with profit 
from the sphere of the special sciences to the sphere. of 
philosophy,” p. 4. 
© The Manhood of Humanity, Alfred Korzybski. 


13 


the physical sciences and the feeble slow-moving 
and at times cataclysmic nature of social sci- 
ence by indicating that the relations between 
things and things and between man and things 
are unmoral, i.e., do not involve the sense of — 
right. Time-binding and morality are thus 
held to be the unique traits of man which ren- 
der him a stubborn resister to science. Others 
take particular delight in pointing out that the 
human mind has always been at a very low ebb 
and that altogether too much is expected of 
human nature.’ Thus the historian collaborates — 
with the theologian in preaching the new doc-— 
trine of original sin and depravity! ‘“Time-— 
binding”’ is merely a fine-sounding substitute for 
memory, and it does not appear that the mere 
recognition by man of the fact that he can re- 
member past experiences and transmit them to 
future generations will be sufficient to give the 
social sciences a new birth. Morality is not a- 
unique attribute of man but merely a concept of 
exceedingly wide variability. It constitutes a 
rationalization of behavior in terms of certain 
accepted values. Insofar as these values emerge — 
from significant experience they are a part a 
the subject matter of the social sciences. But 
it is dificult to see how they can be treated as 
the differentiating factor, and whether or not 
man’s mind is at a very low ebb has no relation — 

® Social Ethics, John M. Mecklin. 

7 Mind in the Making, J. H. Robinson. 

14. 


to the problem. Even the originator of this 
theory comes paradoxically to the perennial con- 
clusion of all who are baffled by the puzzle of 
human progress, namely, that education is the 
Way out. 

The hypothesis of ‘cultural lag,” as an- 
nounced by Professor Ogburn ° in the following 
terms remains also to be considered: “The 
thesis is that the various parts of modern cul- 
ture are not changing at the same rate, some 
parts are changing more rapidly than others; 
and that since there is a correlation and interde- 
pendence of parts, a rapid change in one part 
of our culture requires readjustments through 
other changes in the various correlated parts of 
culture. For instance, industry and education 
are correlated, hence a change in industry ° 


8 Social Change, W. F. Ogburn, pp. 200-201. 

® Professor Ogburn here makes an arbitrary sepa- 
ration of education and industry in which we must 
assume that he takes the position that education is a 
part of the culture-complex and that industry is not. 
This is, of course, an untenable position. Wissler, 
Man and Culture, even goes so far as to utilize eco- 
nomic factors, the cultivation of maize for example, as 
the radiating points for the other factors in the com- 
plex. This is probably also an arbitrary method of at- 
tempting to place particular factors in causal relation to 
other factors, but Wissler’s treatise contributes much to 
substantiate the theory that culture is a complex of 
variables which are interdependent and out of which 
no single factor, such as industry, may be arbitrarily 
extracted, 


i) 


makes adjustment necessary through changes in 
the educational system. Industry and educa- 
tion are two variables, and if the change in in- 
dustry occurs first and the adjustment through 


education follows, industry may be referred to 


as the independent variable and education as 
the dependent variable. ... The extent of 


this lag will vary according to the nature of the 


cultural material, but may exist for a considera- 
ble number of years, during which time there 


may be said to be a maladjustment.” This hy- — 
pothesis has much in common with the theories — 
of Korzybski and Robinson. Professor Og- — 


burn does follow up his hypothesis with 


illustrative material which demonstrates that — 


what he states as an hypothesis actually tran-— 
spires. In the end, it all amounts to saying © 
that life is a whole and that all parts are inter- 
dependent; one part is a stimulus and another © 
is a response, when viewed from either angle, © 


i.e., from the viewpoint of one aspect rather — 
than another. There can, obviously, be no in- — 


dependent variables in such an interdependent ~ 
whole, and when Professor Ogburn “refers”’ to 


dependent and independent variables, he prob- 
ably uses this term merely as a convenient mode 


of reference. This theory translated in terms — 


of group relations indicates that certain groups 
are more static than others and that if the more 


static groups remain too static, they bring about | 
an instance of maladjustment. That is, if one © 


16 


group is presumed to be in advance of, more 
progressive than, another group, and if the sec- 
ond group fails to respond quickly or ade- 
quately to the first group, this may be looked 
upon as a maladjustment. From this point of 
view maladjustment is reduced to the factor of 
time since the theory does imply interdepend- 
ence and correlation; ultimately there must be 
a response betwen correlated groups. Whether 
or not the time element may be utilized as an in- 
dex of maladjustment is open to. serious 
doubts.*° For purposes of illustration let us 


10 Emphasis upon the time factor in adjustment fre- 
quently leads to erroneous historical cause-and-effect 
reasoning. It seems rational to state that the event 
which occurs first is a cause of the event which occurs 
next. Thus, in Motley’s Rise of the Dutch Republic, 
Vol. I, p. 30, this innocent phrase appears, “. . . the 
establishment of the community, of course, preceding 
the incorporation of the guilds.” Motley is here speak- 
ing of the medieval rise of the guild system and his 
purpose appears to be merely that of placing events 
properly in respect to time. Social theorists, however, 
“may utilize an apparently innocuous reference of this 
‘sort to construct the most diverse arguments for par- 
ticularist forms of social organization. It is plain, of 
‘course, that the mere legal recognition of the com- 
‘munity and the granting of a charter to the guilds are 
‘events after the fact. Which of these legalizing acts 
‘occurred first or last is of very little significance to 
‘social theory, although this fact may be of distinct im- 
portance to political theory. The communities were 
not causally related to the guilds because they were 
first to receive charters. 

17 


assume that education does respond to the 
changes in industry (as in fact it has). Does 
it necessarily follow that this response repre- 
sents a progressive adjustment? May not edu- 
cation respond to faulty elements in industry? 
And may not this response create in reality a 
greater maladjustment than if no response had 
taken place at all? It seems preferable to sub- 
stitute the term “lack of adjustment” for mal- 
adjustment, since maladjustment implies values, 
accepted means of evaluating what is called 
progress, et cetera. Under the heading ‘‘Sugges- 
tions for Better Adjustments,’ Professor Og- 
burn admits that his theory involves the prob-— 
lem of values, hence the term “‘better.”’ And i 
his suggestions for achieving the better adjust-_ 
ments are confined to (a) Attention to nervous — 
disorders, (b) Sublimation, (c) Attention to ‘ 
strain, (d) Attention directed to the obstacles 
to the use of our psychological equipment, (e) 
Substitution, (f) Recreation. ‘Sublimation os) 
substitution are doubtful concepts as is revealed 
when our author afirms: ‘‘What seems to be 
needed is some invention that will do for the 
mechanisms of instinct what the gymnasium 
does for the muscles.’’** But, where are the 
mechanisms of instinct? Is it to be assumed 
that the mechanisms of instincts are confined 
to the nervous system, and are we then to have 


11 Social Change, p. 353. 
18 


neural exercises to supplement muscular ex- 
ercises? In what manner may the neuro-mus- 
cular system be thus particularized? 

Korzybski’s emphasis upon the lack of cul- 
tural continuity, Robinson’s realistic reminder 
of man’s unscientific rationalizations, and Og- 
burn’s analysis of social change are useful in- 
struments for puncturing the laissez faire con- 
cepts of social progress. Each analysis leads 
to recommendations looking toward social con- 
trol. A prior need exists, namely, a scientific 
method for determining the objective facts of 
social action. Social processes can be con- 
trolled only when they are understood, and they 
cannot be properly understood by generalized 
analyses of negative factors. Determination of 
how the way was lost is only the beginning of 
learning how to discover the right way. The 
task of blue-penciling must go forward but 
critical corrections should lead to new methods 
of creating. 

The various theories advanced to explain the 
hiatus between the development of the psychical 
sciences and that of the social sciences all con- 
verge at one point; they appear to be based 
upon the assumption that what man may know 
is conditioned by what he knows. A more 
valid, a more scientific assumption is that what 
man may know is conditioned, not by what he 
_ knows but by how he knows. Much of what he 
already presumes to know may not be known in 


19 


the true sense at all. Thus Comte’s ™” notion 
of society as a developing organism was not 
known but merely guessed. All deductive gen- 
eralizations about society belong to this cate- 
gory.* The essence of the study of man, as 
well as the clue to this study, is not what man 
knows but how man knows. 

To speak of ‘man’ in the generic sense is 
not sufficiently definitive. ‘The sphere of the 
social sciences is not man but rather man in as- 
sociation, men. How has man come to be what © 
he is? Why does man behave as he does? 
These are the generalized problems of all the — 
sciences dealing with human nature. But ef- — 
fective investigation must be conducted in the © 
presence of a specific problem. The objective © 
materials of the social sciences are human ~ 
groupings and the problem of the social sci- — 
ences is to understand the significance of these 
groupings. 

Sociologists have been for long periods en- — 
gaged upon the task of describing society, but — 
there is no society; there are only societies, and — 
these societies are somehow the sum total of © 
numerous constituent groups. The central ques- 
tion then becomes, what is man as a member — 
of a group, or groups? Man as an individual — 
is an abstraction to the social scientist. The 


12 Positive Philosophy, Auguste Comte. 
18 Spencer’s ‘ ‘cosmic evolution and social evolution” 
and Giddings’ “consciousness of kind.” 
20 


Se erm 


attributes of man which are the object of his 
study are those attributes which inhere in and 
express themselves through group relations. 
Man in relation to other men is the sphere of 
social science. he problem is to discover the 
nature and the meaning of this relationship. 
Human beings in relation are human beings 
behaving, or sociology is the science of collective 
behavior. Collective behavior is social process: 
the activities which transpire between individ- 
uals as members of groups and the activities 
which may be indicated as active relations be- 
tween groups. What then are the sources of 
collective behavior? This query leads directly 
into the sphere of psychology since it is the 
same question which the psychologists use as 
the central pivot of their science.** ‘The psy- 
chologists are spending their chief energies in 
the search for a method which will provide 
them with accurate knowledge of behavior. 
Account will be taken later of this evolving 
psychological method. But are there separate 


14 “Fvery one agrees that man’s acts are determined 
by something, and that, whether he acts orderly or not, 
there are sufficient grounds for his acting as he does 
act, if only these grounds can be discovered... .” 
“As a science psychology puts before herself the task of 
unraveling the complex factors involved in the develop- 
ment of human behavior from infancy to old age, and 
of finding the laws for the regulation of behavior.” 
Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, John 
B. Watson, pp. 1, 8. 

7 | 


spheres and separate problems of human be- 
havior which are sufficiently definitive and dif- 
ferentiated to justify two sciences: psychology 
and social psychology? *® We are not yet pre- 
pared to deal with this question in an adequate 
manner;** some postulate must, however, be 
roughly stated and it is that there is a valid dis- 
tinction between the behavior which the psy- 
chologist studies and the behavior which the so- 
cial psychologist studies; and further that each 
science must develop its own method of finding 
out and trying out. No one would deny that the 
behavior which the psychologist observes and 
the behavior which the social psychologist ob- 
serves are interrelated, but interrelation does 
not necessarily imply identity nor even similar- 
ity. Psychology studies ways of behavior; so- 
cial psychology studies conduct.2? 

Psychology may need to go beyond the in- 
dividual in order to discover certain stimuli, or 
seats of behavior, but the collective psychol- 
ogist always goes beyond the individual; his 
specific search is for that element in behavior 


15 It becomes increasingly evident that sociology ap- 
proximates scientific proportions in ratio to its use of 
psychological data and methods. 

10 See Chapter V. 

17 “Conduct is always shared; this is the difference 
between it and a physiological process. It is not an 
ethical ‘ought’ that conduct should be social. It is so- 
cial, whether bad or good.” Human Nature and Con- 
duct, John Dewey, p. 17. 

22 


a 


which can be accounted for only by the fact 
that man lives and has his being in a social en- 
vironment. Collective psychology is not search- 
ing for a “group mind,” or the “mob mind,” or 
the “crowd mind,’’—those psychological will- 
o’-the-wisps which have led so many astray; 
rather it is searching for group interactions, 
their processes and their meaning. Its labora- 
tory is the complex of groups whose activities 
constitute the dominant aspect of the modern 
world. 

The foregoing constitutes a somewhat devi- 
ous and trying effort to clear the way for an 
analysis of the methods of social investigations. 
Unfortunately the pathway toward the social 
sciences is still cluttered with doubtful concepts 
which have long since lost what little scientific 
integrity they ever possessed but which are still 
being taught in classrooms and which cannot be 
ignored. Presumably the road toward truth is 
partly constructed by cutting away error. Much 
of what has been said above is by itself merely 
negative but as a part of the complete context 
of this essay contributes to a positive view- 
point. 


7. The Scientist as Artist 


Science regarded as a method of solving 
problems and not as a body of laws constitutes 
a viewpoint which, because of its pragmatic im- 


23 


portance, deserves protracted attention. One 
may accept the first part of the statement—-sci- 
ence is a method—and still reject the theory 
that it is a method of solving problems. Mr. 
Havelock Ellis, in his brilliant though preju- 
diced and partial chapter on the Art of Think 
ing,’* interprets Vaihinger *° as a protagonist of 
the first part of the above statement. Ellis, 
however, uses Vaihinger to prove a point—the 
point being that there is a utility in fictions, and 
that science is a system of representative 
though fictional symbols. ‘“The business of sci- 
ence is to make the symbol ever more accurate, 
but it remains a symbol, a means of action, for 
action is the last end of thinking.” *° If science 
has a ‘‘business”’ then, it must be that of solving 
problems. And if its business is nothing more 


than the attempt to make symbols more ac- — 


curate,” this constitutes a problem. Mr. Ellis 


interprets the careers of Leonardo da Vinci, — 


Faraday, Galton, Darwin, Kepler and Einstein 
in terms of his preconceived assumption that all 


18 The Dance of Life, Havelock Ellis, Chap. III. 

19 Die Philosophie des Als Ob, Hans Vaihinger. 

20 The Dance of Life, Havelock Ellis, p. 97. 

21 Tt would be an interesting problem to request Mr. 
Ellis to state just what it is that the symbols are to be 
made more accurate to, i.e., with what are they to be 
compared in order to attain greater accuracy? ‘To the 
objective things for which they act as symbols? Or 
merely to some other fiction? 


24. 


a i a es ee 


great scientists are at bottom artists. It is well 
that he begins this discussion by subscribing to 
the dictum of Leibnitz that “‘disinterest is a 
chimera.” His “interest” is to prove that the 
above-named scientists were really artists be- 
cause they made their chief discoveries by the 
use of imagination. ‘Yet Faraday had no prac- 
tical ends in view; it has been possible to say of 
him that he investigated Nature as a poet in- 
vestigates the emotions.” ** The criticism of 
Ellis’ statement and position is not that he 
wishes to ascribe artistic and imaginative at- 
tributes to scientists but that he finds it neces- 
sary therefore to eliminate the problem-nature 
of the scientists’ investigations. The analogy of 
the poet is also misleading. Poets do not inves- 
tigate emotions; they describe emotions. If in 
their descriptions they “hit” upon certain charac- 
teristics which may be regarded as new facts 
concerning emotions, such facts must be cor- 
roborated by science before they can achieve 
validity. If Faraday had contented himself 
with speculations and imaginary descriptions of 
the factors involved in magnetic electricity, he 
could never have been credited with real discov- 
eries. Science is something more than imagin- 
ing an explanation of phenomena; its real effec- 
tiveness lies in experimentation, not in imagina- 
tion. Einstein’s hypothesis of relativity may be 
22 Same, p. 130, 


25 


perfectly sound, nevertheless scientists are at 
work securing corroborations and evidences. 
Darwin did not leap from his imaginary de- 
ductions upon the reading of Malthus to the 
statement of his theory of natural selection. 
On the contrary, he spent years in laborious 
observation and experimentation after which he 
ventured, reluctantly even then, to put forth 
his theory. As a matter of fact, it was his 
imaginary deduction from Malthus which set 
for Darwin the problem which henceforth oc- 
cupied his researches. To say that the scientist 
is an artist because he utilizes his imagination is 
merely to state that all human beings are ar- 
tists to a greater or lesser degree. This state- 
ment, however, does not necessarily carry the 
implication that scientists do not begin with 
problems. 

The chief deficiency of the sociologists and 
social psychologists of the past was that they 
were seeking for general laws to explain group 
behavior and they arrived at the statement of 
these laws without adequate study of group 
behavior in its particulars. They had not de- 
limited their problem. ‘Their researches were 
deductions, not inductions.”®> In this connection 
the influence of Professor Cooley’s theory of 
primary groups upon social investigation may 


23 This cannot fairly be said of Cooley, whose first 
volume, Human Nature and the Social Order, was for 
the most part based upon inductive observations. 

26 


' 


be noted.** Following the statement of this 
theory, researches were begun with the explicit 
intention of discovering the nature and func- 
tioning of groups; for example, families, 
groups of families and neighborhoods. 


8. Science a “Perpetual Tentativeness” 


Is science, when regarded as a method, to es- 
cape all dogmatism? ‘This is plainly impossi- 
ble and under certain conditions the complete 
absence of dogma is as undesirable as it is im- 
possible. If science is to be regarded as a 
method, it is a method to be used for some- 
thing, and as interpreted above, this means that 
the use is to be that of solving some specific 
problem. If any discovered method results 
in a solution which ‘‘works,” i.e., succeeds in 
achieving a new adjustment, dogmatism will fol- 
low. The scientist may not be the person to 
insist upon dogmatising the solution but some 
person or some group is certain to be attached 
to the solution by emotional ties; dogmatism 
of one sort or another is then sure to be born. 
The uses of dogmatism are obscure and doubt- 
ful but it seems at least pertinent to our pres- 
ent problem to point to the fact that real criti- 

24 See, for example, studies by J. H. Kolb, of the 
University of Wisconsin; Rural Primary Groups, Re- 
search Bulletin 51, 1921; and C. C. Zimmerman and 


C. C. Taylor of North Carolina State College; Rural 
Organization, Bulletin 245, 1922. 


27 


cism arises only when dogmas come into con- 
flict. Not until science itself becomes the 
dogma do the gravest difficulties set in. There 
is some legitimacy in regarding the conclusions 
of science, especially those that have brought 
success, as dogmas, but there are no reasonable 
grounds for regarding science itself as dogma. 
Fortunately scientists rarely betray themselves 
in this fashion, but many of the dilettante ad- 
herents of science and many who have tasted 
the first fruits of surety which result from the 
use of scientific method are hastily and dog- 
matically assertive. The social sciences are, 
happily, just recovering from a rather severe 
attack of dogmatism and it should not be dif- 


ficult for the workers in this sphere to accept 


the view of science as a “perpetual tentative- 
ness.” This volume goes so far as to attri- 
bute this view to scientific method as well as to 


the conclusions of science. Pearson” cata- — 
logues three criteria of science: (1) exact and — 


impartial analysis of facts, (2) investigation of 
objects which represent a species, a type 
or a class of facts, (3) formulation of 
scientific laws. So far as method is concerned, 
this statement has been accepted and trans- 


mitted with the spirit of dogmatism. But 


these criteria include a number of doubtful 
terms. Is it to be inferred that statements 


are exact only when they are stated in mathe- — 


25 The Grammar of Science, K. Pearson. 
28 


matical terms? Are all discoveries which 
are attained by means that are not im- 
partial to be excluded from science? What 
is a fact? What grounds are there for ex- 
cluding an analysis of facts which is an inte- 
gration of partial and impartial investigation? 
Is it humanly possible to conduct wholly im- 
partial analyses of human affairs? Once these 
questions are raised, it becomes necessary to 
regard scientific method as well as scientific 
law as a tentative procedure. 


29 


CHAPTER II 


HISTORICAL AND ANALOGICAL 
METHODS 


A THOROUGHGOING critique of the methods ~ 


now utilized by social scientists is sorely 
needed. Such analysis does not, however, fall 


within the compass of the present undertaking. © 


The traditional methods of the social sciences 
have been (1) reference to the past, (2) com- 
parison, (3) reasoning. History, analogy and 


logic are the tools which have been most fre- — 
quently used in the attempt to describe and — 
. predict collective behavior. Some may wish — 
to add a fourth, namely, speculation, and ~ 


there are reasons for regarding the specula- — 
tive approach as a method. It is, however, an © 
individual method which cannot be utilized by © 
others laboring in the same field. Insofar as © 
speculation is based upon observed facts, it be- — 
comes a part of one of the three methods men- — 
tioned above and may be regarded as an hy- — 
pothesis. Statistics as a method of the social © 
sciences can scarcely be called traditional since © 


30 


£ 


its technical application may be regarded as a 
contemporary development. 


1. The Criteria of Science and the Criteria 
of Philosophy 


Even a partial critique of method must pro- 
ceed upon lines which are both scientific 
and philosophical. Scientists and philosophers 
alike base their inquiries upon essence, mode, 
causality, end, space, time, number and rela- 
tion. If Kant’s famous definition of philoso- 
phy * may be paraphrased, a critique of method 
must involve the three questions: What can the 
method reveal? What needs to be revealed? 
How may what is revealed be utilized? And 
the criteria of method are the same criteria of 
the scientist and the philosopher. In each case 
the conclusions must run the gamut of the same 
rigorous tests. Does the conclusion (the 
method) exclude other conclusions? Is it a 
consistent conclusion? Does it apply equally 
to the whole and to the parts? Is objective 
evidence available? If not, what is the validity 
of the subjective evidence? Will the conclusion 
be substantiated by the ‘“‘consensus of the com- 
petent’’? Is a consensus of the competent pos- 
sible? Does the conclusion close the door upon 


1 “What can Lknow? What ought I to do? What 
may I hope for?” Critique of Pure Reason, Kant. 
Trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn. 


31 


experimentation? In view of these tests and 
criteria, which it is assumed must ultimately be 
applied to any form of method, it becomes nec- 
essary to take a frank position. As, obviously, 
no method has ever met all of these tests, all 
methods must be regarded as relative and none 
as ultimate. No other course is open to social 
science. ‘The materials which have thus far 
been gathered under its domain are too scant 
and too untrustworthy to permit the discussion 
of ultimate traits. These may very well be left 
to the philosophers for the present.? Until a 
more adequate method of discovery is devised, 
it will be the part of wisdom to leave both the 
method and the content of the social sciences 
in a state of ‘“‘experimental solution.” The dis- 
cussion of the deficiencies of method here at- 
tempted will revolve about the two questions: 
What can the particular method reveal? What 
needs to be revealed? ‘The second question, on 
its face, involves the selection of values and any 
determination of values is predicated upon the 
assumption that values are measurable. Such 
measuring, evaluating, is now a philosophical 
proceeding. Only the experimental attitude 


2 When, for example, Professor Dewey says, “Con- 
flict and uncertainty are ultimate traits” (p. 12), he is 
philosophising; when he says, “Habits as organized ac- 
tivities are secondary and acquired, not native and ori- 
ginal,” he is making what either is or might be a scien- 
tific statement. Human Nature and Conduct, p. 81. 


32 


toward life and its problems will tend to bring 
such measuring of values within the scope of 
science. Although both scientific and philo- 
sophical approaches are to be made to the cri- 
tique of methods it is not assumed that there is 
a fundamental cleavage between these two 
viewpoints. On the contrary, the precise posi- 
tion herein hazarded is that these two. view- 
points tend to merge. Good science eventually 
becomes philosophical and good philosophy is 
scientific.® 


THE HISTORICAL METHOD 


2. History as Past Experience; Scientifically 
Valid 


What capacity has history for revealing the 
significant facts incident to social process? His- 
tory as method includes every attempt to fur- 
nish a factual account or interpretation of a 
past event. Its answer to the query, ‘‘How has 
man come to be what he is?” may be succinctly 
stated as the dictum: Find out what man has 
been. ‘The assumption here is that once it is 
known what man has been, it becomes possible 

$It has frequently been remarked that most scien- 
tists turn to philosophy as old age approaches, i.e., they 
bezin to think about their problems in terms of values. 
This is a reversal of the genetic process; art and philos- 
ophy preceded science and technics. Unfortunately a 
long life is needed to rid many scientists of those pre- 
possessions which exclude the philosophic view. 


a5 


to discover the causes and events which have 
led to his present state. Given this sequence 
of events (which constitutes a series of adjust- 
ments of man to his environment), one may in- 
duce a behavior-pattern of man which supplies 
the clue for predicting what man may become 
or what man may do when confronted with a 
new situation. ‘History repeats itself” is 
the colloquial summarization of the historical 
method. 
History is past experience and upon the basis 
of past experience all predictions are made.* 
The chemist and the physicist are here on com- 
mon ground with the anthropologist and the 
ethnologist. Science and history are at one in 
basing predictions upon past experience. This 
commonplace is noteworthy since it is always a 
time-saving process to keep in mind the unities 
and conformities of situations which also em- 
brace conflicts and variables. Insofar as the 
sciences and the arts which use the historical 
method base their prophecies of the future 
upon valid experiences of the past, they are 


4 The process is aptly illustrated by the account of 
the revolutions of 1848 (Seventy-five Years Ago; a 
Memory of 1848 by Zuberkloss in Das Demokratische 
Deutschland; reprinted in The Living Age for May 
12, 1923) in which the author points out that Munich 
has always been a step ahead of Berlin in all historical 
movements. He thereupon concludes by inference that 
modern Germany is to become reactionary and mon-— 
archistic since Munich is already in that frame of mind. 


OF 


ren 


scientific. ‘There is no other way of dealing 
with the future, unless it be by the uses of im- 
agination. Novelists may create characters 
whose responses to imagined situations are 
clearly foreseen, but man and life are not fic- 
tions. True, the writers of fiction and the 
poets frequently transcend the scientific method 
by prognosticating events which are ultimately 
ratified by experience. 


3. Predictability; the Aim of Science 


The entire question of the predictability of 
human nature and human events is now raised. 
It is in essence a philosophical question. “Theo- 
retically, i.e., scientifically, there can be no ulti- 
mate limits to the scientific method, to the proc- 
ess of factualizing and refining experience as a 
mode of prediction. Philosophically, i.e., in 
view of the present limits of the human mind, 
there is an altogether valid justification for the 
statement that “conflict and uncertainty are ul- 
timate traits.” *> The question for science is not 
whether uncertainty is an ultimate trait or not, 
but how ultimate it is. If the area of uncer- 
tainty is being diminished by ever so small a 
degree, this is the only clue which the scientist 
needs. The philosopher who insists that “hu- 
man behavior may be predicted only if there 
can be produced an archangelic human being 
5 Human Nature and Conduct, John Dewey, p. 12. 

35 


with a capacity for integrating problems of dif- 
ferential calculus at a speed of three hundred 
thousand per second”’ is merely juggling words 
and concepts. ‘The scientist need not be halted 
in his task by such scarifying formule. He need 
not interrupt his pursuit of dealing with ex- 
periential materials in order to speculate upon 
the validity of apocalypses and revelations. 
_ For all practical purposes he may be permitted 
to go forward in his attempt to shrink the area 
of uncertainty. ‘The questions of mind versus 
matter, relative uncertainty versus ultimate un- 
certainty, are provocative subjects of debate 
for the metaphysicians; the scientist is con- 
cerned with mind and matter, relative uncer- 
tainty and increasing certainty. 


4. Historical Methodology 


In simplified form the historical method pro- 
ceeds by: 


Selection of significant events.° 

Accurate description of those events. 

c. Discovery of the causes and effects involved © 
in the events. : 

d. Prediction of future events in terms of the — 

cause-and-effect relationships discovered — 

in past events. | 


oe 


°’ The term “event” is here used to include move-— 
ments with certain tendencies as well as specific ac- 
tivities. 


Not all historians, to say nothing of the critics 
of the historical method, are agreed that the 
last two steps belong intrinsically to history. 
Obviously, the above simplification of the his- 
torical method is only germane to the history, 
at the most, of the last century. ‘The quest for 
the discovery of forces in history is wholly mod- 
ern and may be attributed to the impact of 
science upon the historian. Out of this move- 
ment have arisen the economic interpretation 
of history, which implies that the real forces 
which shape historical events are at bottom 
economic, and similar historical theories. 
When economic causes are interpreted in terms 
of laws whose functioning is not conditioned by 
human intelligence, the logical conclusion is that 
historical causes are at bottom materialistic. 
The historical method has in this illustration 
completed the cycle from observation of facts 
to speculation of origins and ends, from scien- 
tific approach to philosophic interpretation. 
The newer branches of history, as anthro- 
pology, ethnology and folk-lore, owe their rise 
‘as well as their unusual recognition in the 
sphere of science to the use of (b) and (c); 
discovery of cause-and-effect relations and pre- 
diction. 

To enumerate the specific and the general 
contributions which history and _ historical 
method have made to the social sciences is not 
pertinent to the present inquiry. Nor is the 


37 


aim to delineate the progress made in the so- 
cial sciences by accoun tine for the involved his- 
torical sequences.’ The chief concern here is 
to bring to bear upon the historical method the 
tests which will reveal how the historical ap- 
proach may be utilized in discovering the na- 
ture and the processes of collective activity. 
(a) Selection of significant events. ‘The his- 
torian selects for research the events which may 
be described as social change.* The critics of 
history are prone to point to faulty selection of 
events, ignorance of certain events which were 
of significance but which do not interest the his- 
torian because of traditional predelictions of his 
craft and a tendency to rationalize events so- 
as to make them fit into sequential order. These 
are criticisms of the use of the method and not 
of the method itself. The historical method, 
then, begins with a selection of events and ac- 
tivities which represent problems. ‘This is a 
scientifically sound procedure. From the view- 
point of social science and its quest for an un- 
derstanding of social process, the chief criticism 
of the historical method is that it must deal 


7 For a rather complete treatment of this subject, see 
the series of articles appearing in The American Jour- 
nal of Sociology, prepared by Dr. Albion W. Small, be- 
ginning with the issue of January 1923, and entitled, 
“Some Contributions to the History of Sociology.” 

8 The conflicts and adjustments involved in the rise 
and decline of feudalism, for example, constitute sig- 
nificant events. f 

4 


38 


OE ERE ae ae te ae 


with retroactive problems. Only the historian 
of contemporary events and movements can 


utilize the method of observation. But curi- 


ously the contemporary historian is invariably 
discredited. He is said to lack the correctives 
of perspective, to make of history nothing but 
high-grade reporting, journalism. In one sense, 
history is a perspective of events. It deals with 
social changes, not as problems to be solved but 
rather as problems already solved. ‘The his- 
torical method reveals and records adjustments 
to changing situations which the social group 
has either met successfully or has failed to meet. 
The so-called “‘rises’”’ of civilizations, nations or 
cultural groups are the records of successfully 
accelerating adjustments and the consequent 
“falls” are the records of failure to adjust. 
The historical method precludes observation of 
the adjusting process.® It can only take advan- 
tage of its fragmentary materials in construct- 
ing a picture of how the event may have tran- 
spired. The actual transpiring must ever es- 
cape the historian. To the extent that the his- 
torian’s picture conforms to the knowable facts, 
he contributes to an understanding of the na- 
ture of social change. Such pictures of past 


® Hence the variety of ascribed causes for the fall of 
Rome are to be regarded as logical conclusions from 
selected events used as premises. “These so-called causes 
are not false but merely partial; some validity un- 
doubtedly resides in each historical syllogism. 


a0 


events assist materially in directing the social 
scientist toward the sources of significant ma- 
terials for study. The method of the social 
scientist must therefore begin where that of the 
historian leaves off. 

(b) Accurate description of events. Omit- 
ting for the moment the inevitable partiality 
of historians, it must be granted that the his- 
torical method, in laying emphasis in these lat- 
ter years upon the necessity of laborious re- 
search for the purposes of discovering factual 
material, has acted in the interests of science. 
The process as actually utilized in historical re- 
search involves memory, the placing of events 
in point of time, the variability of terminology © 
and many other debatable factors. Much of 
the descriptive material of history is lamentably — 
defective but it is being constantly corrected, — 
and considering the multiplicity of fields of in-— 
quiry to which the historical method is applied, © 
there is cause for giving praise to this phase of © 
the method. However, no one can accurately de- 
scribe an event which he has not observed.” — 
The historical composite, which consists of the — 
conjoined observations of persons who lived in — 
the period selected for interpretation, is an im-_ 
provement over individual interpretation from — 


2 The difficulties involved in providing accurate and - 
convincing descriptions of events observed are well-— 
known to jurists. See The Expert Witness, C. A, | 
Mitchell. 


wae 
i piee 


40 


b 


assumed causes. But historical composites are 
not to be fully trusted. The individuals who 
commented contemporaneously upon events of 
importance were probably so intimately related 
to those events as to make impartiality impos- 
sible. ‘These observers were also living in an 
environment of presumed cause-and-effect and 
their descriptions of current events were un- 
doubtedly colored by these presumptions.*° 
Improvements in this phase of historical 
method are probably to be tooked for when his- 
torians earnestly seek to resolve opposing de- 
scriptions. 

(c) Discovery of cause-and-effect relations. 
A phase of historical method has now been 
reached, the validity of which, in view of mod- 
ern science, is subject to grave doubts. What 
is a cause and what is an effect? Can the his- 
torian ever know? Palpably the cause-and-ef- 
fect relation has been oversimplified in all of 
history. ‘To rationalize is the temptation to 
which the human mind most easily succumbs 
and practically all historical cause-and-effect re- 
lations are either adroit or maladroit rationali- 
zations. The monarch and the mob—which is 
cause and which is effect? Education and 


10 The subtle method of J. G. Frazer in the Golden 
Bough, by which he aims to state fairly the mystical 
cause-and-effect assumption and then translate it in 
terms of modern rationality, is an excellent example of 
one historical method for dealing with past events. 


41 


democracy—which is cause and which is effect? 
Which is means and which is end? 

Two and two are four if you are speaking 
of houses or potatoes, but two and two are not 
four if you are speaking of human beings in 
collective activity. Two and two ideas certainly 
do not result in four ideas. ‘The causes which 
the chemist isolates and upon which he predicts 
inevitable effects are not of the same kind as 
the causes which lie at the roots of human be- 
havior. One may always evade this issue as 
did the biologist who predicted numerous ef- 
fects of the behavior of a frog in response to 


definite causes or stimuli. When asked what | 


conclusions he arrived at when the frog refused 
to respond in the way he predicted, his reply 
was: ‘“‘Well, I must then conclude that the frog 
was right.” ‘This is an evasion. What the 
biologist might with profit have said was that 
he did not understand the cause-and-effect re- 
lation. In any case, this is precisely what the 
social scientists are obliged to say. Historians 
are still debating whether the Civil War was 
fought for the purpose of saving the union or 
of liberating the slaves. Modifications of these 
two viewpoints are represented by attributing 
the real cause of the conflict to economic or cul- 
tural differentiation or some similar more un- 
derlying factor. The debate over the exact 
cause which brought the United States into the 


recent world war bids fair to equal the above — 


42 


in spite of the fact that the events were closely 
observed.™ 

The more recent results of experimental psy- 
chology,’® interpretations of the stimulus-re- 
sponse process, and the realignments of 
thought in regard to means and ends as in- 
volved in activity ** are leading toward a re- 
vamping of the concept of psychological causa- 
tion. If, as now seems to be the fact, it is neces- 
sary to view the stimulus-response relation of 
an organism as a complex, it is wholly reasona- 
ble to assume that an even greater complexity 
will appear in the application of the stimulus- 
response formula to group behavior. ‘That 
causes and effects are not the sharply defined 
and separable entities which they were once 
thought to be becomes increasingly evident. 
What may at one time be isolated and labeled 
cause, may at another time and under other cir- 
cumstances be legitimately labeled effect. The 
historical method arbitrarily chops the social 
process into cycles of causes and effects. It 
sharpens and delineates the flow of historical 
events. This means that it is the method by 
which history may most easily be made to ap- 

1 For a skillful effort to interpret these events 
psychologically, see ““American Withdrawal from Eu- 
rope—How and Why?” Herbert Croly; The New Re- 
public, September 12, 1923. 

12 Especially the “conditioned reflex” of Pavlov. 


18 By Holt particularly. 
14 By Dewey and Holt. 


43 


pear rational. Life and the social process are 
not made up of bracketed situations of cause 
and effect, means and ends, stimulus and re- 
sponse. On the contrary, life is composed of 
related and interrelated. situations. Arbitrarily 
to isolate action and its reaction from the so- 
cial process provides only static concepts. Life 
is flow, process. The real search is not for ac- 
tion and reaction but interaction. What hap- 
pens between action and reaction, cause and ef- 
fect, means and ends, stimulus and response con- 
stitutes the search of the social scientist. 

The group is a plurality of individuals; but 
what the group does is not plural but singular. 
The difficulty of accurately describing a group 
is inherent largely in the persistency of viewing 
the group as a collection, a plurality, a thing, 
rather than as an activity. In attempting to 
describe significant events historians are fre- 
quently found to be describing significant per- 
sons or combinations of persons. 


Illustration: 
“Tf a man and a woman marry, the interrela- 


tion generates qualities in each; and these quali-. 


ties should be predicated of each, as the marital 
qualities of the man or the woman. There are 
certain characteristics, such for example, as be- 
ing an even number, or walking down the street 
arm in arm, that can only be attributed to the 
couple, and cannot be attributed either to the 
man or the woman without contradicting his or 


44 


her numerical or anatomical properties. But I 
venture to say that most of the interesting and 
significant facts of married life are of the first 
rather than of the second variety; and that it is 
more fruitful to study the history of the man 
and of the woman each in the environment of 
the other, than to study the history of the 
couple.” *° 


The description of a couple in terms of joint 
activity has nothing to do with numerical or 
anatomical properties. ‘he couple is not a new 
and mystical entity in need of description. The 


search is for the meaning of interactions of the 


couple with other couples or other individuals 
or the neighborhood. The history of each in- 
dividual will undoubtedly be of assistance in 
describing the couple’s interaction, but this in- 
teraction is the result of some previous resolu- 
tion or integration or interpenetration of the 
couple. There are occasions when the couple is 
thought of and reacted to as though the couple 
were a unity; for example in the question, 
“Shall we invite the Smiths?” ‘The presence 
of both Smiths means something entirely dif- 
ferent from the presence of either Smith. 
When the illustration is expanded to include a 
family group instead of a couple, the above 
distinctions are still further clarified. 


15 “Ts There a Social Mind?” Ralph Barton Perry, 
American Journaleof Sociology, May 1922, pp. 735- 
736. 

45 


(d) The prediction of future events is a 
function of the historical process only in a 


strictly limited sense. Even with restrictions, 


it remains debatable whether or not the his- 
torian may ever legitimately assume the role of 
prophet. Practically considered, however, 
those who use the historical method are forever 
making predictions. This utilization of histori- 


cal ‘‘backgrounds”’ has been responsible for the — 
existence of what may be termed historical fa- 


talism. For example, some students of history 
constantly remind us of a certain human futility. 
They rear specters, usually called “determi- 
nants,” 
complete span of historical sequence on the 


of many sorts. Karl Marx laid out a - 


basis of economic determinism in which he reck- 


oned almost not at all with the possibilities of 


changes in human nature.*® Anthropologists, © 
or the interpreters of anthropologists, occa- 
sionally allow their prophesying propensities to — 
go so far as to construct rhythmic cycles of in-— 
tegration and disintegration, presumably based — 
upon a sort of biological determinism.” Poli- — 
ticlans and publicists appear to take such proph- 


ecies seriously.** How often are we warned of | 


our impending decay by the ominous finger 


16 Das Kapital, Kar] Marx. 

17 Vodern Man and His Forerunners, H. G. Fj 
Spurrell. 

18 Walled Towns, Ralph Adams Cram. 


46 


pointed at fallen Rome! Some who use the 
historical method complete the cycle, thereby 
producing an inverse prophecy of hope. The 
historical pessimists settle the future by saying: 
‘What's the use? Everything is bound to go to 
the dogs anyway. It always has.” The his- 
torical optimists carry this hypothesis a bit far- 
ther and say: “What's the use? Everything 
is bound to come out all right anyway. It al- 
ways has.”’ And here stands revealed the di- 
lemma of historical prediction! 


5. History; Unreliable for Prediction 


The past is merely a clue to the future, not a 
diagram, chart or compass. It is even mislead- 
ing as a clue, since attention focused on the past 
event and its correlations with the present may 
tend to produce “‘blind-spots” which shut out of 
view the new factors in the present situation. 
That there are new factors is as certain as the 
fact that to-day is not the same as yesterday. 
History does not repeat itself for the simple and 
obvious reason that this repetition is impossi- 
ble. There can no more be two identical his- 
torical situations than there can be two identical 
persons. If history repeating itself merely 
means that because of the habit-nature of man 
it is possible to discover similarities of response 
and adjustment in varying situations in time, 


47 


no objections can be made. But if the meaning 
is that there are causal interrelations between 
the fall of Rome and the impending fall of 
modern civilization, both the logic and the pre- 
diction may be challenged. ‘The formula “‘his- 
tory repeats itself” is an aphorism, not a dem- 
onstration. 

The above discourse has led directly to the 
discussion of reasoning from similarities, or 
analogy. Before this phase of method is ap- 
proached, however, it seems appropriate to 
state that there are evidences of evolution in 
historical method. The historians of the scien- 
tific, as distinguished from the literary, school 
are earnestly endeavoring to create for history 
a more fruitful mode.*® The social scientists of 
the future will need to become increasingly 
aware of this evolving historical method; this 
awareness will tend toward the greatly-desired 
unity of the social sciences in method with a 
corresponding diversity of content, 


THE ANALOGICAL METHOD 


6. The Effectiveness of Similes, Metaphors — 
and Analogies 


Nothing appears to beguile the human mind 
more successfully than an apt analogy. If only 
something may be discovered which is like, simi- 

f 


19 See The Processes of History, Francis J. Teggart. 
48 


_ 


on 


pe 


= we we Pres 


lar, parallel to the problem which vexes us, how 
amiably the difficulties evaporate.*° 

Similes and metaphors have their legitimate 
place in verse and fiction. They are, in a sense, 
logical means of rendering new ideas, feelings, 
sensations, emotions more clearly-defined by re- 
lating them (in comparison) to something 
known. 

“Feet as hot as an iron pump-handle on a 
July noon” is an effective method of describing 
a particular sensation. It goes beyond descrip- 
tion in the minds of those who have actually 
had the experience of grasping an iron pump- 
handle on a July noon. ‘The reference to a 
known experience intensifies the reader’s con- 
cept of the sensation and this is what the writer 
in this instance evidently sought. The success- 
ful simile is not merely a mode of comparison 
for the sake of clearness, it is a means of add- 
ing weight, color, intensity. All of this means 
that the simile is intended to make the author’s 
description appear to be more true. A well-se- 
lected simile does make for a more ready ac- 
ceptance of statement, and from the psychologi- 
cal point of view it is easy to see why this is so. 
Reason is one of the egoistic elements in per- 


20 How far this process has proceeded in current 
thought may be indicated by the fact that an industrious 
literary collector now publishes annually for the de- 
lection of the devotees of belles-lettres a complete vol- 
ume of the year’s best similes. 


49 


sonality and when the well-chosen simile corre- 
sponds with some known past experience which 
the mind has recorded, the personality is by so 
much enhanced. The political orator knows 
this principle so well that he often takes the 
pains to discover the possible local bases for his 
similes in order to make sure that his state- 
ments will be “‘telling.”’ Because of the human 
mind’s susceptibility to similes, metaphors and 
analogies, these form the basis for much think- 
ing and acting; hence the necessity for further 
analysis. | 


7. Analogies; Similes with Meaning 


Similes and analogies are alike only in a gen-_ 
eral sense, in the manner of their effects upon — 
the mind, i.e., psychologically. Technically, — 
there is a distinction, and a consciously under- 
stood distinction, between the use of a simile 
and the use of analogy. Analogy is frequently © 
used as a substitute for logic. Things and phe- 
nomena are assumed to be alike because they 
appear to be alike. ‘The likeness supplies an q 
easy conclusion. This is obviously a very loose f 
way of using mere similarity as analogy. A” t 
true analogy is much more than similarity; it is 
similarity with meaning. Thus when the social § 
psychologist compares certain manifestations of © 
crowd-behavior with specific mental aberrations 
(psychoses) of individuals, he is using an 

50 


analogy with meaning." His purpose is to ex- 
plain the nature of crowd-behavior in terms of 
an established or assumed explanation of in- 
dividual behavior. The earlier sociologists at- 
tempted to explain the nature of society by 
pointing to its analogy with the human body as 
a functioning organism. (Spencer and Comte.) 
One still hears the family alluded to as the 
molecule of society. These are analogies with 
the definite purpose of ascribing meaning to the 
object or phenomenon under consideration. 
This use of analogy needs fresh consideration. 

The analogical method is more widely used 
in the social sciences than in the physical sci- 
ences for the reason that objective experimen- 
tation has proceeded further in the latter case. 
The scientist who deals with chemical materials 
and processes need not stop to make guesses on 
the basis of likeness, similarity, resemblance or 
correspondence; he is able to produce situations 
in which such analogies may be tested. They 
then stand upon their own merits as demonstra- 
tions and not as analogies. The complexities 
of human nature and the social process make 
such simple verifications difficult and conse- 
quently they are for the most part left to in- 
trospection. The social sciences, if they are to 
be in fact sciences, must evolve a method which 
goes beyond analogy. However, the analogical 
method will probably continue to enjoy greater 

21 The Behavior of Crowds, Everett Dean Martin. 

g1 


use in the sphere of the social sciences than in 
other scientific fields. ‘This probability imposes 
the task of discovering in what manner analogy 
may be most fruitfully utilized. 


8. Analogy in the Aristotelian Sense 


Analogy in the Aristotelian sense and used as 
part of the logical process, namely, as example, 
occurs commonly in ordinary discussions as well 
as in scientific exposition. The accustomed 
habit of most minds, particularly the minds of © 
so-called “thinkers,” is to proceed a certain dis- — 
tance on the basis of objective materials and ~ 
then to veer off to the tangents of abstraction. 
When this point in discussion is reached, it is — 
always fruitful to demand examples. If the © 
abstract idea is susceptible of illustration by the © 
use of a concrete example, an immediate return © 
to credibility follows. Examples cause ideas to — 
seem more real. They carry the weight of in-— 
duction. A fitting example is a form of evi- — 
dence—at least it is commonly accepted as one. | 
This use of analogy tends to develop the quality © 
which James was pleased to call ‘‘tough-minded- — 
ness,’ *? a penetrating synonym for empiricism. — 
The empirically-minded are those who have de- ' 
veloped the habit of thinking in terms of eX- 
amples. 

This use of analogy in the social sciences may 

22 Pragmatism William James i 

52 5 


serve a most helpful purpose. The sociologists 
who base their conclusions upon the findings of 
anthropology are for the moment popular be- 
cause they have sought and discovered an abun- 
dance of examples, illustrations, parallels. ‘The 
findings in this field are largely the result of a 
combined use of the historical and the analogi- 
cal methods and it must be admitted that his- 
torical analogy lends itself to an exceedingly 
convincing expository form. Anthropology is 
by itself fascinating reading and when used as 
the basis for sociological inductions makes a 
very wide appeal. Happily the anthropologists 
have for the most part distinguished between 
true and false analogy. Therefore they have 
made and are making a most serviceable con- 
tribution to the other social sciences.2* How- 
ever, in evaluating this contribution, one must 
not lose sight of the inherent deficiencies of the 
historical as well as of the analogical method. 


9. Analogy as Distinct Method 


But analogy as method is more than exam- 
ple. The interpretations of analogy provided 
by Kant,** Sir William Hamilton,”® and John 
Stuart Mill,?° justify the treatment of analogy 


23 See Man and Culture, Clark Wissler. 

4 Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant. 

25 T ectures on Logic, Vol. II, Sir William Hamilton, 
26 Yogic, Book III, John Stuart Mill. 


Nas 


as a distinct method, differentiated from for- 
mal logic although not entirely independent of 
it. Analogy as method has come to mean the 
discovery of resemblances in particulars. ‘The 
inductions of logic proceed by discovering the 
resemblances in the many which lead to the con- 
clusion of resemblances in all. The inferences 
of analogy, on the other hand, proceed by dis- 
covering the resemblances in particulars which 
lead to the conclusion of resemblance in wholes. 


In both cases the process is from known to un- — 


known points of agreement. Obviously, if the 


particulars which reveal resemblances are of — 


the same class, on the same level, there is every 
valid reason for believing that such resem- 


blances have meaning. The analogical method © 
has the capacity of discovering significant re- — 
semblances, but does it possess the capacity of — 


validating the meaning of such resemblances? 
Here lies the crux of the analogical method. 


Analogy which stops at the discovery of resem- — 
blances in particulars is not fully scientific. It — 


may disclose resemblances between particulars © 


of the same class or between particulars of dif- — 


ferent classes but in both cases the resemblances ~ 


can have scientific value only if verified by em- — 


pirical methods. In Mill’s words, the analogy — 


“is not an argument although it may imply that 
an argument exists.” 


The existence of the real — 


argument is still to be proved. And it must be — 


said at this point, although parenthetically, that 
54 


rie 
ia 
“ 


i 
, 
D 
AS 
> 
/@ 
ay . 
ee: 


the statistical method of creating a ‘“‘prepon- 
derance of evidence” by the accumulation of in- 
numerable resemblances does not change the sit- 
uation in the least. So far as analogy as 
method is concerned, one resemblance is just as 
significant as one thousand; the causal relation- 
ship between the resemblances is still to be 
proved. 

An illustration of the use of the analogical 
method in a modern treatise on social psychol- 
ogy may serve to clarify the issue: 


“Many of the characteristics of the uncon- 
scious will then appear and will be similar in 
some respects to those of neurosis. It is my 
contention that this is what happens in the 
crowd, and [ will now point out certain phases 
of crowd-behavior which are strikingly analo- 
gous to some of the phenomena which have 
been described above.” *” 


The assumption of this analogy, as in fact 
the total assumption of the entire volume, is as 
follows: having discovered certain manifesta- 
tions of individual behavior of neurotic per- 
sons which resemble certain manifestations of 
the behavior of crowds, the author concludes 
that crowd-behavior is neurotic behavior. The 
remainder of the volume (with the exception 
of the concluding chapter which suggests a cure 


27 The Behavior of Crowds, Everett Dean Martin, 
pp. 71-72. 
55 


for the crowd-neurosis) is a brilliant analysis — 
of these strikingly analogous phases of crowd- | 


behavior. Laying aside for the moment the — 


doubtful concept of crowds, especially the nu- — 
merical concept, one has the scientific right to 
question the entire conclusion. Nothing has © 
been proved. The resemblances of particulars — 
are chosen from two levels, i.e., the level of in- 
dividual behavior and the level of crowd be- — 
havior. Neurosis is an empirical concept on the © 
plane of individual behavior; it is nothing more © 
than a striking resemblance on the social level, © 
a supposition. An analogy carried from one — 
level to another is nothing more than an anal- © 
ogy until it has been empirically and experi- 
mentally proved on the succeeding level. ‘Then ~ 


it becomes a scientific fact. But even if the re- © 


semblances were chosen from the same level, — 
the purely analogical method would still be 
limited to the discovery of the resemblance and ~ 
not the scientific meaning of the resemblance. ~ 

This criticism amounts, not to a discrediting — 
of the use of the analogical method, but rather 
to its delimitation to its prescribed sphere. — 
Again quoting Mill: “Where the resemblance is 
very great, the ascertained difference very small, — 


and our knowledge of the subject-matter very — 
extensive, the argument from analogy may ap- _ 
proach in strength very near to a valid induce 


tion.” From the pragmatic point of view noth- 


ing more is necessary; a conclusion reached by _ 


56 


such a method offers an excellent basis for ex- 
perimentation. If social principles derived in 
this manner actually work, it may be assumed 
that they have for all practical purposes the in- 
tegrity of true principles. 


10. The Fruitful Use of Analogy 


The most fruitful use of analogy in the so- 
cial sciences appears to be its discovery-capa- 
city; it directs attention to the things which if 
proved might be extremely significant. The 
analogical method, instead of lulling the mind 
to sleep, should be the awakener, the stimulus 
to experimentation. Comparison instead of be- 
ing odious, may become the nucleus of creative 
experiment and thought. Some of the analo- 
gous reasoning of the social scientists may be 
_true, but the truth in it will remain undiscov- 
ered so long as it is allowed to go unchallenged. 
The analogical method may then become the 
ally of a healthy skepticism. 

Ethnology begins where anthropology leaves 
off. Its generalized foundations constitute an 
acceptance of the essential unity of the human 
species. Its particularized foundations rest 
upon the differences between various groups of 
the human family, the so-called ethnic groups. 
Ethnology may be thus useful to sociology (so- 
ciology being the science which deals with the 
associative processes within groups and between 


Sif 


groups) by pointing out the nature of the dif- 
ferences and the nature of the similarities. 
Analogical discoveries within the sphere of eth- 
nology may lead to the method of composing 
differences as well as to the social use of simi- 
larities. At present racial groups stand in awe 
or fear of each other because of the tacit recog- 
nition of difference. This act of giving atten- 
tion to difference may be one of the chief fac- 
tors in perpetuating unintegrated difference. 
It is entirely possible when we say that two ra- 
cial groups cannot get on with each other that 
what we really mean is that the differences and 
similarities of these two groups are not under- 
stood. ‘Consciousness of kind” ** as it now 
stands in theory is mere subjectivism. Empiri- 


——— 


cal consciousness of kind can be discovered only ~ 


in terms of activity of kind. The use of anal- 


ogy as is suggested in the above is merely one 1 


of the ways in which the analogical method may 
be utilized as one of the modes of social discov- 
ery. 

Ouspensky’s * recommendation of the use of 
analogy for the purpose of discovering new 


categories is based upon pure (or impure, de- 


pending upon the viewpoint) Kantian doctrine. 


His assumption is that if we can perceive and — 
conceive things or processes in new ways they 
are insofar new. All of reality is thus placed 


28 Franklin Giddings. 
29 Tertium Organum, P. D. Ouspensky. 


58 


within the perceiving and conceiving capacity 
of man and none is left to the things or proc- 
esses perceived or conceived. The underlying 
assumption of this volume is that reality of 
some sort resides in man as an individual (1.e., 
in his so-called consciousness) , in groups of men 
and in the perceived and conceived environ- 
ment. Whether or not these are independent 
forms of reality is a debatable point, but it ap- 
pears entirely tenable to assume that prag- 
matic reality—the only kind with which we can 
deal fruitfully—comes into being when two 
forms of hitherto independent reality become 
dependent or interdependent. When man 
comes to know reality outside himself, 1.e., to 
know in the sense of being able to utilize or in- 
terpret in a rational manner, the two forms of 
reality then become interdependent in a func- 
tional sense. Man does not perceive that the 
sun does not move about the earth daily, but he 
is able to conceive this phenomenon in such man- 
ner as to make it a part of his rational life. 


—. 


59 


CHAPTER III 
LOGICAL METHOD 


History and analogy are arbitrarily joined 
in this discussion, not because of any intrinsic 
relationship, but merely as a convenient mode 
of establishing what appears to be a useful se- 
quence. Men or groups do not behave by first 
taking the historical, then the comparative, 
then the reasonable and finally the mathemati-_ 
cal view. When men or groups are called upon 
to rationalize their behavior or to predict its” 
consequences, they are likely to make use of the 
first three views—not as separate methods but 
as a compound mode of interpretation. Since 
statistics is apparently always a backward or 
an historical view it can record only what has 
happened. ‘Thus when the stock market manip- 
ulator bases his calculations upon statistics, he 
is using the historical-statistical method. But 
insofar as he makes comparisons he is also using 
analogy. He would, in addition, be offended if 
told that he was not using logic. The rough 
and ready gambler heeds none of these methods 
of calculation but trusts to the blind fortunes 

60 


MAS; Pay _—— 


of chance. The stock market manipulator lives 


_and functions on the margin of probability and 
the gambler lives and functions always on the 
_margin of mere possibility. The science of pre- 
diction begins where gambling leaves off. At 
this point the sequence of method begins. Past 


experience, comparative experience and rational 
expectation (reasoning) are used either sepa- 
rately, jointly, or in combination from this step 
onward in all forms of prediction. The next 
step is risked because the person “‘thinks’’ he 
knows what is going to happen. The reasons 
he thinks he knows what will happen are his- 


torical, analogical and logical. Whether these 


processes actually precede or follow the overt 
action is immaterial for the present discussion. 


Logic is a formal method of reassuring 
thought of its effectiveness. “The competence 


of logic rests ultimately upon the ‘‘known-to- 


the-unknown” formula. Poetry and music, in- 


-asmuch as they appear to flow from uncon- 
trolled processes, are generally assumed to be 


-non-logical expressions of thought. The forms 


which poetry and music assume are not formal; 


| they are, it is true, guided by certain fundamen- 


tal rules of a mathematical nature, but poetry 


- and music are forever in conflict with such rules. 
_ New modes in these spheres of art are the re- 
‘sult of new releases from rules. On the other 


hand reasoning, which is usually termed rigor- 


ous thinking, tends to approach the formalistic 
61 


in method. To have followed a line of thought 
from all of its known factors to some unknown 
conclusion is a method which lends sanction to 
the conclusion. Such thinking is called rigorous 
because it has a consciously understood method 
which is strictly followed. 


1. Logic, Science and Jurisprudence 


Logic and science, as methods of arriving at 
conclusions, are still used indiscriminately. In 
the juristic realm, where decisions involving hu- 
man nature in its relations to justice and liberty 
are sought, logic as a method unquestionably 
holds a higher place than science. An increas- 
ing tendency to resort to scientific methods in 


— ee 


legal cases involving mental aberrations is to be © 


noted but even here the technical testimony is 


utilized as a means of strengthening a logical © 


sequence of events or acts... There are evi- © 


dences that the psychiatric clinic for delinquents 
is forcing certain aspects of jurisprudence into a 
scientific channel. Recognition of the same 
tendency in law-making is also due. But when 


all of these more recent applications of portions — 


of a scientific method in jurisprudence are ac- 


counted for, it still remains true that law-mak- — 
ing and law-execution follow the rules of logic © 


rather than those of science. 


1See particularly Chapter XIX, Insanity and the 
Criminal Law, W. A. White. 
62 


The difficulties which arise as a result of this 
use of logic may be realized when the law is ob- 
served in relation to the newer problems inci- 
dent to industrial evolution. Industrial tech- 
nique developed its rules out of an impersonal, 
technological relation between machines and 
raw materials. Legal controls evolved rules 
of relations between employer and em- 
ployee based upon the logical precedents of 
the pre-machine age. Workmen’s compensa- 
tion legislation was forced upon unwilling em- 
ployers and was regarded by them as an entire- 
ly revolutionary departure from logic. It cre- 
ated or validated a new set of values, establish- 
ing rules of relation between workers and ma- 
chines, between industrial technique and an 
evolving social ethics. This illustration indi- 
cates that when life is approached from a scien- 
tific point of view, the logical presuppositions 
break down. They break down in fact as all 
logical presumptions break down when the 
premises are intermittently examined. 


2. Why Logic Cannot Be an Independent 


Science 


Logic is not a science for the very obvious 
reason that it begins with known terms; it does 
nothing to make those terms known. ‘The 
premises of logic are assumptions. If the as- 
sumptions are true, they are true not because 


63 


they are used in logic but because they are em- 
pirically true, i.e., scientifically true. “Thus the 
scientist may always interrupt the logician by — 
challenging his premises. In comparison with 


scientific reasoning, the logical method is far 
less rigorous; it is in fact not rigorous at all. 
What causes the appearance of scrupulous and 
exact thinking is, of course, the strict adherence 
to rules. The implications and inferences be- © 
tween terms, objects or classes have value only © 
if science has preceded logic. A brief illustra- — 
tion should make this point clear: : 


Major Premise: The twelve-hour day in indus- — 
try is injurious to the health of workers. 
Minor Premise: The steel industry requires — 
workers to labor twelve hours per day. ‘ 
Conclusion: The health of workers is being in- — 
jured in the steel industry. 


In this example of logic lies one item of fact, 
namely, that the steel industry requires a © 
twelve-hour day. All else is implication and 
inference. The original generalization (major — 
premise) can have no scientific integrity until — 
proved by the empirical tests of science? — 


2 In this particular case, the President of the United 
States requested the members of the American Steel 
and Iron Institute to test the major premise according 
to the methods of science. Curiously enough the re- — 
port of the special investigating committee negatived — 


64 


When science asks: How does one know that 
the twelve-hour day is injurious to the health of 
workers, the logician can have no answer. He 
can only appeal to the scientist to find out. 
Hereupon the scientist begins to find out, not 
by the use of logic, but by the more rigorous 
methods of analysis, observation and experi- 
mentation. All that has validity in the logical 
procedure is conditioned by science. Since the 
conclusions of logic are implied in the premises 
and the premises may always be doubted, there 
is nothing creative in the conclusions. To as- 
sume that the ‘unknown’ (new knowledge) 
may be derived from the ‘‘known”’ (old knowl- 
edge) is a scientific and not a logical assump- 
tion. Given sufficient scientific data, the logi- 
cian may be of inestimable value to the scientist 
and hence to all who are intent upon factual- 
izing events and activities. This point must 
be elaborated in defense of the logical method. 


the premise. A careful reading of this report is indic- 
ative of the misuse of science. “The attention of the 
investigators appeared to have been focused upon what 
seemed to them the technological necessities of the steel 
industry. ‘They applied engineering acumen to the 
problem of the welfare of the steel industry and not 
to the welfare of workers. In brief, their negation of 
the major premise was in fact an introduction of a new 
element. In their terms, the major premise was changed 
to: “The twelve-hour day is essential to a profitable 
conduct of the steel industry and so far as we can dis- 
cover has no ill-effects upon the health of workers.” 


65 


u 


3. Logic as Rationalization of Experience 


The admission that logic discovers no new 
truth clarifies the atmosphere and makes room 
for a really constructive use of logic. The 
logical method in one form or another is con- 
stantly playing an important role in thinking 
and therefore in adjustments. When applied 
to human affairs without too great an effort 
at nicety it furnishes surprisingly accurate pre- 
dictions of behavior. In this form logic is of 
course a rationalization of experience, past or 
future. The devious and prolonged methods 
of logic utilized by a Sherlock Holmes are 


seldom found in actual life. A large part of 


the fascination which such narratives hold, 
even for scientists, may be attributed to the 
fact that the human mind seems to feel defi- 


nite satisfactions when its predictions material- — 
ize. Detectives whose lives are devoted to the © 
discovery and apprehension of criminals un- © 


doubtedly possess a full set of generalizations 


which, evolved out of the records of accumu- © 
lated experiences, form the basis of their logi- © 
cal method. Logic implies that the generaliza- — 
tions should furnish certain classifications of © 
human beings. Out of these classifications arise _ 
the predictions of human behavior. Journal-— 
ists, particularly those located in the center of | 


political activities, have also developed a simi- 
lar method which is on the whole superior to 


66 


t 4 


i 


i 


that of detectives.* Teachers utilize a similar 
method of logic in their generalizations and clas- 
sifications of pupils. Such uses of logical 
method are so well-known that they demand no 
further description. 

A scientific approach to the problems of 
group behavior might profitably begin with 
the logical inductions based upon experience 
and utilized by practical persons of affairs. 
Logic of this. sort't .pplied to social affairs 
would never be guilty of the crass errors of 
the historical parallelists* Anthropology 
takes its place as a science largely through the 
use of this combined method. Some of its 
‘premises are based upon detailed observation 
of the behavior of prehistoric man and are 
therefore the result of historical research. 


* The approximate accuracy of journalistic predic- 
tions 1s frequently vitiated by the fact that the journal- 
‘Ast must adapt his predictions to a preconceived policy 
of his journal. This naturally gives journalistic logic 
a peculiar twist or bias. 

* An example of logic plus the historical method oc- 
curs in Modern Man and His Forerunners, H. G. F. 
Spurrell. He compares “cycles,” “phases,” and “waves” 
of various civilizations rather than the civilizations 
themselves. His method is summarized in the sentence: 
“If we narrow our attention from the great waves of 
civilization to the rise and fall of the little systems out 
of which they are piled up, we find firmer ground be- 
neath our feet and can lay down some sound generali- 
zations upon the reasons why civilizations decay.” P. 
127. 


67 


With such materials in hand, the anthropolo- — 
gist breaks up his problem into comparable — 
parts; the correspondences thus revealed lay — 
the foundation for generalizations. Sociolo- © 
gists have also utilized this method but they 
have been handicapped by the breadth of their — 
inquiry and by the allurements of easy general- 
izations. 


4. Logic Dependent upon the Habit Category 


The conclusions of logic, when applied to 
group behavior, approximate accuracy only to — 
the degree in which the premises are based ~ 
upon the habit nature of man. Predictions” 
of human events are logically valid only be- — 
cause the habit category is valid. This prob- — 
ably accounts for the close affiliation between — 
legalism and logic. -Laws are notoriously in- 
effective when they attempt to change habits. 
They can in fact be enforced effectively only 
when they conform to generalized habit sys- — 
tems. Laws are, in one sense, sanctions of 
changed habits. ‘The social sciences, on the : 
other hand, may become efiectively applied — 
sciences by accounting for the expediency and — | 
_ the value of creating new habits. If logic i is to” 
have its place in social thinking, and it is dif- 
ficult to see how such thinking can proceed in 
the common life without logic, its traditional — 
uses must be improved. Logic as ordinarily — 


we. 


a le Ae SF: 


used avoids new technique and new method, 
whereas science seeks new technique and new 
method. 


5. Possibility of Creativeness in Conclusions 


The premises of sociological logic must be 
founded upon scientific research.” They must 
be as nearly factual as known methods of find- 
ing out allow. With such foundations we may 
look for creativeness in the conclusions. Con- 
clusions may be creative only if stated in the 
form of hypotheses. This implies that the 
same premises may provide the basis for nu- 
merous conclusions.© There may be some 
value in each of the conclusions and the im- 
aginative social scientist will be alert to dis- 
cover these values. Discovery, naturally, can 
proceed only upon the basis of experimenta- 
tion. ‘This discussion constitutes a pragmatic 
interpretation of logic.’ It suggests that the 


5 See “evidences” of J. S. Mill. 

® In the realm of the physical sciences such conclu- 
sions are called “laws,” and for long periods they were 
so regarded. ‘The modern scientist becomes increas- 
ingly suspicious of laws. 

™“But as the sciences have developed farther, the 
notion has gained ground that most, perhaps all, of our 
laws are only approximations. ‘The laws themselves, 
moreover, have grown so numerous that there is no 
counting them; and so many rival formulations are 
proposed in all the branches of science that investigators 


69 


logical method may be utilized as a guide to 
new and fruitful experiences. 

The foregoing is an appeal to creative rea- 
soning—to free the spirit from the yoke of 
logic as well as of history. The method in 
social science is to be one whose tests are 
found in “the consciousness of the living gen- 
eration.” It must not be dominated by a stulti- 
fying discipline. Logic may have its universals 
and its determinates, but it must also take ac- 
count of the variables. ‘The present generation 
of social scientists is just emerging from the 
use of the concept of instinct as the determi- 
nant which accounts for all otherwise inex- 
plicable behavior. But the yoke of instincts 
is no sooner lifted than these self-same scien-— 
tists sell themselves into the bondage of hab- 
its. Man is a habit-made creature. There is 
no disgrace in this admission, nor is there any 
grace. ‘The hope of mankind lies in the fact 
that he is both a habit-making and a habit- 
breaking being. If the social sciences are to 
become something more than merely descrip- 
tive they must give attention to human be- 
havior variables—to the modes according to- 
which new habits are created. From this point — 
of view logic may regain its once honored 


have become accustomed to the notion that no theory 
is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one 
of them tnay from some point of view be useful.” — 
Pragmatism, William James, p. 56. 


70 


place as a part of the scientific method.* The 
facts of human behavior are conditioned by 
their use and their use is ultimately dependent 
upon rational sanctions. ‘This is an experi- 
mental view and it is the only practicable view 
possible under our present limitations of psy- 
chological knowledge. 
The older logic may be stated thus: 


M is P—major premise 
S is M—minor premise 
S is P—conclusion 


The newer logic may be stated thus: 


M is P—major premise 
S is M—minor premise 
Diet ore or/Pior PP’ or PY ‘ep cetera: 


Stated in the form of logic applied to social 
process, the formula might be stated thus: 


M is a social group. 


8 Since it deals only with abstractions there is an 
argument that the scientist need pay no attention to 
logic. This view does not appear to be tenable. So long 
as human beings need both conceptual and perceptual 
tools, we shall also have need of a communicating 
method and some form of logic will be utilized. ‘The 
difficulties in this connection arise from the confusion 
of logic with epistemology and with psychology. Logic 
becomes fruitful when it is viewed as a method of rea- 
soning with related and interrelated facts. 


Al 


P is a known behavior-quality of groups 
in this class. 

S is a new activity imposed upon M. 

P and P’ and P” et cetera are possible re- 
sults (hypotheses) of the new activity. 

M is a unit of related human beings and 
is derived by descriptive means. 

P is a behavior-pattern of this group and 
numerous similar groups and is de- 
rived by psychological observation. 

S is activity, process, venture, and is im- 
posed upon M by the activity of some 
other group, i.e., it represents an im- 
pelling adjustment of the group. 


ative imagination to bear on the problem. 
His logic compels him to describe the various 
ways in which this new activity will produce — 
certain specific results. He will know most of — 
the ways in which this and similar groups have — 
reacted in the past. Some of these ways have | 
produced negative and some positive results, 
none of which may be discarded. But the cre- 
ative scientist will not stop here. He will sug- 
gest numerous other ways, consonant with | 
what he knows about human nature, not alone 
as it has always behaved but as it has capacity — 
to behave, in which the group might react. — 
Logic may thus become something more than ~ 
an “elaboration of the obvious.” It may in- ~ 
deed become the discoverer of new experience, — 


72 


The social scientist may now bring his cre- — 


the revealer of new flows of value in the many- 
faceted life. 


6. Logic and Social Analysis 


The suggested use of logic in the foregoing 
implies the use of the analytical method. The 
two premises take on real meaning only when 
they are separated into their constituent parts. 
“M”’ is a unit of related human beings and 
forms the subject of the major premise which 
must now be analysed. In its completed form 
the major premise might be stated in the form 
of the following syllogism: 

All trade unions utilize the strike. 

The Amalgamated Clothing Workers is a 
trade union. 

The Amalgamated Clothing Workers utilizes 
the strike. 

In this case the major premise is a universal, 
the minor premise is an affirmation and the 
conclusion is a particular. Or 


M—P 
S—M 
sS—P 


in which there are three objective elements 
for analysis, namely, trade unions in general 
(M), the Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
(S), and the strike (P). An analysis of the 


nature and function of trade unions in gen- 


73 


eral may turn out to be merely a proof of the 
major premise, i.e., the compulsions which 
necessitate the use of the strike. On the 
other hand, the analysis may materially modify 
the major premise. An analysis of the Amal- 
gamated Clothing Workers should reveal, not 
merely the afhrmation that it is a trade union 
but also the ways in which this particular trade 
union differs from all other trade unions. ‘The 
differences may not be sufficiently profound to 
alter the soundness of the minor premise and 
for all logical purposes we may assume that 
they are not. If, however, any valid differences 
are noted, they may serve as the clue to the cre- 
ative factor in the conclusion. From the strictly 
logical point of view the analytical process may 
be nothing more than a verification or proof of 
the two premises. From the viewpoint of cre- 
ative logic, the analysis may point the way to 
alternative conclusions, to new experience and 
to an altered interpretation. Something of this 
sort appears to have taken place in connection 
with the example above stated. The Amalga- 
mated Clothing Workers does not utilize the 
strike in order to achieve its ends. At any rate, 
it does not always do so and this is sufficient to 
make the conclusion a variable. In other words, 
the conclusion is logically true but not actually 
true. Whether or not this variable conclusion 
has been reached by formal reasoning matters 


little. The fact is that the Amalgamated Cloth- 


74 


ing Workers is a trade union, that trade unions 
utilize arbitration boards, impartial chairmen, 
joint investigating commissions, education, et 
cetera, in place of the strike. The validity of 
the variables rests not in logic but in activity, 
not in statics but in dynamics. If the various 
relations between groups could be subjected to 
rigorous analysis, it might be revealed that 
logic frequently stands in the way of new ex- 
perience. 

Analysis ° is the preliminary to scientific ex- 
perimentation. The breaking up of wholes ren- 
ders the parts susceptible to minute scrutiny and 
experiment. But analysis is more than this; the 
scientific investigator may be the last to note 
the possible variable relations between parts 
and the analyst may transcend the scientist in 
pointing to fruitful explanations. The infer- 
ence is not that the two processes are separate; 
the unique function of analysis is merely stated. 
Social analysis of this character is a prerequisite 
of social science. The chief social conflicts of 
our time, nations versus nations, racial groups 
versus racial groups, religious groups versus re- 
ligious groups, employers versus employees, 
rural populations versus urban populations, 


® For an excellent illustration of the creative use of 
analysis see Pitkin’s analysis of ““The Adjustment of the 
Flatfish to Various Backgrounds” in The New Real- 
ism, p. 397. Also “A Defense of Analysis,” by Spaul- 
ding, in the same volume. 


75 


cannot be understood, to say nothing of being 
approached constructively, until the wholes are 
broken up into parts. Our sociological defini- 
tions themselves await this process.*° It may 
be possible to think in wholes but it is utterly 


impossible to act in wholes. ‘To “‘see in part 


now,” i.e., to act in part is the most effective 


method of making possible a future seeing of 
the whole. Analysis is the method of seeing 
and acting in part. 


4. More Than One Conclusion Possible When 
Interests Are at Stake 


‘You cannot take seriously the attempt to 
prove two different conclusions from the same 


10 The writer, in attempting to arrive at a working 
concept of a local community in American life, studied 
numerous so-called community activities or projects. 
He soon found that these activities were generated 
within small groups. After continued observation of 
these small groups and the resulting activities, he ar- 
rived at the conclusion that a functional view of a 
modern community could be stated only in terms of 
these groups (vital interest groups). The totality of 
these group interactions was called the “community 
process” and the community process in group terms 
constitutes a working definition of the local community. 
It will be seen at once how this analysis (plus certain 
experiments) led to a definition of the community which 
radically departs from the views which interpret the 
community as the totality of the citizenship, the totality 
of families, et cetera. The Community, E. C. Linde- 


man. 
76 


¥ 
“ 
iT 


set of facts,’’** says the logician. But this is 
precisely what is continuously happening in all 
significant controversy involving human con- 
duct. 


Illustration: 


A body of tax experts makes a preliminary 
study of taxation in order to base future 
legislation on facts. Two sets of facts are 
involved: the capacity of citizens to pay and 
the needs of the government. Logically only 
one conclusion and hence one legislative bill 
based upon this conclusion is possible. It so 
happens, however, that the party of opposition 
. desires to cater to the taxpayers by contending 
against all increased government expenditures; 
this party will invariably oppose whatever tax 
measure is proposed by the party in power. 
The result is never the one single logical con- 
clusion. 

In answer to the above, the logician will state 
that the alternative conclusion represents an 
evasion of facts or a misuse of facts. Perhaps, 
but the very point is that facts are always used 
to fortify an interest. The single logical con- 
clusion is valid only when an abstract question 
is under discussion. When the discussion turns 
upon questions involving human interests, pur- 
poses, motives and desires, the logic of the facts 
may be used to point toward a number of con- 
clusions, only one of which may be utilized in 


11 The Application of Logic, Alfred Sidgwick, p. 18. 
AL 


view of the practical situation in which the con- 
tending parties find themselves.** 


The logician’s formula must be reversed. 
We must take seriously the attempt to prove 
two conclusions from the same set of facts. Ac- 
tivity, life, must go forward. ‘The facts are 
never completely available and if they were, 
what force is there to convince each of the con- 


tending parties that the facts possess integrity, 


that they are invariable and absolute? Who is 
so naive, for example, as to believe that the 
problem of the German reparations will ever 
be settled upon a pure fact basis? If either 


France or Germany accepts the report of an ex- . 


pert commission on the amount to be paid, such 


11a A series of suggestive illustrations of this proposed 
use of logic is contained in Chapters X, XI, and XIII; 
Thinking, Fred Casey. ‘“To say that a thing is straight 
is like saying a thing is right, neither statement has 
any meaning unless we connect it with some purpose, 
for example we might say that a certain piece of wood 
is straight for the purpose of making a window-frame 
but not for testing a lathe bed,” p. 143. And, still 
more pertinent to the theme of this volume are the 
illustrations presented under “‘Logic Applied to Mental 
and Moral Problems” (Chapter XI) where Mr. Casey 
says at the very outset: “Since the understanding can- 
not operate without the senses, and the senses cannot 
function unless in contact with reality, it is clear that 
men, if they reason at all, must reason about things, 
and naturally they look upon things from the stand- 
point of whether or not they serve some need; man’s 
needs, therefore, lie at the bottom of man’s reason.” 


78 


a 


acceptance will not be based upon mutual recog- 
nition of the facts but rather upon helplessness 
or strategy. The complete temper and state of 
mind of the two peoples will need to change 
before fact-concurrence can be made possible. 


8. Unreliability and Inertia of Universals 


The so-called universal rules of logic which 
are the foundation of most major premises do 
not exist in the sphere of human affairs, if in- 
deed they exist atall. All men are mortal—all 
trade unions use the strike—all religious bodies 
have creeds—all wholes are equal to the sum of 
their parts—such are the logical universals, but 
whither do they lead? If universals of this 
type have any integrity at all, it is because they 
tepresent the accumulated evidence, as induc- 
tions, of every case within the type. Identity, 
or rather, similarity in particulars can never be 
established by reasoning, but must, as Bacon 
long ago suggested, always appear as the result 
of scientific observation and experimentation. 
And what such scientific analysis invariably 
demonstrates is that there are variables rather 
than universals. To begin with universals is a 
wasteful, cramping process. ‘The proper use 
of universals is experimental application to par- 
ticular cases and the validity of such universals 
is always dependent upon the liberating process 
which begins with particulars. 


oh 


Illustration: | 
In Professor Perry’s essay, already alluded 
to, the attempt is made to apply logical reason- 
ing to the query: ‘“‘Is There a Social Mind?” 
Considerable space is devoted to the subordi- | 
nate question: “Is society a compound, in the 
sense of being a whole of the same kind as its 
human members?” The logical procedure be-— 
gins with the rule as formulated by Whitehead 
and Russell in Principia Mathematica which 
reads: ‘‘Whatever involves all of a collection 
must not be one of the collection.’’ Or, ‘‘the 
whole cannot be a member of itself.’’ By the 
skillful use of analogies borrowed from other 
levels, Professor Perry then circumvents the — 
rule “without logical offense’ (sic) and proves 
(a) that the whole may duplicate its members, — 
(b) that a society is a member of the same 
class as its members, (c) that the principle of 
unity in society may vary qualitatively and quan- 
titatively, and (d) that the principle of the © 
unity of the whole may be lower than that of its 
members.” 

The last deduction contains the only signifi- © 
cant conclusion of the above reasoning and its — 
utility must now be considered. The conclusion — 
as stated in its analogical form leads Professor 
Perry to say: “An ant-colony, in other words, is” 
a less developed animal (sic) than an ant.” 
(Curiously enough, on the succeeding pages he 
argues that society is not a gigantic man.) 
What Professor Perry intends to convey is 


72“Ts There a Social Mind?” Ralph Barton Perry. 
American Journal of Sociology, May, 1922. 
80 


en ee eee 


made clear later when he intimates that the 
study of groups is not likely to be of great value 
and “‘it is more fruitful to study the history”’ 
of the individual man and of the individual 
woman than to study the history of the couple. 
The essential question now is: Has anything 
been discovered by this process of logical rea- 
soning, and if so, what is its value? 


In the first place most of the questions which 
Professor Perry raises have already been aban- 
doned by most social scientists. “The conclusion 
that the whole is less perfect and less effective 
than the members is a partial statement and 
therefore incorrect when analysed in relation 
to particular cases. Some activities may be per- 
formed by the group which the individual mem- 
bers cannot perform at all after the group 
comes into existence. The raison d’étre of gov- 
ernment, corporations, armies, as well as of the 
numerous smaller groups is that these associa- 
tions of individuals are capable of performing 
functions for which individuals are inadequate. 
A crowd or a mob may engage in activities 
which represent a lower standard than that of 
any of the individual members, but a crowd or 
mob is a transient, unstable group. This argu- 
‘Ment is in reality without meaning, however. 
The comparison between an individual human 
being and a group must remain an analogy. 
One cannot in one breath proclaim that a group 
is not a person and in the next attempt to prove 

St 


that the group is less than the individual person ~ 


as though the two entities were of the same 
class, type or level. The chief importance of 


this illustration lies in its demonstration of the — 


cramping, non-liberating force of logic when ap- 
plied to human and social phenomena. On the 
basis of Professor Perry’s logic there is no fur- 
ther need for studying the group or society. 
The entire problem has been dismissed by 
an ingenious method of logical maneuvering. 


Wholesale dismissal of vexing problems is un-— 
worthy of the scientist who must possess the 


patience to allow his generalizations to emerge 
in proportion to the evidence of his particulars. 
The scientific beginning of the study of groups 
must be the discovery of what groups do and not 
the logical description of what groups are pre- 
sumed to be. 


9g. Logic as an Instrument for Group 
Discussion 


Thus far logical method has been discussed 


almost wholly from the viewpoint of its formal-_ 


istic bases and from the viewpoint of its capa- 


city to contribute to discovery in the social sci- 


ences. The revolt against this interpretation 
of logic may be said to have begun with Bacon.* 


He contended against the Aristotelian use of 
18See The Reconstruction of Philosophy, John 


Dewey. 
82 


reasoning as a conquest over mind and substi- 
tuted the objective of aiming at a conquest over 
nature. The formal methods of logic persist, 
however, and unfortunately in such processes 
as jurisprudence, which directly affect the activi- 
ties of groups, and in the inductions from so- 
ciological investigation. 

Logic may also be regarded as an instrument 
‘in the art of inquiry, considered as a joint 
process of ascertainment and invention.” ** 
Every group utilizes discussion in one form or 
another as a means of arriving at joint deci- 
sions or concurrences. ‘This use of logic consti- 
tutes an important consideration for the analy- 
sis of group activity. Further treatment of this 
phase of logic will be postponed to later chap- 
ters where discussion is regarded as one of the 
terms of the category which includes activities 
of groups.*® 


14 Essays in Experimental Logic, John Dewey, p. 25. 
The introduction to this book furnishes an excellent 
foundation for a critique of logical method. 

15 Tf the reader desires to pursue this thesis further 
at this point, it is recommended that reference be made 
to the following volumes: How We Think, John 
Dewey. The Application of Logic, Alfred Sidgwick. 
The Use of Words in Reasoning, Alfred Sidgwick. 
_ Essays in Experimental Logic, John Dewey. Chance, 
_ Love and Logic, Charles §. Peirce. Joining in Public 
| Discussion, Alfred Dwight Sheffield (a particularly use- ~ 


' 


: ful and practical exposition). 


83 


CHAPTER IV 
STATISTICAL METHOD 


STATISTICS is a method of adding integrity 
to facts by stating them in numerical or graphic 
form. ‘The statistician gathers and collates 
facts, and induces principles from facts. His 
method not only tells what is and what is hap- 
pening (rather what has happened), but it as- 
sumes to tell what is likely or certain to hap- 
pen in the future. ‘He wishes to use his data, 
which record past events, in order to establish 
definite physical or psychological laws.” * And 
the human mind is peculiarly sensitive to this 
method. ‘There is something so finite, so pris- 
tine, so assuring about a numeral that it enters 
the mind with an air of finality. Once facts are 
neatly tabulated in trim columns with distin- 
guished-appearing totals, the common mortal 
has no escape. If perchance he does attempt 
escape he can be completely trapped by the in- 
troduction of a terrifying formula of which the 
purpose is to eliminate any possible error from 
the calculation. , 

1 Klements of saab ethod, W. I. King, p. 18. 

| 4 4 


1. Uncritical Acceptance of Statistical Method 
by Social Scientists 


The application of statistical method to vari- 
ous forms of research and investigation has 
proceeded with alarming rapidity and with only 
a slight amount of criticism.2 The social sci- 
ences appear to have adopted the method in 
toto. Even the older sociologists, reared on 
the generalizations of Spencer and Comte, have 
embraced the new method with surprising cor- 
diality. ‘In measuring anything, tangible or 
intangible, it is necessary to remember that the 
_measuring process begins with counting items 
or units and that all subsequent procedures are 
statistical operations.” * Although statements 
such as the foregoing are generally and read- 
ily accepted, this affirmation contains at least 
two assumptions which are open to challenge. 
The first is that the only method of measuring 
(evaluating) an object or a process is to count 
its units and the second is that none other than 
the statistical method is needed after the ele- 
mentary counting is completed. 

One need only scrutinize some of the conclu- 


? Unfortunately many of the critics of the statistical 
methods appear to base their opposition on a personal 
dislike for mathematics. “This of course fortifies the 
statisticians. 

8 “The Measurement of Social Forces,” Franklin H. 
Giddings, Journal of Social Forces, November, 1921. 


85 


sions and predictions based upon this type of 
statistical social science in order to be made 
aware of its dangers. Professor Giddings, in 
one of the concluding paragraphs of the article 
quoted above, goes on to say: “All social forces 
are generated in grades A and B. They carry 
the entire load of social work. All progress is 
their achievement. Intelligence tests indicate 
that grade A comprises only four and one-half 
per cent of our total population and grade B 
only nine and one-half per cent.” That “all 
social forces are created by fourteen per cent 
of the total population” is ambiguous rhetoric 


even though it be substantiated by the unlimited | 


statistical tables of so-called intelligence tests. 
The statement does not in point of fact make 
good sense. What can be meant by social 
forces created by fourteen per cent of the popu- 
lation? Surely not that social forces are not 
influenced by the remaining eighty-six per cent? 
The definition of social forces which Giddings 
himself acclaims (“‘all energies that both origi- 
nate in society and produce social results”) pre- 
cludes the statement that such forces are cre- 
ated by fourteen per cent of the population. 
Putting the two statements together simply 
means that society is composed of fourteen per 
cent of the population. Upon the basis of this 
definition it would be interesting to determine 


statistically how many social scientists could — 


find a place in society! 


86 


y 


ay 
ri 


But the statistical method deserves better 
treatment even from those who are not com- 
pletely under its spell. How does statistics ar- 
rive at its conclusions, its laws and its predic- 
tions? Its preliminary processes are counting 
and the use of instruments of precision which 
make counting accurate. After its counting is 
done, the statistical method computes results 
by means of averages, correspondences, corre- 
lations, calculations of chance, permutations 
and dispersions. In order to discuss statistics 
as a means of social discovery it will be neces- 
sary to consider several of these secondary 
methods. 


2. The Validity of the Average 


What validity does the ‘‘average”’ possess? 
One might accurately weigh ten thousand farm- 
ers and ten thousand bankers for the purpose 
of determining the average weight of farmers 
and bankers. Would this average weight be 
capable of giving any accurate information re- 
garding the weight of any individual farmer or 
banker? Obviously it would not. Nor would 
it be able to give any accurate information re- 
garding the weight of any individual farmer or 
banker if every individual in the two groups 
were weighed. This, the so-called absolute 
average, would establish a minimum and a 
maximum weight for farmers and bankers and 


87 


so long as the groups measured remained stat- 
ic, these measurements of limits would have 
the value of facts. A law of averages for the 


i 
rd 


respective weights of children at varying ages — 


has been in use for some time and the estab- 


lished minimum and maximum weights have — 


been useful in directing physicians and dieti- 
tians to fruitful experiments. But even in this 


case, the results are valuable only after empiri- — 


cal verification. And the ensuing experimenta- 


tion frequently reveals the hazard assumed — 


when the averages are taken as accurate indices 
of the normal and the abnormal. 


The process of increasing the number of © 
units of any given class measured is based upon ~ 
an inference, and a correct one, that the result- — 


ing average will tend to approach the real meas- 


urement of any individual in the class. This 


point, however, needs further analysis. It has 


been frequently demonstrated that averages — 
change little or not at all after a certain point — 


is reached. ‘Thus the computation of the aver- 


age income of five thousand tenant farmers may — 


give the same result as the computation of eight 
thousand or ten thousand. In this case we are 
not dealing with errors which may be compen- 
sating in both directions and hence may not viti- 


ate the final results. Rather we are dealing — 
with a phenomenon of quantitative measure- — 
ments which appears to indicate that certain — 


permutations and combinations tend to cancel 
88 


each other out of the equation. If we accept 
this mathematical picture, it means that we are 
obliged to assume that variations are less in the 
greater number. The opposite is, of course, 
actually true. Experimental observation indi- 
cates that one may expect to find more varia- 
tions in twenty thousand blades of grass than in 
one hundred. And what is true of blades of 
grass is true of the entire scope of plant and 
animal life. The difficulties here involved be- 
come apparent when the statistical method is 
considered in terms of human life and the so- 
cial process, 


3. Correspondences and Correlations 


The most fruitful as well as the most danger- 
ous use of statistics (in the social sciences) pro- 
ceeds from its discovery of correspondences and 
correlations.* The horticulturist, for example, 
in observing a certain variety of apples dis- 
covers that high quality of flavor in the fruit 
corresponds with medium size. He may use 
the statistical method to determine how gen- 
erally this fact holds true for the entire variety 

# Although these two terms are used in a rather loose 
sense as connoting likenesses of kind in differing cases 
it should be understood that there is a technical distinc- 
tion between a correspondence and a correlation. Cor- 
respondence means that the same thing is discovered in 
varying cases, but correlation implies that such cor- 
respondences possess a so-called causal relation, 


89 


and may then proceed to make observations 
upon other varieties until he has collected suf- 
ficient data to be conclusive proof that this cor- 
respondence is universal. If he hypothecates 
this correspondence as a correlation, 1.e., a 
causal relation between size and flavor, he is 
still within his scientific rights. However, it 
must be remembered that the statistical proc- 


ess has not demonstrated this casual relation; — 


it has simply given indication that such a causal 
relation is likely to exist. The precise causal 
relation is still to be discovered by the plant 
physiologist and cannot, by the nature of the 
case, be discovered by the statistician.» ‘The 
causal relation is involved with growth, with 
process; and it is process which eludes the sta- 
tistician. 

Next to averages, correspondences and corre- 
lations are most frequently employed in the so- 
cial sciences. In the earlier and more naive pe- 
riods, the search was for correlations of crime. 
Delinquency was proved to be correlated with 
poverty, with drunkenness, with disease, with 
malnutrition and with most of the ills and 

5“, . The task of the statistician is not so much to 
find the causality himself as to help others to find it. 
The statistician must be content if he can show that 
certain groups of numbers have marked differences, 
leaving it to physiology, meterology, and other sciences 
to explain these differences.” Westergaard, American 
Statistical Association Journal, September, 1916, p. 
259, quoted by Whipple, p. 404, Vital Statistics. 


gO 


a le ts iy Te a oe 


handicaps of the human organism. Sociology, 
with its powerful reform sentiment, was nat- 
urally susceptible to the lure of the correlate. 
If statistics could prove that crime and inebriety 
were causally related, the inference was that 
crime would be lessened, perhaps eliminated, if 
the use of alcoholic beverages were prohibited. 
That there is a relation between drunkenness 
and crime is obvious, for the intoxicated person 
is an irresponsible person, and all persons in ir- 
responsible moods are likely to perform acts 
contrary to the accepted laws of the group. 
But the inference that all crime or most crime 
will cease when alcoholic beverages can no 
longer be legally consumed is a very loose and 
unscientific assumption. It is, in fact, a very 
partial, inadequate and unwarranted interpre- 
tation of jurisprudence as well as of behavior. 
Assumptions based upon such use of statistics 
have done much to discredit the social sciences. 
The facetious critic, observing such conclusions, 
is not far from truth when he affirms that “‘any- 
thing may be proved by statistics.” The so- 
called “‘bath-tub” sociology which is so much 
derided in scientific circles is an implication that 
any one who has the patience and the curiosity 
to count all of the bath-tubs in the houses of a 
certain area and then to write a treatise on his 
discoveries may call himself a_ sociologist. 
“Lies, damned lies, and statistics’ is another of 
the colloquial though somewhat justified casti- 


gI 


gations from which statistical method suffers in 
the minds of the skeptical. 

When statistical methods are utilized by ex- 
perts without the least attempt to make their 
conclusions intelligible to ordinary non-mathe- 
matical human beings, the result is not merely a 
diminution of faith in scientific procedure of a 
statistical nature, but of scientific procedure of 
all sorts. ‘Thus, the editor of an agricultural 
journal, knowing his constituency far better 
than the experts, comments: ‘Ho! Hum! The 
daily press has been howling so much of late 
about wheat prices that many have come to take 
it seriously and believe something is wrong. We 
wondered about it ourselves until we saw the 
explanation of the whole situation given in the 
latest Bulletin of the X Experiment Station, in 
the form of a large chart with the legend 
as follows: ‘Consumption curve 1878-1922, 
141.144 + 4.033x + 1.685x*. Production 
curve 483.003 — 71.956x + 6.799x”. There 
you are. Any farmer now knows something is 
wrong.” 

This editorial may be termed a righteous 
form of cynicism, and if it tends to widen the 
gulf between the expert and the people whom 
his figures concern, the expert can blame only 
himself and his methods. There is already a 
widespread skepticism of even the feeblest at- 
tempts to popularize statistical and graphical 
methods. ‘“‘Map-dotters,” the opprobious term 


92 


applied to those who desire to give numerical 
strength to arguments lacking other support, 
is indicative of the common good sense 
which penetrates beyond mere figures and 
charts. 


4. Correspondences and Correlations as 
Analogies 


Correspondences and correlations are not far 
removed from analogies. All three are means 
of discovering and verifying likeness, sameness, 
similarity in things, attributes or functions. In 
fact (since the statistical correlation can do no 
more than the analogy in providing proof of 
the actual existence of causal interrelations), 
there is some justification for calling a correla- 
tion a mathematical analogy. When correla- 
tions are utilized in analyses of social phe- 
nomena, they point the way toward fruitful ex- 
perimentation and research. Insofar as such 
correlations emerge from observations of hu- 
man activities which are guided largely by cer- 
tain well-established habits of a particular 
group, they point the way toward relatively 
sound prediction. Rural populations are, for 
example, generally presumed to be conserva- 
tive in thought; in this case, conservative habits 
of thought and agricultural habitation and vo- 
cation appear to be correlated. ‘This correla- 
tion may be statistically established and upon 


93 


such a premise it is entirely possible to fore- 
cast the attitude of the agricultural population 
in regard to any new economic or political pro- 
posal of radical tendencies. Large sections of 
public life proceed upon the basis of such com- 
mon-sense correlations and within their limits 
they are wholly sound. But the important fact 
to keep in mind is that it has not been proved 
that life in the country is a direct cause of con- 
servative-mindedness. Life is not so simple. 
Some of the foremost leaders of urban life are 
also conservative in thought. ‘This hints at the 
possibility of searching for the causes of con- 
servatism in other directions. 

There can be no valid objection to increasing 
the use of statistics as a means of discovering 
correspondences and correlations in the social 
complex. The objections arise from the use 
and interpretation of the discoveries. Many 
statistical interpretations act as a stop-gap to 
real knowledge. The results ensue from the 
crass use of the statistics themselves or from 
the application of logical method to the discov- 
ered correlations. A high correlation between 
two variables is often assumed to be a repre- 
sentation of a real causal interrelation in spite 
of the fact that many statisticians continue to 
give warning against this process. On page 
417, Whipple (Vital Statistics) says, “. . . It 
is not the function of correlations to demon- 
strate causality,’ and then proceeds on page 


94 


ee 


419 to discuss how certain epidemiologists uti- 
lize correlations in arriving at explanations of 
causality, mentioning only in an incidental way 
that experimental evidence was employed. 


5. Conclusions of Statistics Comparable to the 
Conclusions of Logic 


“The drawing of conclusions is the function 
of logic, a process of reasoning, and fallacious 
reasoning should not be charged against statis- 
tics.” ° This is the crux of the entire statistical 
prepossession. The drawing of conclusions is 
not the function of logic but rather that of sci- 
ence. And logic is not science. Mathematics 
and logic, and hence statistics, deal with con- 
cepts, but real experience is a flux of concept plus 
percept, plus experiment. ‘Things conceived are 
not wholly known, and conceptual knowledge is 
always partial knowledge. Until perceptions 
and experimentation are taken into account, all 
social statistics must remain as partial, inter- 
mittent, bracketed bits of the superficial and 
measurable facts of social process.’ Because 

6 Vital Statistics, George C. Whipple, p. 9. 

7“, . To assume, therefore, that the only possible 
philosophy (and science may legitimately be interpo- 
lated here for philosophy) must be mechanical and 
mathematical, and to disparage all inquiry into the 
other sorts of questions is to forget the extreme diversity 


of aspects under which reality undoubtedly exists.’ 
Some Problems of Philosophy, William James, p. 24. 


95 


of the conceptual ease of using numerals as rep- 
resentations of facts, scientists and near-scien- 
tists continue to deal with such representations 
as if they were in themselves possessed of real- 
ity. Things are pragmatically, i.e., usefully 
real when they can be both perceived and con- 
ceived. The anti-intellectualist movement of 
modern times constitutes a violent attack 
against this partial and inadequate conceptual 
manner of dealing with problems, but unfor- 
tunately the attack appears to have missed its 
chief mark; the great bulk of social science as it 
is written and taught is still an intellectualist or 
conceptualist attempt to explain what is hap- 
pening in the realm of the relations between 
human beings. Instead of stemming the tide 


of this intellectualist social science, statistics has — 


thus far served largely to substitute one mode 
of intellectualism for another. Where once the 
social scientist was content to stop with fine- 
sounding teleological explanations, he now stops 
with the equally alluring coefficients of cor- 
relation of the statistician. And this “jump” 
from philosophy to mathematics was made, 
tragically enough, just at a time when philos- 
ophy itself was emerging by new methods and 
new influences of science out of its teleological 
morass. Modern philosophy is asking ques- 
tions which are pertinent and penetrating while 
modern social science is giving doubtful answers 
to half-formed queries. And worst of all, it 
96 


a eet 


gives its answers in terms of the most ab- 
stract of all the allies of science, namely, math- 
ematics. 


6. Statistics; a Check upon Discovery, not 
Discovery 


The above argument is not for the abandon- 
ment of statistical method in the social sciences; 
rather it is for its higher uses and a frank ad- 
mission of its limitations. “It is a common ob- 
servation that a science begins to be exact when 
it is quantitatively treated. What are called 
the exact sciences are no other than the mathe- 
matical ones.’’* ‘The illustration used to sub- 
stantiate the above statement is taken from the 
field of botany. Botany, the writer continues, 
begins to assume scientific proportions when 
stamens and pistils are counted and compared 

_and later used as the basis of classification. 
This is all very well if we are to assume that 
science ends with classifications. Numerical 
classifications are still in the region of the 
“what” and science must penetrate to the 
“how.” Moreover, the term ‘‘exact”’ ® calls for 
considerable modification even in the sphere of 
botanical classification. 

Phases of social science may be brought 

8 Chance, Love and Logic, C. S. Peirce, p. 61. 


® It has been left to an eminent mathematician, Ein- 
stein, to deflate at least a portion of so-called exactness. 


97 


within the sphere of statistics.°° This use of 
statistics may become an aid to discovery in two 
directions: (1) a certain amount of social sta- 
tics is essential when the point is reached for 
making broad generalizations in the field of so- 
cial dynamics, and statistics is the technical mode 
of recording such items; (2) discovered social 
processes may be checked statistically in order 
to determine their extent, providing the proc- 
ess can be adequately stated in numerical form. 
In each case the statistical method is not the 
means of discovery but rather a check on dis- 
coveries already made. Such checking, instead 
of leading to dogmatic conclusions should prove 
to be the spur to improving the other methods 
of research. In brief, statistics cannot be re- 
garded as an integral part of the method of 
social research but merely as the mathematical © 
check on its discoveries. This point is well 

stated in a current verse: | 


‘He gathers data: 
The mathematics of a comet’s curve 
Or when the oriole nests, 


10 “While I ascribe the utmost importance to pre- 
cision in preparing the data of social sciences, I do not 
think its true aim is to bring society within the sphere 
of arithmetic . . . Statistical uniformities do not show 
that it is possible to predict numerically the working — 
of intelligence in new situations, and of course that is 
the decisive test.’ Social Process, C. H. Cooley, pp. 
398-399. 

98 


The tensile strength of steel 
Or the decline of cholera in the Philippines. 


“He does not formulate laws 
Or institute practical measures 
Or touch the kindling spark of imagination 
To facts observed; 
He counts and sifts and classifies. 


“He is no architect, inventor, poet; 

Yet on his faithfulness we build: 

A plumb line wrong, 

And all the bricks are tumbling round our 
heads. 

He bent the timbers of Columbus’ galleon 
and squared the stones of Chartres, 

He pounded Titian colors 

And chronicled events that Shakespeare sang. 


*“A slave, some call him. 
But is he not— 
This man who dares not lose himself in 
beauty 
For fear he miss a fact— 


The proofreader of God?” ™ 


No one would or should scoff at the proof- 
reader, nor does any one expect him to produce 
creative work. His is the task of discovering 
error, not truth. In the vast complex of life 
with its consequently increasing subdivision of 
abor, the proofreader has come to be indis- 
u“The Statistician,” Charles Wharton Stork, The 
Forum, September, 1923. 


99 


pensable. The statistician is capable of placing 
the correct numerals representing the right facts 
in the right columns, providing, and this is the 
important consideration, sufficient scientific. 
knowledge is available to make known when a 
numeral adequately represents a fact, and 
whether or not the facts bear any important re 
lation to each other, together with an explana- 
tion of the nature of that relation. | 


7. Important Distinctions Involved in Rela- 
tions Escape Statistical Method 


Statistics is not a method of discovery; it is a 
method of tabulating discovered facts. The 
Census Bureau, for example, tabulates the num-. 
ber of white people and the number of colored. 
people residing within the borders of the United 
States, but the distinction between white and 
colored people is a biological, not a mathemati-. 
cal one. The Census Bureau does not make the 
distinction; it simply records facts which have 
emanated from the distinction. This illustra-. 
tion affords an opportunity for pointing out how 
dificult a matter it is to get social (in this case, 
bio-social) facts expressed by means of a nu- 
meral. Inthe United States some three to four 
million persons are recorded in the Census Re- 
port as negroes although they are partially 
white. At what point in the intermixture of 

100 


races does the colored person become white, 
and vice versa? Mathematically it may be cor- 
rect to classify a person who is 31/32 white as 
a negro, but biologically and sociologically such 
a classification is open to grave doubts. If in- 
dividual men or individual women are being 
counted, the numeral 1 or the numeral 999 
serves the same purpose as the word ‘“‘man’”’ or 
the word “woman” repeated once or nine hun- 
dred and ninety-nine times. The same holds 
true for certain organized groups such as 
churches; the Census report on the number of 
Methodist congregations in the United States is 
undoubtedly as correct as counting canbe. The 
problem, however, appears when the attempt is 
made to state by means of a numeral what is 
happening between two or more persons, or be- 
tween the Methodist congregations and the 
Baptist congregations. 

When, for example, a statistical report states 
that out of 3,040 trade union strikes of a given 
period, the unions won 35 per cent and the em- 
ployers won 65 per cent, what inferences may 
legitimately be drawn? The logic of the statis- 

tics points unmistakably to such conclusions as 

(a) the employers are more powerful than the 

unions, (b) the unions were in the wrong 35 

times out of each 100, (c) the strike as a 

‘weapon is decreasing in effectiveness, et cetera, 

etcetera. But none of these inferences is valid. 
IOI 


Very few strikes are either won or lost. If the 
workers make ten demands as the basis of the 
strike and only one of these demands is granted, 
it cannot be said that they have lost the strike. 
The single demand granted may have been pre- 
cisely the one of greatest importance. Every 
social fact stated in statistical form is subject 
to error of this character. Statistical increase 
in divorce is assumed to be an index of the de- 
cay of the family. In reality it may be an indi- 
cation of the opposite tendency. A couple liv- 
ing together under conditions of continuous 
friction cannot be said to be one indicative of — 
higher family standards. 

Statistical evidence possesses integrity only 
when its inferences of causality are founded 
upon prior scientific experiment and observa- 
tion. Without these foundations, no form of — 
evidence is so susceptible of diverse interpreta-_ 
tion as that which emanates from statistical ta- ; 
bles.12. And when the tables are further re-— 
duced to charts, the burden of possible error 
becomes even greater. ‘The fine though impor-— 
tant lines of distinction which may still be dis- 
cerned in the numerals are entirely blurred over 


12'The control of bacterial diseases may have in- 
creased the average length of life ten years in a decade. _ 
In the meantime, organic diseases of the vital organs 
may have increased so that the effective life span is in 
reality shorter. At least five plausible conclusions have — 
been drawn by authorities from this simple statistical — 
statement. a 


102 


or lost in the sharply-defined black on white of 
the chart. 

The social sciences must deal with relations 
and with correlations. The discovery of rela- 
tions and of the meaning of relations must pre- 
cede the tabulation of discoveries. Social sci- 
ence is chiefly concerned with precisely those 
facts which either escape the statistical method 
entirely or are injected too hastily, namely, the 
facts of relation. The symbolism (language) 
of these sciences will need to be greatly im- 
proved before the application of statistics is 
likely to prove helpful. 


8. The Validity of Dispersion no Greater than 
the Validity of the Average 


The statistical method of computing disper- 
sion demands attention if for no other reason 
than its frequent application to social problems. 
“The dispersion of a group may be measured 
by the difference in size or characteristics of the 
most extreme items, in other words, the range, 
or it may be measured by the general deviation 
of the items from the type.” ** The most fa- 
miliar use of dispersion interpretations occurs 
in connection with the distribution of wealth, 
the standard of living, income, wages, diseases, 
deaths, births, et cetera. Interpretations with 

18 Elements of Statistical Method, W. I. King, pp. 
141 and 143. 

103 


social implications derived from so-called intel- 
ligence tests * are also based chiefly upon the 
statistical method of dispersion. It will be seen 
at once that a dispersion is merely an iny cted 
average and that the same objections which 
were stated for averages are equally applicable 
to dispersions. If the average income of ten 
per cent of the families of a given commi ity 
is $800 per year and the average income of an- 
other ten per cent is $8,000 per year, it may be 
said that the dispersion is great. On the other 
hand, if one extreme group has an income per 
family of $850 per year and the other extreme 
group has an average income of $875 per year, 
it may be said that the dispersion is small and 
negligible. Such calculations are, of course, 
amenable to diverse interpretations and n9 
gross conclusions are permissible until consider - 
able knowledge is available regarding the rela- 
tion between income, value of services, standard 
of living, et cetera. And when the method of 
dispersion is applied to such debatable and quali- 
tative facts as are involved in intelligence and 
capacity to make social contributions the dif- 
ficulties are obvious. 


14 Interpretations such as Professor Giddings gives 
on p. 85. 


104 


SYNTHESIS OF METHOD 


. A FOOTNOTE TO PART I 


ne Postscript 
4 

THE various methods of social discovery 
discussed in the foregoing chapters are, if prop- 
erly used, capable of revealing phases of objec- 
tive happenings within the social process. In 
any broad study leading to generalizations, each 
method will undoubtedly play its part. In fact, 
it>is doubtful whether these various methods 
are, strictly speaking, separable. Logic, analogy 
aid statistics flow into each other, and analysis 
of numerous modern social investigations indi- 
cates that the investigators are scarcely aware 
of the transition from one method to another. 
The line of demarcation between historical 
method and the other methods enumerated is 
more or less sharply defined. It has come to be 
the custom to introduce sociological studies 
with historical descriptions of the factors in- 
volved in the problem to be investigated; this 
is, of course, not exactly the use of the histori- 
cal method but the manner of these historical 
introductions indicates that there exists an ac- 
cepted and clearly-defined distinction between 

105 


historical methed and other methods. But even 
here the distinction tends to be blurred by modi- 
fications of historical method; there is, for ex- 
ample, one school of thought which insists that 
history itself can become scientific only when it 
has learned to utilize statistical methodology. 

The critical portions of the foregoing chap- 
ters may now be placed in the background while 
the attempt is made to summarize the ways ac- 
cording to which the positive uses of the meth- 
ods discussed may be synthetically utilized in 
social discovery: 


The Historical Method: 


(a) Assists in the selection of significant 
events of the past and hence provides 
clues in regard to the significant events 
of the present and future. 

(b) Leads toward the sifting of evidence in- 
volved in past events and hence aids 
a similar sifting of evidence in connec- 
tion with contemporary events. 

(c) Tends to correct hasty cause-and-effect 
arrangements in event sequences. 

(d) Helps the independent investigator at 
work on an isolated problem to view 
this problem in terms of larger social 
wholes. 


The Logical Method: 

(a) Suggests fruitful generalizations which 
lead toward further investigation, verifi- 
cation and experimentation. 

106 


(b) 


(d) 


Leads to the discovery of variables; the 
multiple conclusions of logic (granting 
that multiple conclusions are allowable) 
may become the starting-points for 
scientific inductions. 

Encourages rigorous thinking in connec- 
tion with all stages of the discovery 
process and may hence be utilized as a 
test for inductions otherwise reached. 
May be utilized as one of the means of 
breaking up ‘‘wholes,” i.e., separating 
a given problem into its constituent 
parts before the real process of investi- 
gation begins. (Analysis.) 


The Analogical Method: 


(a) 


(b) 


Leads to the discovery of similarities, 
differences, correspondences and proba- 
ble correlations. 

Furnishes examples and illustrations on 
various levels (animal behavior, indi- 
vidual behavior, group behavior, et 
cetera) which may lead to the discov- 
ery of significant unknown factors and 
significant relations. 


The Statistical Method 


(a) 
(b) 
(c) 


Provides a numerical record of social 
status. 
Furnishes a graph of the known and 
separable factors in social change. 
Leads to the discovery of averages, dis- 
persions, correspondences and probable 
correlations. 

107 


(d) Provides numerical verifications for dis- 
covered correspondences and correla- 
tions. 

(e) Makes possible the statement of meas- 
urable data in precise terms. 


History, logic, analogy and statistics are 
thus seen to be integral parts of the process of 
social discovery. Every important explanation 
of a social phenomenon includes what is known 
of similar phenomena in the past, what may be 
reasoned about the present phenomena, what 
may be inferred by comparison with similar 
phenomena, and what may be measured and 
calculated in the present phenomenon. A given 
investigator may not either consciously or un- 
consciously utilize all of these methods, but be- 
fore his conclusions have run the gamut of 
criticism of his fellow scientists they will be 
tested according to each method, with the pos- 
sible exception of the analogical. Synthesis of 
method may not always take place in the actual 
investigations but it will invariably be applied 
before conclusions are accorded scientific in- 
tegrity, 


108 


PART II 


A PROPOSED STEP TOWARD THE IMPROVEMENT 
OF METHODS OF SOCIAL DISCOVERY 


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CHAPTER V 


PSYCHOLOGY AND THE URGENCY 
OF NEW METHOD 


\Mopern life is group life. The individual 
of the modern world who has no vital adher- 
ence to and expression through a group is an 
individual who plays a diminishing role; he is in- 
significant and unimportant to the social proc- 
€ss in direct proportion to his lack of member- 
ship in a functioning group. ‘This is true of the 
banker, the employer, the laborer, the teacher, 
the student, the politician, the farmer, the 
preacher—true, in brief, in an increasing de- 
gree of all persons with the possible exception 
of the artist. But even the artist gains a pecu- 
liar significance by belonging to a particular 
“school.” “Indeed it seems as if the percep- 
tion of beauty as well as the creation of beauty 
in art is essentially social; because the great 
periods of art have been precisely those in 
which the social consciousness was highly de- 
veloped.” * 


1 The Contact Between Minds, C. Delisle Burns, 
Macmillan, 1923, p. 101. 
pid gp) 


The group is one of the means wherewith the 
individual expresses and strives toward his 
dominant interests. ‘The task of social scien- 
tists is to discover the nature of these group- 
ings and their functional attributes. The meth- 
ods hitherto utilized by social scientists are in- 
adequate for the task. At any rate, these 
methods cannot attain their highest use until a 
better understanding of what is to be discov- 
ered is brought into existence. 


1. The Social Group: Description Possible 
Only in Psychological Terms 


a) What is a social group? 
b) How does a social group behave in rela- 
tion to its total environment? 


The next step in the evolution of the social 
sciences is likely to be the development of a 
scientific method which is capable of illumi- 
nating the above questions.2, Whatever else a 
group may be, there is sufficient reason for view- 
ing it as any number of human personalities act- 
ing jointly to express and attain a common in- 


terest. “Chis common interest may be revealed — 
as purpose, desire, feeling, will, thought or ac- 
tion—depending upon the angle from which the © 
view is taken. The idealist may insist upon 


2 They are in reality but one question, since the an- 
swer to (a) can only be revealed by answering (b). 
I1I2 


pepe a 


seeing the group as the expression of common 
hopes, wishes, aspirations. Philosophers of a 
certain turn of mind will not be content until 
the group is described in terms of a common 
will. Some psychologists will insist upon a com- 
mon mind. The practical man of affairs will 
probably waive all of these in lieu of a common 
activity. Each of these viewpoints must be 
stated in psychological terms. Interests, pur- 
poses, desires, feelings, will, thought, hopes, 
wishes, aspirations and activities are terms 
which possess psychological content.® 

The necessity of viewing social or group be- 
havior from the psychological point of view has 
been repeatedly pointed cut, but very little has 
been accomplished to make such ‘‘viewing”’ 
scientifically possible. ‘That group behavior 
cannot be explained in terms of structural cate- 
gories 1s obvious, since no form of behavior can 
be thus interpreted. The group is a phenome- 
non which may be sociologically conceived; in 
activity it is a sociological phenomenon which 
can be studied and interpreted only psychologi- 
cally. This statement is not to be taken as an 
attempt to set psychology over against soci- 
ology, but rather to indicate their interdepend- 
ence. The psychologist who insists upon indi- 
vidualizing behavior is probably as far wrong 


3 Activity is here used as a specific response and spe- 
cific responses constitute behavior; hence, activity may 
be legitimately used as a psychological symbol. 


113 


as the sociologist who insists upon viewing it 
only as a social phenomenon. ‘‘Now that we 
know that there is no such thing as a separate 
ego, that individuals are created by reciprocal 
interplay, our whole study of psychology is be- 
ing transformed.’ * ‘The whole study of so- 
ciology is destined to be transformed in like 
manner and for like reasons. 


2. The Utility of Subjective and Introspective 
Ideas 


One need not be merely a confirmed ad- 
dict of the ‘“‘new”’ in order to understand why 
so much emphasis is being placed upon the 
psychological factors of life. (This emphasis, 
which may now seem to some undue, will 
undoubtedly diminish as method in the other 
social sciences improves.) One by one the vari- 
ous determinants which were presumed to act as 
unyielding and unfailing fates in marking the 
course of human behavior have dropped by the 
wayside. Manno longer believes himself to be 
the helpless victim of gods, fates or innate 
forces. Even economic determinism, the latest 
of the series of fates, has not retained its once 
convincing role. Gradually but inevitably man’s 
searchings have shorn him of his fond determ- 
inants, his exterior controls. ‘“The importance 


* The New State, Mary P. Follett, p. 19. 
114 


of the new psychology is that it acknowledges 
man as the centre and shaper of his universe. 
In his nature all institutions are latent and per- 
force must be adapted to this nature.” > ‘The one 
remaining determinant, if indeed it may be so 
called, that shapes the destinies of men, is what 
happens between the minds of men. (Mind is 
here used to include the total equipment with 
which man responds to his environment—all 
that enters into behavior from the side of hu- 
man nature.) ‘The idealist with Kantian lean- 
ings may interpret this statement as a vindica- 
tion of his assumption that ideas rule the world. 
In one sense the idealist is right; if he recog- 
nizes that ideas are not the products of an in- 
dividual mind, he can make out a plausible case. 
Considered from the practical viewpoint it mat- 
ters little whether time and space and move- 
ment have any reality outside of man’s percep- 
tions and conceptions if man may deal with 
these perceptions and conceptions in such man- 
ner as to produce results which are satisfactory 
to him. Perhaps the better statement would 
be: if man can deal with these percepts and con- 
cepts in such manner as to serve his ends and 
‘not allow them to become his destroyers. ‘This 


5 The New State, M. P. Follett, p. 19. See also p. 
1103, The Dance of Life, Havelock Ellis: “We make 
our own world; when we have made it awry, we can 
remake it, approximately truer, though it cannot be ab- 
solutely true, to the facts.” 


LYS 


is, however, a totally different statement. The 
introduction of the term ‘‘destroyers’’ modifies 
the Kantian doctrine; it implies that the ante- 
cedents or referents of percepts and concepts 
have existential reality. They cannot be de- 
stroyers if they are nothing more than at- 
tributes of the mind of man. Man cannot de- 


stroy himself with his mind. Thus the idealist 


is right, provided he makes certain reservations; 
the realist is also right if he is permitted to ar- 
range his definition of mind, ideas, et cetera. 


But it must be repeated that it matters little 


which of these two viewpoints is utilized. An 


understanding of what happens when man be- © 
haves is the important point. For the social ” 
sciences to understand what happens when 


groups behave is what matters. A full under-— 


standing of what happens will perhaps forever 
escape the knowledge of man; regions of the 


et a — 


“mind” and its functioning in behavior may 


exist which subjective terms only can explain. 


But the area of subjectivism has been dimin-— 


ished in other spheres of life and there are no 


reasons to expect its diminution to stop. The 
assumption that science is the enemy of subjec-— 
tivism has beclouded many issues and retarded © 
the codperative intelligence of numerous think-— 
ers. Science is the absorber of subjectivism, not 


its antithesis. What was regarded as true ac- 
cording to subjective canons does not remain as — 
false after objective means have demonstrated 


116 


its subjectivity. It does not remain at all. 
Whatever of value was contained in the sub- 
jective idea is incorporated in the new objective 
idea; the rest is discarded. The tolerant scien- 
tist does not ridicule subjective ideas for he 
must know that these have provided him with 
motives for objective research. The intolerant 
scientist has created a new sort of scientific 
snobbery; he refers to persons who deal with 
mystical and subjective ideas as though they 
were made of inferior stuff. Subjective ideas 
are useful if for no other reason than that they 
confront the scientist with something against 
which to tilt his methodology. Most of the 
scientific problems of the present have emerged 
out of subjective generalizations of the past. 
This book and the studies upon which it is 
based could hardly have been undertaken except 
as a reaction to subjective interpretations of 
group behavior; in some respects it may justly 
be regarded as a “‘reflex”’ of those ideas. 


3. Psychological Approaches to Social and 


Economic Problems 


There are numerous evidences that psy- 
chology has been responsible for certain newer 
ways of viewing social behavior and the social 
process. Carleton Parker,® Ordway Tead,‘ and 

6 The Casual Laborer and 

‘Instincts in Industry are, of course, outdated; 


II7 


others have sought to interpret economic prob- 
lems from psychological points of view. The 
Acquisitive Society,® Incentives in the New In- 
dustrial Order,® and Economic Motives* are 
all psychological interpretations of economic 
and social facts. And the literature on social 
psychology has grown apace since Ross released 
his volume in 1917 with the prefatory baptism: 
“Perish the book, if only social psychology may 
go forward.’ Graham Wallas,* Walter Lipp- 
mann” and Herbert Croly ** have performed a 
similar service for political science. The lists 
might be extended to include philosophy, edu- 
cation, history and social work, for in all of 
these fields the characteristic note of the past 
decade reveals psychological quality and con- 
tent. The increased use of the psychological 
approach to social, political and economic prob- 
lems occurred during the period in which psy- 
chology as an independent science made its 
‘greatest advances in method.** Such is always 


largely because their integrity depended upon a naive 


assumption of the predominating roéle of instinctive 
behavior. 

8R. H. Tawney. 

9 J. A. Hobson. 

10-7, ‘Con Dickinson: 

11 Human Nature and Politics. 

12,4 Preface to Politics. 

13 Federalism. 


14’The fact that psychologists are themselves in- 


volved in a bitter controversy in which the behavior- 
118 


' 
. 


the case: when one science improves its method 
so that its facts are accepted because its method 
is believed to be valid, this science exerts an in- 
creasing influence over all related sciences. 
(The influence of mathematics upon other 
sciences may be partly due to the fact that 
mathematics is nothing but method.) This is, 
of course, not the sole reason for the greatly in- 
creased psychological emphasis in the social sci- 
ences; more important is the discovery that the 
social process is a psychological phenomenon."® 


4. The Social Group; a New Quality 


To go beyond the bounds of the present 
study is unnecessary in order to appreciate why 
it is essential that psychological approaches and 
tools should be employed in the task of social 


ists are pitted over against all the rest is exactly what 
might have been expected. When new methods 
evolve, certain devotees of old methods are always 
unable to make the necessary adjustment to the newer 
method. ‘These fall by the wayside. Rather they 
stand by the wayside and shout on behalf of the old! 
This does not mean that the behaviorists are all right 
and the others all wrong. .It simply means that the 
great advances in psychological method owe their ac- 
celeration to the behavioristic impact. 

18 ‘This does not mean that the emphasis will always 
remain with psychology. Many reasons lead to the 
conclusion that the next emphasis may shift to the 
physiological level. The behaviorists are themselves 
largely responsible for this change. 


119 


discovery. The delimited problem of this study 
was to discover the modus vivendi and the 
modus operandi—the why and the how—of 
specific groups of farmers organized into asso- 
ciations for the purposes of marketing their 
crops cooperatively. No attempt at describing 
these groups proved to be fruitful unless the 
descriptions turned upon activities. In this con- 
nection, the social scientist’s task is similar to 
that of the biologist who is confronted with a 
new animal species. He cannot provide an ac- 
curate description of the animal until he has 
observed the animal in activity—until he 
knows how the animal will behave. The 
recognition of this fact constitutes the chief 
distinction between the older taxonomic or 
classificatory science and the modern science of 
function. Structural descriptions may appear 
first since they are simpler and more superficial, 
but the complete account of the animal cannot 
be given until it is known how the animal will 
act. In the same manner the social scientist 
may describe human groupings but he will not 
know the significance of these groups until he 
observes the groups behaving. At this point 
the analogy becomes more than a mere analogy. 
The human group cannot be described at all 
until at least a portion of its behavior is under- 
stood. From the purely descriptive point of 
view, the group remains a congeries of individ- 
uals. From the activity point of view, the 
I20 


group becomes a new quality. New qualities 
are the resultant of new relations. The 
tones which result from chorus-singing may be 
designated by the same mathematical scale 
utilized for individual singing but the quality 
of these tones can never be repeated or 
reproduced by the individual. Voices in rela- 
tion, from a functional point of view, are so 
far modified that it may be said that a new 
quality has been created. ‘If I pull ona rope 
with another man, I can feel that the pull is 
different from what it is when I pull alone; but 
when we pull together I cannot distinguish one 
part or element in the pull which is mine and 
another part which is his. By some means I 
am aware of this joint pull; and it seems rea- 
sonable to say that I enjoy this joint pull, if I 
enjoy my pulling alone. Similarly when I put 
my suggestion together with another man’s and 
we agree to a common opinion, I can be aware 
that the opinion is different from what it is 
when I form my own opinion; but when we 
agree, I cannot distinguish one element in the 
opinion which is mine and another which is 
his.” @/} 

Farmers who were at one time simply in- 
dividuals growing and marketing their crops as 
individuals suddenly became parts of groups— 
organized groups with implied modes of be- 


16 The Contact Between Minds, C. Delisle Burns, 
Macmillan, 1923, p. 15. 
I2I 


havior. These groups constituted the object of 
the investigator’s study. Five thousand in- 
dividual farmers growing and marketing their 
products as individuals mean nothing to the 
social scientist, but five thousand farmers or- 
ganized to market their crops codperatively— 
pooling their crops and hence their interests— 
mean everything to him. 


5. The Activity of the Group: Description 
Inadequate by Use of the Atstorical, 
Logical or Analogical Method 


What history reveals: ‘That similar farmer 
groups have failed; that they lacked leadership ; 
that they lacked the services of honest experts; 
that the forces in opposition were always too 
powerful; et cetera. All of this, history tells, 
and it is all worth knowing. 

But this group differs from the previous 
groups which have failed. It possesses a new 
leadership, a new principle of marketing, a new 
principle of organization; it utilizes experts of 
the highest order. Moreover, it exists and 
functions in a new environment, or at least in 
an environment which has changed considerably 
since the failures. This movement appears to 
constitute an event of far greater significance 
than those of a similar kind recorded by history. 

What logic reveals: Logic may isolate the 
various principles (premises) upon which the 

122 


new cooperative movement is based and then 
proceed to reason toward either failure or suc- 
cess. This was done. ‘The reasons of the op- 
position gave eloquent proof of inevitable fail- 
ure. The reasons of the leaders of the co- 
operative movement gave equally eloquent 
proof of inevitable success. There are no more 
grounds for believing the one than the other; 
both sets of logic are based upon premises which 
are modified by opinion, and hence the conclu- 
sions carry along the color of.the opinionated 
premise. Logic can, however, Jead to a minute 
analysis of many series of possible results. It 
can proceed to multiply the question: If this 
happens, what is likely to happen? ‘This con- 
tinuous querying should lead to experimenta- 
tion. Only the experiments will tell whether 
the logic was fruitful. 

What analogy reveals: The farmers’ co- 
operative movement may be compared with 
numerous other codperative ventures. One of 
the leaders of the movement, for example, in a 
public address said, pointing to Judge Gary of 
the United States Steel Corporation: “Yes, 
Judge Gary, we have become prosperous by 
taking a leaf from your own note-book.” ** 
How much is such an analogy worth to the in- 
vestigator? Evidently it was of importance to 
the leader; he was comparing the farmers’ or- 
ganization with the United States Steel Cor- 

17 American Magazine, April, 1923. 

123 


poration with the obvious motive of enhancing 
the prestige of the farmers’ organization. But 
there is no generally valid basis for the compari- 
son. [nits technique of organization the Steel 
Corporation is almost the antithesis of the 
farmers’ codperative organization. On the one 
hand are farmer-members who hold no stock 
and who receive no profits through the direct 
ministrations of the codperative, while on the 
other hand there are stock-holders who have 
invested funds with only one purpose, namely, 
to secure dividends. In the farmers’ codpera- 
tive there is the assumption that the producers 
control the organization; in the Steel Corpora- 
tion there is the assumption that the manage- 
ment controls the organization. ‘There are at 
least seven other distinct aspects of difference 
between a farmers’ coOperative organization 
and the Steel Corporation, any one of which 
would be sufficient to vitiate any comparison 
between the two organizations.1™ 

Would a more accurate specimen of analogy 
prove to be more fruitful? ‘The farmers of 
Denmark have, for example, conducted success- 


172 Tt must be admitted, however, that the actual re- 
sults of some of the older codperative associations are 
not easily distinguishable from the results attained by 
capitalistic corporations. In terms of these results the 
two types of productive distribution are similar in 
technique, but codperatives of this character have 
eliminated a vital factor in codperative principles. 


124 


ful codperative marketing organizations for 
more than a half century. In proportion to the 
similarity of principles involved in these two 
cases, there would undoubtedly be considerable 
value in making comparative studies. This was 
also done. But it was found that the Danish 
situation contains many elements not included 
in the American situation, and vice versa. The 
Danish farmers all speak the same language, at- 
tend the same church, and participate in a com- 
mon culture. On the other hand, the American 
farmers adhere to numerous religious bodies 
and in addition are separated linguistically and 
culturally. When these and many other dif- 
ferences are taken into consideration it becomes 
evident that the analogy can only suggest cer- 
tain clues. 

A discussion of what statistics may reveal is 
premature since the utilization of statistics de- 
pends upon certain categories which are not yet 
available; there is no reason for counting until 
it is known what is to be counted. History, 
logic, and analogy point the direction toward 
the things to be counted, or rather studied. 


6. The Group as a New Series of Relations: 
Description Impossible Unless New Cate- 
gories are Invented 


The investigator is forced to the analysis of 
new categories. ‘The following questions are 
125 


suggested to him as a result of his attempts to 
use history, logic and analogy: 


Why do farmers join a movement which 
has invariably failed in the past? 

What has been learned from past ex- 
periences ? 

What changes have taken place in the 
environment of the coOperative move- 
ment? 

Why are the leaders assured of success? 

Why is the opposition assured of 
failure? 

Are the motives of stock-holders in the 
Steel Corporation comparable to the mo- 
tives of the farmers? 

What is the relation between religion, 
language, culture, et cetera, and the co- 
operative movement? 

To what extent do the new leaders of 
the codperative movement express the mo- 
tives, desires, ideas, et cetera, of the 
farmers? 


We shall not begin to formulate new cate- 
gories of information here, but merely point 
to the pertinence of the above questions. 
Each question possesses psychological content. 
None can be answered without a knowledge 
of motives, purposes, desires, customs, mores, 
leadership, representation, consent, idea-sys- 
tems, power, et cetera—all psychological 

126 


ei 


Pers gy c2s 


ve 


terms or concepts. Psychology therefore fur- 
nishes the urgency of new sociological method. 

Man behaves. Psychology is a method for 
studying and interpreting his behavior. Groups 
behave. Collective psychology is a method for 
studying and interpreting group behavior."* 
May the social psychologist or the sociologist 
make use of the method used by the psy- 
chologist? He may not for the obvious reason 
that he is dealing with a relation of a different 
class. (If a group of twelve persons were twelve 
persons, i.e., a congeries of twelve individual 
persons, then the psychological method would 
suffice for the social scientist. But a group of 
twelve persons is not twelve persons; it is a 
new quality. The individuals behaving as a 


_part of the group do not behave as individuals. 


True, the mechanism which acts in the behavior 
of the individual also operates when the in- 
dividual is a part of a group, but it operates 
in conjunction with different means and pro- 


18Tn Professor Goldenweiser’s stimulating essay 
called “History, Psychology and Culture: A Set of 


| Categories for an Introduction to Social Science,” a 


distinction is drawn between data which are objective, 
external and describable in terms of outward behavior 


and data which are psychological, referring to proc» 


esses which occur in minds. (Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. XV., No. 21, 
p. 563. ) The investigator who attempts to observe 


| ond interpret group behavior will find it difficult if 


| not impossible to make such a differentiation. 


127 


duces different results. An accurate under- 
standing of the behavior-pattern of each in- 
dividual in the group would undoubtedly assist 
in arriving at conclusions regarding the group, 
but the sum total of these individual behavior- 
patterns would not constitute the behavior-pat- 
tern of the group. The psychological method 
is capable of revealing aspects of individual be- 
havior which bear a relation to group behavior. 
Thus a person with a distinct inferiority com- 
plex might find in group adherence a certain 
compensation. To know this would throw 
light upon the nature of the group and its func- 
tioning, but the study would still be that of the — 
individual and not of the group. ‘ 


7. New Categories of Information not Fur- — 
nished by Individual and Social Psy- 
chology 


Introspective, reflective, speculative psy- 
chology deals with the problems of “mind” — 
from the angle of causes, nature, origin. Ex- © 
perimental psychology deals with the problems 
of “mind” from the angle of effects, conse- — 
quences, results, 1.e., from the angle of be- — 
havior. Neither approach necessarily excludes ~ 
the other. The speculative psychologist is — 
shortsighted if he insists that the experimental — 
psychologist is incapable of throwing light upon ~ 
the problems of mind as cause and the experi- 

128 


mental psychologist is equally shortsighted if 
he insists that his approach alone will reveal the 
whole truth. Instead of antagonizing each 
other, the two schools might supplement and 
complement each other in a codperative way if 
only they would recognize their approaches as 
methods and not as truths or laws. 

In order to discover the place, or rather the 
function of psychology in social science, it may 
prove profitable to reproduce the classifications 
of psychology as used by representatives of the 
two types or approaches to psychology men- 
tioned above: 


W atson’s Classification 


Individual psychology 
Vocational ‘ 

Child s 

Folk 

Educational ‘“ 

Legal 

Pathological 
Social 


McDougall’s Classification *° 


Psychology of the normal human adult 
Psychology of animals 

Psychology of children 

Individual psychology 


19 Behavior, J. B. Watson, p. 18. 
20 Psychology, W. McDougall, p. 123. 
129 


OPN EON 3S pes ad CS 


WD 


5. Psychology of men in abnormal and diseased 
states of mind 
6. Social psychology 


Watson defines psychology as “that division of 
natural science which takes human activity and 
conduct as its subject matter.” ** McDougall 
defines psychology as ‘‘the positive science of 
the behavior of living things.” ?? Watson does 
not define his terms “folk” and “social” psy- 
chology, although he does give hints elsewhere 
which indicate that he intends to convey by 
the first term what Wundt and others have in- 
cluded under the search for the origins and 
functions of cultural forms; language, re- 
ligions, etc. In Chapter XI, Personality and 
Its Disturbances,** he approaches interpreta- 
tions of individual behavior from the stand- 
point of how that behavior is affected by social 
contacts. This is, obviously, what he under- 
stands social psychology to be; at least, this 
may be regarded as his gateway to social 


science. McDougall, on the other hand, is 


explicit in stating that social psychology is “‘the 
study of the mass-mind and of its influence upon 
the individual mind in both its development and 


i 


operation.” ** Neither Watson nor McDougall — 


4D ae 
sold wpa CEN 
28 Psychology, J. B. Watson, pp. 393-420. 
24 In his Social Psychology, p. 18, McDougall says: 
“For social psychology has to show how, given the na- 
130 


is of great assistance in showing the place 
and the function of psychology in relation to 
social groups as the objects of study. Mc- 
Dougall’s “‘mass-mind’’ notion has been de- 
veloped in his later volume, The Group Mind, 
but this effort has done nothing to eliminate 
the inevitable and non-observable subjectivism 
which clings to the concept of mass or group 
mind. And if we turn to Tarde, LeBon, Ross 
or Martin we find only hypothetical descrip- 
tions of mobs and crowds—abnormal groups, 
not permanently functioning groups—or we 
find similar hypotheses regarding convention, 
fashions, et cetera. In short, the search for aid 
on this problem in the works of psychologists 
and sociologists alike leads only to confusion. 
Social psychology is used either as a term to 
describe the study of individual behavior in the 
light of its social relations or to describe some 
hypothetical group mind. ‘The search, how- 
ever, does reveal the existence of a general con- 
‘sciousness and recognition of the fact that 
‘group behavior must be reduced to psycho- 


_ tive propensities and capacities of the individual human 

| mind, all the complex mental life of societies is shaped 

by them and in turn reacts upon the course of their 
ieevelopment and operation in the individual . . . the 
fundamental problem of social psychology is the morali- 
_Zation of the individual by the society into which he 
is born as a creature in which the non-moral and purely 

_egoistic tendencies are so much stronger than any altru- 
_ istic tendencies.” 


131 


logical explanations. .Between the individual 
considered in relation to his social contacts and 
the picturesque movements of masses, crowds, 
and mobs lie the innumerable and increasing 
groups of persons organized and functioning on 
behalf of specific interests. This interwoven 
web of groups is the most striking feature in 
modern life. It is impossible to understand 
modern human activity without knowing what 
these groups are and how they behave. Our 
deliberative bodies function through committees 
which are groups; our business, professional, 
sociable, recreational and religious interests are 
vested in groups; our philanthropic expressions 
pass through the medium of groups. Doctors, 
lawyers, bakers, bankers, teachers, carpenters, 
paper-hangers, plumbers, printers, actors—all 
express their dominant, functional interests 
through groups. If social psychology is not to 
include the study of such groups, then some 
other name must be chosen. ‘Their study may 
not be neglected.*® ‘The field belongs to those 
who are capable of evolving a method of ob- 
jective group studies. It may become a part of 
the science of sociology although there are in- 
dications that this science has mapped out its 
field without recognition of the nature of the 


25 Suggested titles for the study of groups: Collective 
Psychology, Collective Behavior, The Psychology of 
Collective Behavior, Psychology of Groups, Group 
Psychology, et cetera. See p. 168. 

132 


) 


| problem with which this volume is concerned. 


The sociological field, according to the latest 
concurrence, includes: 


I. Personality: The Individual and the 


Person. 
II. The Family. 
III. Peoples and Cultural Groups. 
IV. Conflict and Accommodation Groups. 
V. Communities and Territorial Groups. 
VI. Social Institutions. 
VII. Social Science and the Social Process 
VIII. Social Pathology: Personal and So- 
cial Disorganization. 
IX. Methods of Investigation. 
X. General Sociology and Methodology 
of the Social Sciences.”° 


The first seven items of this classification con- 
tain the scope of sociology from the standpoint 
of the objects of its study. Numbers III, [IV 
and V mention groups, but the nearest this cate- 
gory comes to including the sort of groups 
dealt with in this book is IV, Conflict and Ac- 


' commodation Groups, under which are named 


(1) Classes and the Class Struggle; Labor and 
Capital, (2) Nationalities and Races, (3) Poli- 


| tical Parties and Political Doctrines, (4) Re- 


26 Scheme adopted by The American Journal of So- 
ciology for classifying the literature of sociology and 
the social sciences. 


133 


ligious Denominations and Sects. Labor can- — 
not be looked upon as a group unless one has 
in mind a specifically organized section of labor, — 
and the same is true of capital. Political 
parties and religious bodies may at times be 
groups but this is not necessary. 

We do not need a psychological label to — 
designate the study of groups. The science of 
education, if it may be said that the science © 
exists, is made up largely of psychological con-— 
tent but it does not therefore receive the name — 
of “education of psychology” or “psychology of 
education.” *7 In any case, the symbol chosen — 
to represent the study of group behavior is rela- 
tively unimportant. The main consideration at 
this point is to understand that if a method is 
to be devised for the study of such behavior, it 
will perforce need to be a method which deals 
with psychological objects of study. 

The term ‘‘behavior of groups”’ is adequate 
if it is understood that in this instance the 
word “behavior” is used psychologically. A 
bullet shot from a gun, a billiard ball shot 
from the end of a cue, a comet shooting through 
space, a ship plying the ocean—these are all 
examples of behavior, but they are not psy- 
chological behavior. They can be explained 
without reference to an integrated organism. 
A labor union striking for higher wages, a 


27 “Psychology of education” is a recognized term 
but it is not synonymous for education. 


134 


group of politicians representing a nation in 
claims for reparations, a codperative associa- 
tion of farmers marketing crops—these are ex- 
amples of behavior which cannot be explained 
without reference to psychological factors. 


8. The Group a Means, not an End 


The pathway toward a scientific study of 
groups is cluttered with numerous and confusing 
concepts, attitudes and beliefs. The most con- 
fusing of all the barriers is the belief that the 
group constitutes an end—that the ideal states 
of social organization symbolized by such terms 
as “‘the Kingdom,” ‘‘the Brotherhood of Man,”’ 
et cetera, are the goals of all effort. “Any 
ethics grounded in a hard-headed objective 
psychology will have to regard the individual 
as the only possible end.’ ** ‘The needs, pur- 
poses and aspirations of the individual or- 
ganism (which alone is capable of possessing 
needs, acquiring purposes and expressing as- 
pirations) are the ends of life and effort. But 
these needs, purposes and aspirations are condi- 
tioned by the relation which the individual or- 
ganism bears to all other individual organisms 
striving toward the same or kindred ends. 
The first form of human association bearing a 
relation to the modern group was conceiv- 


28 Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method, 
A. B. Wolfe, p. 253. 


135 


ably the result of a conscious agreement not 
to attack, i.e., a recognition that certain needs 
could be satisfied and certain purposes fulfilled 
with greater adequacy by means of joint rather 
than individual striving. At any rate, a func- 
tional view of this sort is a more fruitful hypo- 
thesis than is supplied by those theoretical as- 
sumptions which account for society, communi- 
cation and association on the basis of congenital 
or instinctive sympathy. 

The individual and the group are both reali- 
ties. The individual may be viewed as an in- 
tegration of functioning organs, and the group 
merely an integration of functions. The rela- 
tion which an individual bears to a group is 
therefore not the same kind of relation which 
exists between an organ and the integrated or- 
ganism. ‘The individual organism utilizes nu- 
merous and varied means for the satisfaction 
of its changing needs and on the human plane 
an increasing number of needs may be satisfied 
only by joint or group action. There is a 
strong probability that man has developed 
social or group modes of response in so many 
directions that group adherence has itself come 
to be a need; the recognition of this fact may 
have led earlier sociologists to assume the hypo- 
thesis of an organic society. But there can be 
nothing organic about society or a group; there 
can only be series of relations, the results of 
specific responses to specific situations. ‘They 


136 


are means utilized by individuals in the effort 
to satisfy individual needs. \ 

The above point of view is repulsive to many 
idealists on the ground that it degrades and 
minimizes the state, the church, the trade union, 
the codperative association—in short, the 
group. To regard the individual as the center 
of ends is to them to embrace selfishness. It is 
perhaps superfluous to add that the terms 
“egotism,” ‘conceit,’ et cetera, which are Used 
to denote selfishness, carry an emotional over- 
tone which is socially favorable to the elimina- 
tion of the individual as anend. The idealists 
are not wholly in the wrong; they are merely 
confused, and the result of their confusion leads 
to the use of means which justify ends, or to 
stubborn insistence upon static and unrealizable 
ends. “When ends are regarded as literally 
ends to action rather than as directive stimuli 
to present choice they are frozen and _ iso- 
lated.” *° On the other hand, when the group 
is recognized as a means, both means and ends 
attain sufficient fluidity to come, using the ter- 
minology of James, to “speaking terms with 
the universe.” ‘‘Ends are, in fact, literally end- 
less, forever coming into existence as new ac- 


29 Human Nature and Conduct, John Dewey, p. 
227. ‘The entire chapter on “The Nature of Aims,” 
from which the above quotation is taken, should be dili- 
gently studied by all who are confused over means and 
ends. 


137 


tivities occasion new consequences.”’ *° Life pro- 
ceeds in the atmosphere of imperative means, 
the stuff out of which, in reality, life is made. 
The recognition of the group as a means im- 
parts new reality and new significance to every- 
thing that pertains to it as a relation and as a 
function, as a quality and as a form of activity. 


If the group is to be the chief means by which | 
individuals in the modern world are to attain 


their ends, it becomes highly important to learn 
both the mechanism and the performance of the 
group.” 


80 Dewey, p. 232. 
81 “The amount of opportunity available to the indi- 


vidual, and hence the amplitude of his life, depend very 


largely upon the efficiency of the social organization of 
which he is a part.” Conservatism, Radicalism and 


Scientific Method, A. B. Wolfe, p. 261. 


138 


is 


CHAPTER VI 


GROUP CONFLICT AS THE LABORA- 
TORY 


A MAN’s interests have to do with his obliga- 
tory relations with other human beings, i.e., the - 
essence of a man’s behavior is revealed when 
his interests are at stake. ‘The most fruitful 
means of knowing a person is to have necessary 
relations with him which concern both you and 
him. “Parlor” conduct is a poor indicator of 
real behavior. 


1. The Group; a Representation of Interests 


| A group is a representation of certain in- 
terests which all members share. An individual 
becomes part of a group in order to advance 
some particular interest. Exceptions to this 
rule are merely apparent. Individuals are 
sometimes urged to join a group for some altru- 
istic purpose and all outward circumstances ap- 
pear to indicate that the “‘joining’’ represents a 
sacrifice rather than a gain. Closer observation 
invariably reveals that such ‘“‘joining”’ is ar- 
tificial. It is usuallv not difficult to discover the 


139 


interest which is protected by this type of group 
adherence. ‘The test of membership in a group 
occurs when the group’s activities actually con- 
travene an individual’s interests. Nothing but 
fear of larger loss to some other interest will 
then suffice to hold the individual’s allegiance. 


Pseudo-patrotism is born of the stuff of such ad- 


herence. It can express loyalty only under the 
stress of danger. / 

Some iconoclastic observers of the social 
process, upon discerning the interest basis of 
group allegiance, hurry gleefully to the conclu- 
sion that life zs egoistic. Interests are to them 
the very essence of proof against all altruism. 
The waves of nominalistic philosophy are recur- 
rent tokens of man’s loss of faith in the social 
process. As all joint efforts fail ultimately, be- 
lief once more gravitates to the individual as the 
center of all reality. But the nominalist has the 
answer to his argument in his own experience. 
He cannot live the egoistic life. From birth 
until death his significant acts are those which 
bear a relation to other human beings. (Ex- 
treme altruism is probably as false on its side as 
radical egoism.) Civilization is the process of 
joining egos. 

The philosophers of egoism are usually ex- 
treme analogists. When proof of their posi- 
tion is lacking on the human or social level, 
they have no compunctions about grasping their 
conclusions from the sphere of zodlogy. Thus 


140 


the eminent late biologist of France, Félix Le 
Dantec, in his L’Egoisme,* concludes with pro- 
found assurance, since he finds it to be true in 
so-called animal societies, that egoism is the 
“basis of all society.”” This, of course, proves 
nothing but it has the flavor of realism and 
therefore carries considerable weight, particu- 
larly with those who are eager for “sole” ex- 
planations. Where the egoists err on the side 
of a faulty realism, the altruists fail equally in 
substituting wishes for facts. The words, ego- 
ism and altruism, are, in fact, too heavily over- 
laid with emotions and biases to permit of ex- 
tended scientific use. 

Professional dodging of the interest view of 
the life process leads nowhere. But this is 
never quite true; all ideas do lead somewhere. 
A psychology instructor, upon being pressed for 
an answer to the problem of egoism by a student 
with an extremely realistic tendency, disposed of 
the inquiry by saying: “Yes, of course we do 
some things egoistically because we have the 
self-preserving instinct, but we also do some 
things non-egoistically, i.e., altruistically, be- 
cause we have the gregarious instinct.” 
This is one result of dodging! The denial of 
the fact that we do act on behalf of our vital 
interests precludes discussion of the validity of 


17T’Egoisme, Félix Le Dantec. Bibliotheque de 
Philosophie Scientifiae, Ernest Flammarion, Editor, 
Paris. 


I4I 


interests; it relegates ethics and the law, the 
evaluation of interests, to a non-motor level. 
The pursuance of certain interests in direct vio- 
lation to ethical concepts fervidly approved 
thus becomes possible. 

If attention is directed to the actual function- 
ing of a group, e.g., it soon becomes evident 
that the group stands to represent, advance, en- 
hance some very definite interest. Sooner or 
later this interest will clash with other interests 
protected by other groups or arising within the 
same group. Conflict is then inevitable. The 
eternal vigilance assumed to be expended on 
behalf of vague “rights” is seen to be a conflict 
to maintain specific interests. Rights may be 
mentioned only in connection with the process 
of evaluating interests. The economic inter- 
pretation of history recognizes this fact, but, 
alas, it leaves unrecognized so many factors 
that its total value is doubtful. 


2. Conflict and Codperation: Parts of the 
Same Process of Adjustment 


Conflict as a term or symbol suffers from its 
emotional accretions. “Two modes of escape 
are open; one may substitute other terms which 
possess less objectionable connotations or one 
may attempt to refine the terms already in gen- 
eral use. An ingenious combination of the two 
processes is that used by the late Dr. Southard 

142 


in his volume entitled, The Kingdom of Evils.? 
This book is based upon a classification of five 
major forms of evil which are designated: 
Morbi: Diseases and Defects of Body and 
Mind. 
Errores: Educational Deficiencies and Misin- 
formation. 
Vitia: Vices and Bad Habits, Non-psycho- 
pathic. 
Litigia: Legal Entanglements In and Out of 
Court. 
Penuria: Poverty and Other Forms of Re- 
sourcelessness. 
Aside from the artificial nature of this classi- 
fication and its academic appearance, it presents 
other difficulties. It does nothing to refine 
terms already in common usage and there is no 
likelihood that the social workers for whom 
the volume was intended will take up the use of 
the terms: morbi, errores, et cetera. Vices will 
still be regarded as vices even though they be 
labeled vitia. In addition, the Latin terms do 
not tend to define the terms or forms for which 
they act as symbols. To call educational 
‘deficiencies errores tends toward a compre- 
hensive rather than a definitive use of the term; 
‘it places too heavy a strain upon the term 
‘errores. 
Conflict is ordinarily set over against co- 


OT he Kingdom of Evils; Southard and Jarrett, 
Macmillan. 


143 


operation. The latter term carries good or 
positive, the former bad or negative connota- 
tions. From the scientific point of view “good” 
and “‘bad’’ connotations must be eliminated. | 
Certain forms of codperation may lead to nega- 
tive results and certain forms of conflict to posi- 
tive results. A scientific use of these two terms | 
will be served best by going beyond the words 
themselves to the processes which they aim to 
describe. ) 


3. The Group Adjusting Itself to Other 
Groups 


/ An active, functioning group is one which is 
making adjustments to its environment. “Be. 
havior is any process of release which is a func ' 
tion of factors external to the mechanism re- 
leased,” says Holt.* The definition needs only ° 
slight alteration to make it fit the group. | 
(Holt has shown clearly that the term behavior 
covers all objects as well as organisms, and 
therefore it must be equally applicable to 
groups.) The behavior of the group is a func. 
tion of its environment. If the environment. 
remains unchanged, no adjustments are called 
for. When the environment does change, an 
adjustment or accommodation is essential, and 
since a static environment is impossible, adjust-. 

3 The Freudian Wish, E. B. Holt, Henry Holt & 
Company, p. 167. 

144 


ments of one sort or another are always in 

process. Behavior is then the adjusting process. 
The study of groups and group behavior begins 
with observation of adjustments. 

The adjustments which groups make are 
largely in relation to other groups. Thus, the 
farmers’ cooperative associations are in con- 
tinuous adjustment in relation to the middle- 
men, the bankers, the merchants, manufac- 
turers, exporters, consumers. Not all of these 
classifications represent organized groups, but 
the study of these adjustments soon reveals the 
fact that acute adjustments always occur in re- 
‘lation to an organized group. Further, it be- 

comes evident that the adjustments of this na- 
/ ture are always made in the face of implicit or 
| explicit opposition of an exterior group. The 
trade union which represents the anthracite coal 
miners is at the present writing attempting to 
make an adjustment to the coal operators. 
Two sets of interests are at stake and the argu- 
ment proceeds on the basis of antagonism of 
interests. At least one of the operators’ in- 
_terests is presumed to exclude one of the specific 
interests of the miners. Conflict is the symbol 
for this clash of interests. 

Group conflict implies that something im- 
-pedes the advancement of interests. It implies 
further that the validity of interests can never 

be tested until the interests are challenged. 
“When one group opposes the interests of an- 


145 


other group, the implication is that the chal- 
lenging group considers its interests to be of a 
higher order of validity than those of the group 
which it opposes.* Without such opposition no 
evaluation of interests can proceed. ‘To ad- 
monish the group for not “giving in,” for 
“selfishness,” is sheer misconception of the en- 
tire adjusting process. To “give in” when the 
group’s interests are wholly valid is the grossest 
sort of treachery, not merely to the group itself 
but to the total social process. It is an implica- 
tion that fear of conflict has caused the group 
to recant what the conflict itself might have re- 
vealed to be a perfectly valid interest. J 

The aim of this chapter is to indicate the 
reasons for the use of group conflict as the 
laboratory for studying group behavior. This 
end may be furthered by returning to the cate- 
gories of information which are to serve as the 
tentative symbols of the various aspects of 
group process. Our scientific objective is the 
discovery of the nature and function of leader- 
ship, the process of representation and consent, 
the use of experts and facts, et cetera, as parts 
of the process of group adjustment. 


4 The interest concept of conflict from the point of — 


view of jurisprudence and political science is well set 


forth in The Modern Idea of the State, H. Krabbe. 


146 


| 


| 
| 


oe cee 


4. The Behavior of the Group; an Adjust- 
ment of the Total Environment. 


“The behavior of the group is a function of 
its environment’ is a statement which calls for 
slight modification. Its rigid interpretation 
leads logically to an elimination of choice, will, 
purposes. In individual psychology, behavior 
appears as the total process which includes the 
environment as the stimulating agency plus the 
habits of the individual as the response. The 
possibilities of changing habits do not inhere in 
the environment but rather in the habit-chang- 
ing capacity of the individual; at any rate, no 
adequate explanation of a changed habit can 
be arrived at if exclusive attention is paid to the 
environment. The beginning of behavior is a 
function of environment. Total behavior is a 
change in both the organism and the environ- 
ment and hence must be a function of both. 
Adjustment is not to the environment but of the 
environment and of the organism. The case 
does not appear to be otherwise in regard to 
- group behavior. 


Illustration: 

In a certain community in the South there 
appeared to be a sudden conversion of the com- 
mercial interests of the community to the co- 
operative marketing movement among farmers. 
The event was of extreme importance to the 
community since its commercial enterprises 
were built upon the marketing of tobacco. At 


147 


the time of the initial organization of the 
farmers’ cooperative, the merchants’ associa- 
tion passed resolutions favoring the movement; 
they even placed placards in the windows of 
their shops making this declaration to the pub- 
lic. ‘The merchants were in this case acting in 
response to a changed environment. It may be 
said that they were making an adjustment to 
this changed environment in terms of what they 
conceived to be their interests. 4 

But this action constituted not merely an ad- — 
justment to but also an adjustment of the total — 
environment. It was quickly reflected to other 
commercial interests back of and above the 
merchants, namely, the bankers, exporters, and 
tobacco buyers whose interests were also at 
stake. If the merchants proposed to give en- 
couragement to the farmers’ codperative and if 
the codperative carried out its stated objective 
of purchasing the tobacco formerly merchan- 
dised by private buyers, the ultimate result 
would of course be an elimination of these pri- 
vate buyers. The adjustment. which the mer- 
chants thought to be merely an adjustment to 
the farmers turned out to be an adjustment of 
the total community situation. It was a change 
of such proportions that it precipitated a bitter 
controversy. In the end, the merchants were 
obliged to rescind their favorable resolutions, 
the placards were removed from the shop win- — 
dows, and the community settled down to a pro- — 
tracted conflict.® 

5 Problems of this nature will be discussed later un- 
der Multiple Response. 

148 


The above illustration contains three sig- 
nificant points: (1) group responses are exceed- 
ingly complex; (2) the behavior of a group is 
a complex of responses to its total environment, 
which in the end means an adjustment of the 
total environment; (3) the group responds to 
situations which appear to jeopardize its in- 
terests. 

( “Life is interruptions and recoveries,” °® or, 
life for the group is an interruption of its pur- 
suit of interests by some other group or by 
some change in the total situation; recovery is 
the mode according to which the group meets 
this interruption. ‘The group in significant be- 
havior is the group attempting to establish 
itself and its interests. In essence this means 
the group in conflict. If then one wishes to dis- 
cover the nature of group behavior, it appears 
reasonable to expect that more of the real na- 
ture of that behavior will be revealed when con- 
flict is in process. If the group’s interests are 
not challenged, its behavior will run on orderly 
lines; its activities will be of the nature of 
cumulative habits, or rather customs. The 
study of these habitual or customary modes of 
group behavior is by itself an important field 
for investigation but it lacks opportunities for 
discovering the dynamic aspects of behavior. 
These are revealed only when there is present 
a sufficient stimulus to change the customary 


6 Human Nature and Conduct, John Dewey, p. 179. 
149 


mode of behavior, i.e., when the group is in 
conflict. 


5. Theories of Conflict 


The foregoing argument in favor of the use 
of group conflict as the most adequate and re- 
vealing laboratory for observing group be- 
havior must be distinguished from the historical 
and biological interpretations of conflict itself. 
It is merely one way of making use of conflict, 
not a glorification of social conflict as a Ding an 
sich. Hegel assumed the necessity of a negative 
element in life as a prerequisite of progress 
and Marx proceeded to embody this generaliza- 
tion in his theory of class conflict as the only 
means toward ultimate social harmony. Many 
evolutionists equipped with a simplified form of 
Darwinism likewise adduce all sorts of ana- 
logical supports for competition and war on 
the basis of the presumed ‘“‘good”’ results of con- 
flict.) Whether or not conflict or a negative ele- 
ment is essential to life, no thinking person can 
be so obtuse as to fail to see that conflict is 
wasteful and brutal; the harmonies which it is 
supposed to establish (as treaties of peace fol- 
lowing wars) are palpably not real harmonies 
at all... The above theories of conflict are, 


7 The reader is urged to read Dewey’s discussion of 
this theme on pages 300 to 302 in Human Nature and 
Conduct. 

150 


when carried to their logical conclusions, jus- 
tifications for the use of force. If conflict pre- 
determines a good result, then any means of 
precipitating and carrying on conflict are, of 
course, justifiable. Marx and Nietzsche are in 
this respect logical and if the events of the past 
decade have taught any lessons at all, it is the 
fallacy of such logic. All theories of conflict- 
as-a-good-in-itself are examples of truncated 
thinking. ‘he problem is not whether or not 
conflict is a good, but rather what to do with it. 
And we shall never know what to do with it so 
long as it is deified on the one hand or abjectly 
feared on the other. The reality of conflict 
surrounds us on every side; we see that it pro- 
duces certain results, serves as “‘the gadfly of 
thought,”’ cruelly submerges some human be- 
ings, elevates other human beings to seats of 
great power, is wasteful. All of this we see 
about us on every hand. What we fail to see 
is the possibility of making use of conflict. One 
of the ways of approaching the problem of 
making use of conflict is to come to some under- 
standing of its processes. This, however, is 
merely the secondary implication of the chap- 
ter; the use of conflict as the place for studying 
group actions and interactions arose out of the 
compulsions of the present study itself. 


ISI 


6. The Significant Aspects of Group Behavior; 
Revealed when the Group is in Conflict 


What are the tests of leadership? When is 
the real nature of leadership revealed? What 
is the significance of the contentious leader in 
group behavior? When does the relation be- 
tween the leader and the group become sharply 
delineated? ‘The answer to these queries is: 
when the group is in a militant mood; when the 
group is struggling to express its interests; 
when disharmony has arisen within the group; 
when the group is in danger of succumbing to 
its enemies; when the group is defending itself 
against its opposition; when the group is striv- 
ing for a public evaluation of its interests. 
Militant, struggle, disharmony, succumb, de- 
fend, strive—these are terms denoting conflict. 
When the group is struggling, succumbing, de- 
fending, striving—then its leaders will either 
solidify the group around an interest worth 
fighting for, or the leaders will be deposed and 
the group will disintegrate. Groups which have 
accommodated themselves to a non-militant, 
compromising mode of behavior may retain the 
same leadership for what seems like an inter- 
minable period; these are the groups which re- 
main outside the circle of real conflict and they 
are worthy of study because of the “lag’’ which 
they impose upon other groups. They owe 
their chief capacity to function at all to the fact 

162 


that habits are persistent and pleasant protec- 
tors against thought.* But if the dynamic quali- 
ties of group behavior are to be discovered, we 
must turn a portion of our attention at least to 
groups involved in social change. Such groups 
will be found to be engaged in the effort to vali- 
date certain specific interests and therefore they 
will be groups in conflict. 

When do the problems of representation and 
consent become pertinent problems? Observa- 
tion leads to the conclusion that these questions 
become problems only at the periods of initial 
group formation and when the group is involved 
in a conflict. (It should be remembered in 
this connection that groups are usually formed 
out of controversy; the period of initial group 
formation is almost invariably, for the members 
of the group at least, a period of conflict.) 
Labor unions function perfectly when no dispute 
is in the offing, but during these periods of calm, 
attendance at meetings dwindles to the point 
where only those come who possess a sense of 


®8’The well-known psychological argument which 
reads: habits permit the individual to do things so much 
more quickly and effectively that greater time is thus 
provided for deliberation, creative thought, et cetera, is 
permissible only if stated as a wish. It can be demon- 
strated only when proof is submitted to the effect that 
persons whose lives proceed upon the basis of the larg- 
est number of habits are also the most creative thinkers, 
i.e., that they actually do utilize in creative effort the 
time which is saved by habitual behavior, 


153 


duty. Cases are known in which meetings have 
been dispensed with entirely and others where 
only the officers attended. Why should the 
membership be concerned about attendance, 
representation, consent, when there is nothing 
vital to be represented, nothing to which to con- 
sent, when there is no meaning in attendance? 
The only reason for going to meetings in such 
cases is that the habit of attending is tenacious 
and to break the habit may be painful. (Mem- 
bership in a religious group entails a different 
kind of attendance. Non-attendance may not 
be affected so much by habit as by the moral 
judgments of others which may bring a dif- 
ferent kind of pain.) Once the group is 
aroused to the point of defending what it con- 
siders to be a valid interest, all of this changes. 
Leaders are immediately placed in a new en- 
vironment of scrutiny. Shades of difference 
within the group become manifest; how shall 
the members who envisage these differences 
secure adequate representation? Shall the 
minorities give consent to the activities and pro- 
grams of the majority? Do the leaders actually 
represent the desires and wishes of the mem- 
bers? Or do they represent merely a portion of 
the members? How has consent been given to 
the representativeness of the leaders? ‘These 
all become pertinent questions the moment the 
group is engaged in conflict. Hence if the in- 
vestigator aims to discover the nature of these 


154 


i 


aspects of group behavior, he is presented with 
observable modes of behavior when group con- 
flicts are in process. 


7. Group Conflict; not Necessarily a Form of 
Dissociation 


The above viewpoint is not one borrowed 
from the field of so-called abnormal psychology, 
although the analogy may have pointed the way. 
Since abnormal behavior is a form of dissocia- 
tion, to which all individuals are subject, within 
the personality, its study throws light upon nor- 
mal behavior. Conflict, as it is dealt with in 
this study, is not considered to be a form of dis- 
sociation or a form of abnormal behavior. 
Group conflicts may and do become forms of 
dissociation which embody many features simi- 
lar to abnormal behavior in the individual. 
Thus two nations may through conflict become 
so embittered against each other as groups that 
the dissociation becomes a permanent friction, 
an enduring antagonism.° 

Another theory of conflict or antagonism 
used by writers who are concerned with the 

® The author is indebted to Professor Harry Over- 


street for an able presentation of social conflict as a 
form of dissociation; the arguments are based upon 


_psycho-pathological analogies involving the dissociated 


or “split” personality. The paper—d Psychological 
Approach to Conflict—is still unpublished and hence 


cannot be quoted. 


155 


problems of group behavior may be called “the 
law of mutually opposed stimuli” *° or the “uni- 
versal principle of antagonism.”’ The underly- 
ing assumption of this theory is that all motion 
is kept in balance by positive and negative 
forces. Like most ‘“‘universals’’ of the sort, 
this theory leads its devotees into fantastic 
emotional flights. Thus Mr. Page writes: 
‘Through its operation (the law of mutually 
opposed stimuli) the stars are kept in their 
courses, and the Earth fitted for the habita- 
tion of man. And it governs as well the eco- 
nomic life by which vast populations are shel- 
tered and rendered progressively more efficient 
for human happiness.”’ Our author then passes 
on to make various applications of this theory 
to social and economic life as though the theory 
had been proved because stated. Nothing is 
done to discover the nature or the working of 
this formidable “law.” ‘The electronic theory 
may in time vindicate this generalization for 
physics, but a theory should lead to experimen- 
tation and not to dogmatism. It should raise 
innumerable subsidiary queries instead of be- 
ing used as a general solution for most vexing 
problems. For example, if motion results 
from mutually opposed stimuli, why is it not 
reasonable to suppose that equilibrium or rest 
may also be the result of mutually opposed 

10 Used by E. D. Page in his book, Trade Morals, 
Yale University Press, p. 248. 

156 


stimuli? If the mutually opposed stimuli hap- 
pen to be equal, equilibrium would of course 
be the result. Then there is always the possi- 
bility that the causes which keep (or do not 
keep) the stars in their courses are not the same 
causes which are involved in, let us say, a labor 
controversy ! 

These various ambiguous theories of con- 
flict have so much analogical currency that so- 
cial investigators must be driven to a fresh 
approach to the problems of social conflict in 
particulars. “It would seem, too, that the 
world had experimented with the conflict 
method long enough to begin to arrive at a 
strong suspicion that the codperative, con- 
structive method will produce better results,” ™ 
says Professor Wolfe with a slight touch of 
plaintiveness in his tone. But, the point is that 
there has been no experimenting with conflict. 
The historical observation that mankind has 
known a long acquaintance with conflict is not 
a logical reason for attempting to dismiss it; 
rather is it an added reason for beginning to 
understand its processes.” 


11 Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method, 
p. 276. 

12 Tndications of a movement toward an understand- 
ing of social conflict are beginning to appear. See, for 
example, the subtitle to James Mickel Williams’ Prin- 
ciples of Social Psychology which reads, “‘as developed 
in a study of economic and social conflict.” 


1$7 


CuHapTer VII 


THE NEW INFORMATIONAL 
CATEGORIES 


1. The Language Difficulty 


THE social sciences cannot proceed scientifi- 
cally until adequate categories of information 
are conceived. Social discovery as a scientific 
procedure or method must know what it is that 
is to be discovered. ‘The problem as stated 
heretofore is still a vague generalization. It 
is not sufficiently definite to say that the search 
is to be for the social group, its inner and outer 
relations. Precisely what is it that the investi- 
gator needs to know concerning the group and 
its active relations? The foregoing chapter 
has aimed to establish the principle that the 
unknown elements in groups and group rela- 
tions can be stated only in psychological terms. 
An analysis of those terms is now in order. 

The conceiving and arranging of knowledge 
categories is a perilous task. The language 
difficulty presents itself at the outset as one 
of the predominant obstacles. “Our concepts 
are limited by language. Our language is 

158 


eg a 


deeply dualistic. This is indeed a terrible ob- 
stacle. I showed previously how language re- 
tards our thought, making it impossible to ex- 
press the relations of a being universe. In our 
language only an eternal becoming universe ex- 
ists.” * ‘The difficulty herein described can be 
met only by continuous search for new concepts. 
But there are equally grave impediments in 
other directions. Concepts are overlaid with 
emotions which produce perplexing overtones 
and undertones. Ihe same word does not carry 
the same meaning to all persons; nor does it 
carry the same meaning to the same person 
under varying conditions and at varying times. 
Moreover, ‘‘there is no certainty whatever that 
the same word will call out exactly the same 
idea in the reader’s mind as it did in the re- 
porter’s,” ? i.e., the written word is far more 
likely to be misunderstood than the spoken 
word. Language is qualitative. Words, so far 
from being the vehicles of understanding, lend 
themselves readily to purposive misunderstand- 
ing. The essence of a complete controversy 
may be lost sight of by the mere use of a ques- 
tion-begging term or an epithet. Words are 
figurative, symbolic, and there is some justifi- 
cation for Jean Paul’s cryptic characterization 
of language as ‘‘a dictionary of faded meta- 
phors.”’ 
1 Tertium Organum, Ouspensky, p. 189. 
2 Public Opinion, Walter Lippman, p. 66. 
159 


But we must overcome these obstacles. A\l- 
though there is little indication that we shall 
all soon be able to converse in terms of exact 
mathematical symbols, a certain degree of pre- 
cision has already been achieved in the sphere 
of the so-called exact sciences. ‘here are evi- 
dencés that steps are being taken in a similar 
direction in the sphere of the social sciences. ° 
However difficult and imposing the task may 
appear, there is no visible alternative—con- 
cepts and symbols must be utilized and hence 
they must be defined, redefined and refined. If 
there is the slightest possibility of changing lan- 
guage from a “dictionary of faded metaphors’”’ 
to an evolving, living set of approximately ac- 
curate and universal concepts, the endeavor 
must be made. ‘True it is that by means of 
language we see as through a glass darkly, but 
we do see. 

Definition is not the first but rather the last 
step in scientific procedure. The scientists must 
first of all agree that they see the same thing 


8 As, for example, the work of the Commission on 
Intellectual Codperation of the League of Nations, 
and the Committee on Terminology (joint) of the 
American Sociological Society and the National Com- 
munity Center Association. 

For an admirable treatment of one phase of the lan- 
guage difficulty, the reader is referred to Chapter V, 
“Speed, Words and Clearness,” in Mr. Lippmann’s 
Public Opinion, also Sidgwick’s The Use of Words in 
Reasoning. 

160 


before the concepts used to describe what they 
see can be defined. To begin an argument with 
definitions of terms is to assume that each per- 
son involved has accepted the same meaning 
of each term. Unhappily the social sciences 
are still far distant from the desired goal. The 
assumption of this essay is that terms, words, 
concepts will be cumulatively defined and re- 
fined as the investigating process proceeds and 
further that the present is a decidedly inap- 
propriate time for being dogmatic about def- 
nitions. 


2. The Categories of Social Psychology 


A brief review of the categories of informa- 
tion employed by writers who have definitely 
aimed to illumine the problems of social psy- 
chology should prove helpful at this juncture. 
In studying the ensuing catalogues of categor- 
ies selected from various texts, the reader is 
warned to keep constantly in mind the fact that 
the authors have not been consulted; the cate- 
gories were selected from their works. Each 
author would undoubtedly claim the right to 
make amendments and corrections to the lists 
as they stand, 


16r 


Categories * of Information as Selected from 
Six Works Dealing With the Problems of 
Social Psychology: 


Social Psychology; an Outline and 
Source Book, by E. A. Ross 


Suggestibility; the crowd; the mob mind; 
fashion; conventionality; imitation; customs; 
conflict; compromise; public opinion. 


Social Psychology, by Wm. McDougall 


Instincts (an elaborate list) ; emotions; in- 
nate tendencies; sentiments; volition; imitation; 
play; habit. 


Human Nature and the Social Order, 
by C. H. Cooley 


Suggestion; choice (will); sociability; sym- 
pathy; hostility; emulation; leadership; con- 
science; freedom. 


4In The Psychology of Society, by Ginsberg, the fol- 
lowing concepts constitute the categories according to 
which the author views the problems of social psychol- 
ogy: Instincts, reason, will, group mind, general will, 
racial characteristics, national characteristics, tradition, 
community, associations, institutions, the crowd, public 
opinion, the public, democracy. Since the bulk of what 
he says about the above concepts is critical it is very 
difficult to know just which of these items the author 
might choose if he were himself asked to formulate a 
category for social psychology. 
162 


Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, 
by C. A. Ellwood 


Instincts; feelings; intellect; imitation; sym- 
pathy; the social mind (social consciousness) ; 
public opinion (the popular will). 


The Great Society, by Graham Wallas 


Instincts; intelligence; habit; disposition; en- 
vironment; fear; pleasure-pain; happiness; the 
crowd; love; hatred; thought; will. 


Human Nature and Conduct, 
by John Dewey 


Habits; will; customs; impulses; intelligence 
(thought, deliberation, calculation); aims; 
principles; desires; morals; freedom. 


3. The Inadequacies of the Categories of 
Social Psychology 


This is an imposing and perplexing list of 
categories. If an investigator were requested 
to make a specific study of a social group with 
the aid of any one or all of them, he would find 
himself face to face with such questions as: 

How may the instincts of a group be studied? 
Or, are instincts individual attributes which 
manifest themselves in part in group relations? 
If so, how may they be isolated for study? 

If activities of the group are to be explained 
by accrediting each unknown cause-and-effect, 

16% 


or stimulus-response relation to some instinct 
classification, where is this process to stop? 
What is the line of demarcation between an in- 
stinctive action and an impulse? Between senti- 
ments and emotions? Between intelligence and 
habits? 

How many of the terms in these categories 
are descriptive of purely group phenomena? 
How many of them are merely analogies lifted 


bodily from the field of psychology? How - 


many of them are the result of philosophical 
rationalizations of group behavior? 
As a matter of plain fact many of the terms 


of these categories are unadaptable to research. 


methods. They are largely terms used to 
explain group behavior—not terms whereby the 
process of that behavior is studied, observed, 
made known. ‘To attempt the use of many of 
them in the same specified study would be much 
like measuring milk by the yard. Freedom and 
imitation, for example, are not concepts of the 
same kind. The inadequacy of such categories 
of information was soon discovered by the au- 
thor in an earlier attempt to make a study of 
community process or the group relations and 
activities of a small urban community. He be- 
gan at that time the extension of categories. 


In the study (the farmers’ codperative market- 4 


ing movement in its relation to the middleman, 

or the established machinery of marketing farm 

products) which lies at the background of much 
164 


MAb .., 


that is contained in the present volume, the ne- 
cessity of elaborating, extending and experi- 
menting with newer categories of information 
continued. The problem as a whole was con- 
tinuously broken up by the repeated raising 
of the question: ‘‘What is it that needs to be 
known about this group and its activities?” 
What is the group doing? 

Having abandoned the search for the mob- 
mind, the group-mind and similar non-obsery- 
able entities and phenomena, the investigator 
was obliged to proceed with the remaining cate- 
gories which occupy much space in the various 
works on social psychology. Instincts were 
given a fair opportunity, but alas, they led no- 
where. If a particular group is explained in 
terms of an imagined ‘‘gregarious”’ instinct, of 
what significance is the explanation? ‘The 
group may as well be explained in terms of “‘to- 
bacco,” for one of the codperatives studied was 
organized about tobacco. Moreover, farmers 
are not believed to be notoriously gregarious. 
To describe the sudden organization of more 
than a million of them into codperative groups 
on the basis of gregariousness would certainly 
involve numerous contradictions. No_ tech- 
nique exists for a study based upon such cate- 
gories. One might have written volumes on 
the “gregarious versus the self-assertive in- 
_stincts in modern farmers’ codperative organi- 
zations,” but this could have been done without 

165 


taking the trouble to study the groups involved. 

Do the individual farmers who became mem- 
bers of the codperative groups possess habits 
which have a bearing upon the groups’ conduct ? 
Obviously they do, since one’s individual habits 
come into play in conduct regardless of whether 
or not the conduct has social significance. But 
the sum of individual habits does not constitute 
a group habit. Instincts, habits, feelings, imi- 
tation, sympathy, intellect, emotions, senti- 
ments, will, desires, dispositions and thoughts 
are all attributes of the individual and are phe- 
nomena which can be studied only with the in- 
dividual as the object of study. One of the 
chief elements which distinguishes a specialist 
science is the object to which it devotes atten- 
tion. We term a scientist who studies insects 
an entomologist but he is in one sense a zoolo- 
gist. [he scientist who studies attributes and 
functions of an individual from the viewpoint 
of their relation to behavior is a psychologist. 
When he studies those attributes and functions 
of the individual which arise from his social re- 
lations he still belongs to this branch of science. 
Instinct, habits, emotions, et cetera, are influ- 
enced and modified by social contacts, but they 
are attributes and functions of the individual. 
Most social psychology is an interpretation of 
individual traits, attributes, functions, in terms 
of their social relations. Thus when Mr. Gins- 
berg calls his book The Psychology of Society, 

166 


the natural expectation would be a discussion 
of the attributes and functions of society. He 
does indeed devote some attention to this prob- 
lem in the latter sections of the volume, but the 
objective materials upon which his inductions 
are based are drawn from the field of individual 
psychology. Fully one-half of the entire book 
is a discussion of the psychology of individuals. 

Perhaps the use of the term “social psychol- 
ogy” to describe attributes and functions of in- 
dividuals in terms of their social relations has 
now become fixed in the literature of the social 
sciences. In Floyd H. Allport’s recent text on 
Social Psychology, he specifically utilizes the 
term “‘social psychology” as a “‘science of the 
individual” and thereupon devotes a great deal 
of attention to establishing this point of view. 
Since Mr. Allport’s book is by far the most 
scholarly and most adequately scientific of all 
of the various texts on social psychology, its in- 
fluence will undoubtedly tend to standardize 
both the name and the content of social psychol- 
ogy. James Mickel Williams, in his recent text 
entitled Principles of Social Psychology, begins 
by saying “‘social psychology may be definedasa 
science of the motives of people in social rela- 
tions,’ and later specifies that the word “‘peo- 
ple” is intended to mean individuals. It may 
thus be necessary to utilize another term to 
designate the specific study of groups. “‘Col- 
lective psychology” or ‘‘group psychology”’ sug- 

167 


gest themselves as possible substitutes, but in 
this very fluid and uncertain stage of psychol- 
ogy, there are also objections to these terms. 
“Collective behavior” appears to be the term 


most suitable and least objectionable. In any — 


case, the study of groups, if it is a valid separa- 


tion of social science, cannot base its observa- 
tions and experiments exclusively upon the cate- 
gories of individual psychology. 


4. Conventions, Customs, Leadership, Aims — 


and Morals; Valid for Group Categories 


We may then return to the categories, listed 
on page 162, for the purpose of determining 


how many of these concepts are applicable to — 


the study of groups. Eliminating several of 
doubtful character, there remain: Conventional- 


ity, customs, leadership, aims, morals. Aconven- | 
tional mode of behavior is a group attribute, — 
although individuals within the same group may _ 
deviate from the rigid standard of the conven- — 


tion. ‘This deviation has definite limits, how- 


ever, and when the individual separates himself 


too widely from the conventions of his group, 
he automatically ceases to be an integral part 


of it. Customs are likewise group products and — 


attributes. In studying the modern codperative 


movement among farmers, one of the first phe- — 
nomena to attract the observer’s attention was — 


168 


leadership. It is a confusing term since it im- 
plies personal attributes and is inconceivable 
without a group. From the sociological point 
of view, leadership is an attribute of the group. 
The group may have a collective aim which is 
not merely the summation of the aims of the 
individuals composing the group. Further 
study may reveal that leadership is largely or 
entirely a function of the individual and hence 
must be discarded as a useful concept in collec- 
tive psychology. For the present, however, the 
term and the phenomenon behind it must be re- 
tained. No adequate study of the activity of a 
group is possible without consideration of the 
part which leadership plays in this activity. 
Morals, like conventions and customs, are 
evolved within a group and are effective as 
norms of behavior only under group sanction. 
Conventions, customs, leadership, aims and 
morals are expressed in terms of activities and 
hence should be observable. The immediate 
problem before us is to conceive categories of 
information which will be actual, although sym- 
bolic (not accurate) designations of group at- 
tributes and functions. 

Apparently the only rational manner of pro- 
ceeding to formulate categories of information 
is to find names (symbols) for observed phe- 
nomena. What happens when groups behave? 
If what happens may be observed, then it should 

| 169 


be possible to find a name, to conceive of a sym- 
bol which will so describe what happens that 
others will recognize the same phenomenon. 


5. How Does the Group Behave? 


The group is a phenomenon which has been 
generally accepted but little understood. At 
one time thousands of farmers produce cotton 
or tobacco and at another time these same thou- 
sands of farmers are joined in a different activ- 
ity, forming a new entity. What is it that has 
happened? It was formerly asserted that the 
chief significance of a group consisted in the 
fact that the individuals comprising it had sac- 
rificed certain individual prerogatives, rights, 
privileges, et cetera, in order to achieve the 
larger collective end. But it could not be dis- 
covered that the farmers who became members 
of the codperative associations had done any- 
thing of the sort. On the contrary, they were 
chiefly interested in enhancing their own indi- 
vidual interests; they desired a Jarger income 
from the sale of their products and the coépera- 
tive movement promised exactly this. Pur- 
poses, desires, aims and interests are involved 
in group behavior, but there is much to discover 
about the group itself before these attributes 
may be isolated for study. The chief search is 
not to know what purposes, desires, aims are, 
but how they get themselves expressed in the 

170 


——- 


activity of the group. But much of this dis- 
cussion is premature. ‘The group cannot be a 
phenomenon of the group and hence cannot be 
regarded as one of the items of the category 
which it is our present purpose to formulate. 

One of the earliest observations necessitated 
by a study of a particular group is, however, 
closely related to the problem of the nature of 
the group itself. A group consists of individ- 
uals, or rather it is a representation of a rela- 
tion between individuals. How does the group 
represent its constituent individual members? 
Does it represent the total personality of each 
member or does it represent only a specific in- 
terest, a portion of the personality? How is 
the representing done? Representation is not 
a new item in social categories. Political scien- 
tists have devoted a large proportion of their 
study to the problem of representation. The 
state is conceived as a group which represents 
the individuals comprising it. Representative 
government implies that the citizens are so com- 
pletely represented in the functional depart- 
ments of the government that their “‘wills’’ are 
expressed. 

Political science has done very little to il- 
lumine the processes of voluntary groups.’ The 


5 It should be added that the ferment which precedes 
emphasis upon method is at work among increasing 
numbers of political scientists. Professor Charles E. 
Merriam’s introduction to Boss Platt and His New 


171 


state is a component, not a constituent group. 
The only persons who voluntarily “join” or be- 
come members of the state are aliens who be- 
come citizens. Representation in voluntary 
groups has, it is true, followed the lead of poli- 
tics. Ina so-called democracy every voluntary 
group is tested according to its provisions of 
representation. ‘This is true theoretically even 
of business corporations, although here we wit- 
ness the curious spectacle of representation con- 
fined to stockholders; the technicians and em- 
ployees—the most vital parts of the industrial 
organization—are usually without representa- 
tion. So thorough-going has this divorcement 
of representation been in industry that the work- 
ers have in many instances themselves lost the 
desire for representation. 

The individual who is represented either by 
the group itself, by delegates of the group, or 
by experts chosen by the group, is obliged in 
some manner to give his consent to the activity. 
How does he give this consent? In the study 
of the farmers’ codperative movement, it was 
found that consent to the main activity of the 
group was secured by means of legal processes 
and that all other forms of consent were left 
to the general mode of representation. The in- 


York Machine, by H. F. Gosnell, sounds the new note. 
See also the report of the National Conference on the 
Science of Politics, American Political Science Review, 
Vol. XVIII, No. 1. 

172 


a ee 


dividual farmer who became a member of the 
codperative association was obliged to sign a 
legal contract binding him to sell all of his crop 
(tobacco and cotton in the cases studied) 
through the codperative marketing association. 
Such consent is analogous to the ‘“‘love, honor 
and obey”’ clause of a legalized marriage. Is 
this a valid form of consent? Wherein lies its 
validity? The test of this type of consent 
comes, of course, at the time of action, not at 
the time of its being given. The signed con- 
tracts are in the hands of the codperative as- 
sociation; it possesses the tokens of numerous 
individual consents which may now be regarded 
as a collective consent, and it is upon the valid- 
ity of this collective consent that the codpera- 
tive association enters upon the merchandising 
function. The strength or weakness of a group 
may in some measure be gauged by the nature 
of consent which is one of the guarantees of its 
function. 

The group now has leadership, a mode of 
representation and a mode of consent. In the 
case of commodity codperative marketing asso- 
ciations, the function of the group involved a 
technical understanding of the products to be 
marketed, a technical understanding of the 
markets, a technical understanding of finance, 
and in the end a technical understanding of so- 
cial organization. In brief, the group found it 
necessary to add unto itself the services of 


173 


experts. What relation does the expert bear to 
the group? 

The expert bases his function upon the use 
of facts. For example, he grades the tobacco 
crop which is brought to him by members of the 
cooperative association. ‘This grading is per- 
formed in relation to certain facts; the kinds 
of tobacco demanded by certain manufacturers, 
exporters, et cetera. he marketing experi 
bases his performance upon facts related to the 
current operation of the so-called law of supply 
and demand. ‘The financial expert acts in re- 
lation to the facts of terms of available credits, © 
acceptances, amounts of credits needed for or- 
derly supplying of the markets, payments 
needed by members in order to meet current 
expenses, et cetera. The essential problem for 
the social investigator is to determine the rela- 
tion between all of this fact-finding and the 
group itself. Is it the group which uses facts? 
Or, is it merely the expert who uses the facts 
on behalf of the group? Is the expert a func- 
tion of the group? Is the use of facts a func- 
tion of the group? 

The group functions; it acts. Are its acts 
independent functions of the group or are they — 
related to other groups? ‘The investigator of 
group processes soon comes to the sharp reali- 
zation that the activities of the group are ex- 
tremely complex. Situations are constantly 
changing and the group must make adjustments 


174 


to them. Are these adjustments simple activi- 
ties of the group? 


Illustration: 


One of the commodity codperatives under 
consideration began its career without any form 
of local organization. After one year of ex- 
perience, this association began to emphasize 
the importance of a strong local organization. 
At the end of the second year it had 1500 locals 
in operation. 

What changed the situation? The answer is 
complex, although the officials responsible for 
the changed activity appeared to regard the al- 
tered situation as a simple matter. Close study 
revealed that the group was in this instance 
making an adjustment to at least five factors in 
the changing situation. The group was re- 
sponding to its opponents, the middlemen, to 
its constructive critics, to its membership, to 
the fact that contracts were being violated, et 
cetera. 


The group does not ordinarily make a spe- 
cific response to a specific stimulus; it responds 
to multiple stimuli. Its process of adjustment 
to changing situations is one of multiple re- 
sponse. 

The remaining terms of the category which 
have been utilized and experimented with in the 
studies which underlie this volume are: the in- 
terest concept of group motivation, long and 
short-time points of view which influence the 


175 


groups’ activities and policies, the use of lan- 
guage-symbols in group activity, power as a 
concept of group function, customs, mores, tra- 
ditions, ethics as a mode of group evaluation, 
public opinion as an accretion of group norms, 
and the conflict concept of group adjustments. 
It is not to be expected that satisfying materials 
are available in connection with each of the 
above concepts. The usual experience of apply- 
ing new method to old phenomena is in effect 
the raising of numerous questions, rather than 
answers, and the presentment of unsuspected 
problems. The present study is no exception to 
this rule. 


Perhaps a sufficient amount of space has been | 


devoted to the description of the method ac- 
cording to which the newer categories of in- 
formation to be used in the study of groups have 
been conceived and derived. The method is 
indeed simple. The activities of the groups 
under observation were approached from va- 
rious angles until the observer was reasonably 
sure that he knew what was happening. He 


then proceeded to find a name for this phenom- | 


enon. ‘he attempt has been made to utilize 


terms which have already secured a familiar | 


usage. As observation of group behavior con- 
tinues it may be found expedient to change all 
of these terms; at least the refinement of ob- 


servation should be followed by a corresponding — 


refinement of terms and categories. 


176 


eh eT ee ee 


CuHaptTer VIII 


OBSERVATION AND THE PARTICI- 
PANT OBSERVER 


1. The Behavior of the Group as a Stimulus- 
Response Relation 


THE behavior of groups is a complex of re- 


sponses to stimuli originating within and with- 


out the groups. Every individual who is a 
| member of a group may be the source of stimuli 
which cause responses of the group which in 
turn modify the total behavior of the group. 
_ Every individual outside the group whose ac- 
| tivities affect the interests of the group will 
| become a stimulus to that particular group, and 


every other group whose activities affect the 


interest of the group under consideration be- 
_comes a stimulus.’ If the above statements are 


1'There are stimuli of other kinds as well. Indi- 
viduals and other groups may be designated as the 
primary stimuli, although this is an arbitrary classi- 
fication. Facts, events, et cetera, which may not be 
traceable to specific individuals or groups, are never- 


theless effective stimuli to a group. 


177 


based upon facts, and it is assumed that they 
are, it becomes evident that the method of in- 
vestigation designed to isolate stimuli, to study 
responses, and to describe the nature of the 
stimulus-response relation as affecting groups 
must be a method which takes these statements 
into consideration. 

The biologists who aim to illumine the so- 
cial sciences by analogies from the animal level 
are laboring under a misapprehension. Man- 
kind may have some lessons to learn from the 


ants and the bees, but the biologists cannot ap-— 
ply ant and bee methods of investigation and 


observation to human beings. It is possible to 
observe ants and bees without becoming a part 
of the ant-and-bee-environment—without be- | 
coming a stimulus to change the behavior of | 


the ants and bees. It is not possible to study 
human beings and human groups without be- 
coming a part of the human environment and 
hence a possible or potential stimulus. 


2. The Fallacy of the “Yes-or-No” Answer in | 


Soctal Investigation 


Investigators conducting social surveys must | 

ee e ° . \ 

be naive indeed if they assume that their ob-| 
servations do not change situations. ‘That 


they do possess a naiveté of this sort is evident 


from the refinements of their technique which 


all tend to eliminate the personal factor, to 
178 


| 


make the observers increasingly impartial, neu- 
tral. The underlying assumption of this tech- 
nique is that the survey is intended to reveal 
an accurate and unbiased picture of the social 
milieu under attention; but it is no longer the 
same social situation after the observer begins 
to make contacts with the groups affected. 
This is particularly true of studies based upon 
schedules of questions for which the investi- 
gator finds answers by making inquiries of per- 
sons. Analysis of such schedules reveals that 
the questions all contain premises which imply 
simple conclusions. Thus the English statis- 
tician, Bowley,” has laid down certain general 
rules for schedules, among which are found the 
following: 

Questions should require an answer of “‘yes”’ 
or “no” or of a number. 

Questions should be such as will be answered 
without bias. 

Two important errors are always possible 
in this method: in the first place, the assump- 
tion that the investigator has fairly and ac- 
curately stated the premise in his question is 
‘open to grave doubt; in the second place, the 
assumption that life is so simple as to allow 
of its interpretation by “‘yes’’ or “no” or arith- 
metical answers given in response to an un- 
known inquirer is wholly false. The assump- 
tion that the reply will be unbiased because an- 

2 Elements of Statistics, Arthur L. Bowley. 

179 


swered in simple “‘yes” or “‘no”’ form is, on its 
face, absurd. ‘This simplification of the reply 
may indeed be good reason for doubting the en- 
tire conclusion or it may merely account for the 
fact that so many social surveys disclose only 
what was already generally known before the 
investigation. 


Illustration: 

The student wishes to know what impelled 
a particular farmer to join the cooperative 
marketing association. If he asks the question 
according to the “yes” or ‘“‘no” formula, it will 
be stated in some such manner as this: Did you 
join the cooperative marketing association in 
order to increase your economic income? A 
‘‘yes’’ to this query would be a true answer, 
but it would be only partially true. Yet it 
would be the response to be expected. A “ 
would at once be mistrusted, although it might 
be anticipated as a reply to a particular investi- 
gator. If the question were further refined by 
inserting the word “only” after ‘‘association,” 
the answer would be still further vitiated "a 
a “‘yes’’ or “‘no’’ response. 

The essence of this question is “interest.” 
We become members of groups in order to en- 
hance certain of our interests. In the case un- | 
der consideration, the farmer does join the co- 
operative in order to advance his economic in- 
terest, but there may be other interests in- 
volved. His leaders may have so impressed 
him with the economic values in cooperatia | 

180 | 


marketing that he may see no other values for 
the moment. This does not mean that other 
values are not present or that they may not 
become active. Many farmers of the Southern 
States became members of codperative associ- 
ations at great out-of-door mass meetings. No 
observer of these mass tendencies to join could 
escape the conclusion that many became mem- 
bers under the duress of oratory, as a climax 
to an emotional appeal to “fight”? the middle- 
man, or under the fear of “‘being left out.” 


If some painstaking investigator should re- 
port that he had interviewed ten thousand 
members of a cooperative association and that 
91.3 per cent of them were members only be- 
cause they believed that the codperative would 
enhance their economic interests, there would 
be every reason for believing that he had wasted 
a great deal of precious time, but there would 
be almost no valid reason for believing that he 
had obtained an accurate answer to the chief 
pertinence of his inquiry. 

The hypothesis of the social survey and the 
questionnaire involves two kinds of “knowing.” 
First, the investigator knows what he wishes to 
find out. Second, he assumes that the persons 
involved in his study know what he wishes to 
discover. The first part of this hypothesis is 
entirely valid providing the investigator works 
with adequate categories. If he merely wishes 
to know how many farms of a particular size 

181 


there are in a given area, how many people live 
in a single city block, et cetera, this information 
may be obtained. When he approaches the sec- 
ond part of his hypothesis, however, and at- 
tempts to secure information by asking ques- 
tions of persons, his method must be subjected 
to rigorous criticism. If he is still within the 
realm of the “what” of life, he may obtain 
satisfactory answers to his queries. If he 
enters upon the “why” and the “how” of life, 
which he must do if he is to learn anything 
about process as distinguished from status, he 
cannot rely upon simple answers to his cate- 
gorical questions. The ‘“‘yes-or-no,” ‘“‘black- 
or-white’”’ view of life is not only too much of 
a simplification but it is in reality a falsification. 


3. The Behaviorist’s Position on Asking 
Questions 


One school of psychologists, the behaviorists, 
has gone so far as to eliminate almost entirely 
from its technique the method of finding out by 
asking questions.* Answers to inquiries are ra- 
tionalizations, introspections, and are not sub- 
ject to tests and measurements. If, say the be- 
haviorists, you wish to know what a person is 
doing, by all means refrain from asking him. 
His answer is sure to be wrong, not merely be- 
cause he does not know what he is doing but 

5 See exceptions, pp. 38 to 42, Watson’s Psychology. 

182 


| 
i 
) 
. 


| 
| 
| 
: 


precisely because he is answering a question and 
he will make the reply in terms of you and not 
in terms of the objective thing he really is 
doing.* Observation, in order to become the 
basis of a true induction, must be divorced from 
the unreliable influences of introspection. Thus, 
insist the behaviorists, if you wish to know what 
a person is really doing, watch him (don’t ask 


him). 


4. Observation; a Form of Asking Questions 


The position of the behaviorists appears to 
be wholly sound within certain prescribed 
spheres. Thus the method of objective observa- 
tion in relation to all phenomena connected 
with behavior which are subject to measure- 
ment is superior to any other conceivable 
method of interpreting these phenomena; cer- 
tainly it is not to be compared with the unre- 


Curiously enough, the psycho-analysts, who are 
equally popular with the behaviorists and appear to 
get on amicably with them, function under a directly 
anti-behavioristic assumption. ‘They appear to hold 
that the product of their analyses belongs to the sub- 
ject’s mind. It appears wholly obvious that the product 
must of necessity be the joint product of the analyst 
and the subject. The main basis of error in this 
method is the common one of assuming that stimuli do 
not enter into and become a part of the final response. 

For a disagreement with the above, see The Freudian 
Wish, E. B. Holt. 

183 


liable results of mere introspection. If, for 
example, a person explains to an investigator 
what he is doing and his activities are then ob- 
served by six other investigators with the result 
that the six observers find an explanation of the 
person’s conduct which is in contradiction with 
the person’s own explanation, it is not difficult 
to determine which conclusion will find the most 
ready acceptance. A defendant in court may be 
ever so insistent upon his innocence but if a 
jury of twelve persons decides that he is guilty, 
this verdict will be approved. And if the de- 
fendant’s testimony can be refuted with the ob- 
servations of expert observers, alienists, psy- 


chiatrists, physicians, accountants, et cetera, the 


weight of evidence will inevitably fall against 
the defendant. The jury does not of course 
constitute an observing body, but is presumed to 
base its inductions upon the observations of 
others; when these others are experts, the as- 
sumption is that the inductions are handed to 
the jury ready-made. 

Returning to our case, the man whose ex- 
planation of his conduct does not conform to 
the explanation of the six expert observers, the 
problem here involved is not so simple as it 
was made to appear above. What happens 
when six expert observers disagree? Is there 
any reason for attaching greater integrity to 
any of the conflicting expert conclusions than to 
that of the person whose behavior is being ob- 

184 


served and whose introspections are being dis- 
credited? ‘This is not a purely hypothetical 
question, for juries do not invariably render 
their verdicts in conformity with expert testi- 
mony, and experts—when were they ever 
_known to agree? But the behaviorist is still 
right—within a certain prescribed sphere. If 
the conduct of the person under observation is 
susceptible of isolation in particulars, and if 
these particulars are objectively measurable, 
then the expert observer’s measurements must 
be accorded infinitely greater weight than any- 
thing which any one may say concerning them. 
But since behavior is the response of the total 
organism it cannot be explained in terms of par- 
ticulars. Watson not only clarifies this point 
but states the problem admirably when he says: 
“The behaviorist is interested in integrations 
and total activities of the individual. At one 
moment we ask the question: What is the in- 
dividual doing? We observe that he is type- 
writing, searching for a lost pocket-book or 
‘reacting’ to an emotional stimulus. If the 
latter happens to be true and we are interested 
in the way his emotional life as a whole hangs 
together, we may go on to show why the in- 
dividual reacts in an emotional way to this 
particular stimulus. . . . Surely objective psy- 
chology can study brick laying, house building, 
playing games, marriage or emotional activity 
without being accused of reducing everything to 
185 


a muscle twitch or the secretion of a gland.” ® 
This is a fair-minded admission which many 
critics of behaviorism appear to have over- 
looked. It introduces essential factors of the 
study of behavior which are not now susceptible 
to objective tests and measurements. As Wat- 
son himself says, ‘‘Certain important psychologi- 
cal undertakings probably can never be brought 
under laboratory control.” * In such cases the 
behaviorist does what every other scientist 
does, namely, he conceives hypotheses, theories, 
postulates, by the methods of inference, and by 
means of these conclusions, he attempts to ex- 
plain (preferably after experimentation) the 
objectively commensurable factors. In doing 
this, the behaviorist of course uses the mental 
processes of the ordinary individual. Whether 
or not these processes involve consciousness, 
or the effectiveness of consciousness, or con- 
sciousness as a cause, appears to be a debate 
over words—albeit a debate which is accom- 
panied by considerable heat in the philosophical 
camp. If science and philosophy could tran- 
scend the propensity of making dogmatic classi- 


fications of ‘‘schools,” of using artificial labels — 


which serve chiefly as the symbols of partisan- 
ship, how greatly might the advances of knowl- 
edge be accelerated! All of this comes evi- 


5 Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, 
J. B. Watson, p. 40. 
6 Tbid., p. 28. 
186 


dently from the failure to regard science as a 
method, or rather from the opposite tendency 
of regarding science as a body of laws. 

Insofar as behaviorism is a method of dis- 
covery, it is scientific. “Those who would ex- 
tend its domain to the field of philosophy do in- 
jury to its possible effectiveness as method. 
Particular responses may be isolated (at least 
partially), observed, controlled and measured. 
For the present it is not possible to make purely 
objective observations, controls and measure- 
ments of the responses of the total personality. 
Hence objective psychology cannot give an ade- 
quate and complete account of behavior. “Two 
constructive paths lie before the investigator: 
one is to assist in perfecting the facilities of ob- 
jective observation and the other is to make the 
highest possible use of all other forms of ob- 
servation.™ 


5. The Study of Behavior Involves What the 
Person (or Goup) is Doing Plus What He 
(orIt) Thinks He (or It) is Doing 


Asking questions of a person is a form of ob- 
servation. Even if the answers are false, they 
may serve to refine the ultimate conclusions. 


62’The so-called Gestalt school of psychology 
(Kohler) appears to have made an excellent beginning 
in the development of a technique for observing be- 
havior as a total response. 


187 


In fact, the psychiatrist who makes inquiries of 
his subject does not anticipate true replies, but — 
he nevertheless makes use of such responses as 
he receives. The so-called intelligence tests 
(which might be more serviceable if regarded as 
attainment or achievement tests) are forms of — 
observation although they are also based upon — 
answers to questions. The query may demand — 
nothing more than a non-verbal response, but 
it is still a question and the response is an an- © 
swer. What is in a person’s “mind” may or 
may not be true but it is the sum total of his 
rationalizations upon which his life has pro- 
ceeded. If he acts upon the basis of these 
rationalizations, they are insofar significant in — 
explaining his behavior. If he “thinks” he is 
doing a particular thing for one reason and in 
reality is doing it on entirely different grounds, 
both reasons are important. The people of the © 
United States may be designated as materialistic — 
but they regard themselves as being idealistic — 
and sentimental. Is it not legitimate to 
conclude that they are both? At times they ~ 
act in response to what is represented by their © 
real interests, which may be economic, but at — 
other times they act as though they really be- 
lieved themselves to be idealistic. Both types — 
of acting are real, and both enter into the total — 
behavior-pattern. 
The individual responds as a whole. There- — 
fore if his behavior is to be understood, the ~ 
188 


whole must be observed as well as the parts. 
In like manner it may be said, although with 
less accuracy, that the group responds as a unit. 
There is thus placed upon the investigator the 
obligation of discovering means of observing 
the group as a whole. 


-6. The Answer to the Question: What is the 
Group Doing—Must Come from Both 
the Inside and the Outside 


We have now set out to discover certain 
definite things about two specific groups: a 
farmers’ cooperative association and the mid- 
dlemen whom it would displace. Our cate- 
gories of information have been derived by ob- 
serving the groups in action. ‘This observation 
has led us to the inquiry: What is the nature of 
the behavior of these groups? In attempting 
to study the behavior of the groups we have 
found it necessary to break up the whole into 
parts. Thus far we are quite willing to admit 
that much of the process of breaking up the 
whole is purely arbitrary procedure. It is of 
the same type as the arbitrary marks on a ther- 
mometer or a scale, although its initial purpose 
is not to measure units but to designate or con- 
ceive what is believed to be happening. Its 
secondary purpose is to attempt explanations of 
what is believed to be happening. We are now 
confronted with the questions: 

189 


a. The groups have leaders; what is 
the relation between the leaders and the 
groups? 

b. The groups represent interests; 
what interests? how are these interests 
represented? 

c. The groups give consent to cer- 
tain activities; what is this consent? How — 
is it given? 

d. The groups utilize the services of ex- 
perts; what is the function of the expert? 
how is this function interpreted to the 
group? 

e. The activities as well as the prin- 
ciples of the groups are assumed to be 
based upon facts: how are these facts 
obtained? how used? 

f. The groups under observation are 
seen to respond to other groups, to in- 
dividuals, to the Government, et cetera; 
what is the nature of this multiple re- 
sponse? 


Observation as used in this study is taken to © 
mean two things: (1) What is the group do- 
ing? (2) What does the group “think’’ it is 
doing?” Or, observation from the inside as 
well as observation from the outside. Ob- 


7 Of equal importance is the question: What do oth- 
ers think the group is doing? How do they react in 
terms of what the group is doing, or thinks it is doing? 
These questions are left to the discussion of multiple 
response and public opinion. 

190 


viously no single investigator would be capable 
of carrying on this type of observation alone. 
The task makes an experiment in joint or co- 
operative (investigation) observation impera- 
tive. This is no slight demand. Much is said 
about the necessity for joint investigation but 
the scarcity of this sort of investigation (study) 
may be attributed to its difficulties. 


47. The Function of the Participant Observer 


For experimental purposes the codperating 
observers have been called “participant ob- 
servers.’ The term implies, not that the ob- 
servers are participating in the study but that 
they are participating in the activities of the 
group being observed. Persons involved in the 
activities of a group who also understand the 
methods of observation are rare. In fact, 
there are few such persons available and those 
who are must be trained. Such training in- 
volves its own difficulties. Shall the participant 
observer be trained to look for exactly the same 
factors which are sought by the observer from 
the outside? This method would inevitably 
lead to error for the participant observer 
should be free to see many things which the 
outside observer can never see. If he merely 
sees what his mentor on the outside asks him to 
see, it is entirely likely that the sum of his ob- 
servations may turn out to be nothing but pre- 


IgI 


possessions. On the basis of the small amount 
of experience available it is somewhat hazard- 
ous to speak of the functions of the participant 
observer, but an attempt at such specification 
must be made in order to facilitate criticism. 
With this tentative end in view it may then be 
said that the participant observer is one who 
(1) Is a part of the group being 
studied 
(2) Has vital interests involved in the 
group’s activities 
(3) Provides the exterior or outside 
observer with the facts of the group’s ac- 
tivities 
(4) Provides the outside observer 
with facts bearing upon the categories 
utilized in the study 
(5) Presents criticisms of the cate- 
gories 
(6) Discovers new categories as 
emergencies of the group’s changing ac- 
tivities 
(7) Corrects conclusions of the out- 


side observer from the viewpoint of one 


whose interests are at stake 


At once it becomes apparent that the par-_ 


ticipant observer will furnish much biased in- — 


formation. He will be the informant of what 


the group “thinks” it is doing. Hence much of © 


what he contributes will be of a subjective and 
192 


introspective character.’ But his observations 
will still be tinctured with the prejudices of one 
who is a partisan member of a group. ‘This is 
precisely what is wanted. The real meaning of 
the group and its processes is presumed to be 
something which is affected by what the group 
actually does and its rationalizations of what it 
does. Emotions, prejudices, habits, customs, 
mores, sentiments—all of these enter into the 
rationalizations. ‘To assume that they are un- 
important parts of the group’s behavior-pattern 
is to eliminate some of the very mainsprings of 
human action and behavior. Many of the im- 
plications of this method of observation will 
be clarified under the discussion of ‘Social 
Conflict as the Laboratory,’ Chapter X. 
There it will be more clearly disclosed why 
the prejudicial aspects of group _ behavior 
cannot be neglected if we are to ascertain the 
real nature of the group and its processes. 


8. Group Purpose Revealed Through the Par- 


ticipant Observer 


What the group ‘‘thinks”’ it is doing, i.e., its 
rationalizations of its activities—past, present 
and future—may be regarded roughly as the 


8 Experience thus far discloses the fact, however, that 
such observers tend to become objective in their obser- 
vations. 


193 


group’s purpose. ‘This quality corresponds to 
that element in individual behavior which eludes 
objective observation. The minutest observa- 
tions of what a man is doing can never reveal 
the precise purpose or motive ® which accounts 
fully for his acts. His stated purpose may also 
be misleading, but at some point between the 
individual’s purpose and his activity there exists 
either an essential harmony or an essential dis- 
harmony. By discovering this point it becomes 
possible to arrive at certain workable inferences 
regarding the individual’s purpose. Psychiatric 
technique is able to arrive at such inferences 
and the applications of the inferences to be- 
havior problems often produce striking results. 
Psychiatrists do not rely upon objective observa- 
tions, nor do they accept the individual’s ra- 
tionalizations. ‘The use of the participant ob- 
server in attempting to illumine group purpose 
is analogous to the technique of the psychiatrist. 
The group does not, of course, think or ra- 
tionalize as individuals think and rationalize. 
These terms are used merely because of the 
analogical worth; they convey ideas which must — 
at this stage be stated in accustomed terms if 
collective psychology is to be made intelligible. 
The “thinking” and “rationalizing” of the 
group are always phenomena arising out of dis- 


® The term “desire” is not used because its connota- 
tion appears to be included in the broad definition of 
“interest” employed in later chapters. 


194 


il 
ae fi 
f 


cussion or out of the acceptance of the dicta of 
the leaders, the officials or the experts. The 
group does not think, nor does it perform any 
function which may be adequately defined by the 
terms and within the categories of individual 
psychology. But thinking is done by members 
of the group and the product of such thinking 
may roughly be called ‘“‘group-thinking,”’ which 
does not mean that the group thinks but rather 
that the group accepts by some form of con- 
sent a concurrent result of individual thinking. 
What happens when individuals discuss, or 
rather what happens in the relation between 
minds, is a problem which has been almost 
wholly neglected by psychologists and social 
scientists..° If the observer is seated in the 
gallery and watches the group behave in a situa- 
tion of tension, is he likely to understand what 
is happening and why? We are confronted 
here with the double difficulty of having a gal- 
lery which undoubtedly affects the group’s be- 
havior and an observer who must view the ac- 
tivity objectively but who cannot ascertain the 
purposes and motives of activity without as- 
‘suming integrity and knowledge on the part of 
informants. 


10’This is the problem with which Miss Follett is 
concerned in the early chapters of The New State. 
There has recently appeared a commendable effort to 
‘approach the question from the viewpoint of philosophy. 
See The Contact Between Minds, C. Delisle Burns. 


195 


Illustration: . 

A group discussion (Group A) took place. 
The subject was one of vital concern to the 
group. The outside observer was cordially in- 
vited but nothing happened. ‘Iwo weeks later 
a policy was inaugurated which affected the 
subject of this discussion. ‘The observer at 
once made the effort to learn whether this 
policy was precipitated by some new event or 
whether it had merely emerged after continued 
discussion. ‘To his surprise he learned that the 
policy was decided upon almost immediately 
after he had left the group discussion. In this 
case the observer acted as an inhibitor to the 
group’s discussion and nothing but inane and 
irreievant remarks were made. Once the ob- 
server was out of the way, discussion proce 
with despatch.” 


A certain tendency toward the concealment 
of purposes has arisen in social organization. 
Trade unions, chambers of commerce and farm 
organizations are all subject to this tendency. 


11 Numerous experiments of this kind have been at- 
tempted. Continuous attendance of an outside ob- 
server at the meetings of a shop committee tended to" 
emasculate the discussion and in the end the meetings 
were discontinued. In another instance where the out-. 
side observer aligned himself with the interest of the 
group and changed his status from outside to partici- 
pant observer, the situation was entirely changed the 
moment he took part in the discussion as one with in- 
terests at stake. 4 


196 


It is not, however, confined to groups in open 
conflict with other groups where the technique 
resembles military strategy, but strangely, it is 
encountered in social service groups and in or- 
ganizations which have none but sociable func- 
tions. How this tendency affects the use of 
facts in group function will be shown later. It 
is sufficient here to indicate that this constitutes 
an added difficulty in the way of ascertaining 
what the group “‘thinks’”’ it is doing. The ex- 
perimental use of participant observers has, it 
is believed, served as an approach to the solu- 
tion of this difficulty. 


9. Integrating the Conclusions of the Ob- 
server and the Participant Observer; a 
Logical and a Psychological Process 


The assumption already made is: what the 
group is really doing is an integration of what 
it objectively does and what it “thinks” it is 
doing. The total act of the group considered 
in relation to the group’s evolving function is a 
conjunction of activity and purpose. Ulti- 
mately the act comes to be more than a conjunc- 
tion. By “ultimately” is meant the time when 
the particular group becomes an accepted part 
of the totality of functioning groups in the com- 
munity. When this period has been reached, 
purpose and objective activity will necessarily 
transcend the conjoined state and become in- 


197 


tegrated total activity. But there is no end to 
the integrating process; conflicts from within 
and without will constantly recur and the func- 
tion of the group will eventuate in a continuing 
series of integrations of changing purpose with 
changing objective activity. 

From the viewpoint of research technique 
this hypothesis must be reduced to the process 
of integration between the conclusions of the 
observer and those of the participant observer. 
This process, as the following illustration will 
indicate, involves both logical and psychological 
methods. | 


Ttustration: 

One of the groups under observation pursued 
the policy of refusing to publish the amount 
of receipts at its warehouses. This came to be 
an acute situation in one area in which the op- 
position (middlemen’s organization) was par- 
ticularly effective. 


Observations of the Outside Observer: 


a. The fact of refusing to publish receipts. 
b. The purpose of this policy is to conceal 
weakness from the opposition. 

c. The state law states that such receipts must 
be published weekly. 

d. Technical evasion of the law will give moral 
advantage to the opposition. 
198 | 
| 


_ 


Observations of the Participant Observer: 


a. Agreement on the fact. 
b. The purpose of this policy is to 
i. Conceal weakness from the member- 
ship. 
ii. Assist in control of the market. 

c. [he law covers purchases and not receipts; 
bs warehouses merely receive and do not 
sell. 

d. This may be offset by emphasizing the 
iniquities of the middlemen’s marketing 
system. 


Complete analysis of these two sets of ob- 
servations is not necessary for the purpose of 
indicating that whatever reasoning takes place 
must proceed from known facts to possible or 
probable conclusions. ‘This constitutes a logical 
process. But the mere use of logic might end 
in disclosing two opposed conclusions, as in fact 
it did in the above case. The conclusions of the 
participant observer led directly to a contin- 
uance of the stated policy and those of the ob- 
server pointed unmistakably to the necessity of 
changing the policy. Observations b, c and d 
were in reality opposing conclusions de- 
rived from the same premise. They were 
not, however, mutually contradictory. It is 
not difficult to see that the b of both observers 
is susceptible of consolidation; all three pur- 


199 


poses were in reality involved and possibly other — 


purposes which were not definable. Conclusions 
c and d gradually evolved into a joint ethical 
consideration involving the press and public 
opinion. The adjustment which was finally 
made involved the state, the middlemen, the 
press, public opinion, the membership and out- 
side critics of the group. The basis of this ad- 
justment was established as an integrated solu- 
tion in the minds of the observers long before 
it came to be an actual adjustment or activity on 
the part of the group. ‘The integration was 
achieved, obviously, by the use of both logical 
and psychological methods, 


200 


CHAPTER IX 


CATEGORIES AND TERMS 
RE-DEFINED 


1. The Rules of Definition 


THE problem of language persists in all of 
what has been written above—much as a nettle 
adheres to and impedes the progress of a pedes- 
trian. The foregoing chapters on logic and 
analogy are almost entirely dependent upon 
what is understood by the use and meaning of 
words in communication. In Chapter IV the 
position is taken that numerals must be re- 
garded as symbols and that their utilization in 
social statistics is likely to lead to a neglect of 
investigation of the relation between numerals 
as symbols and their referents. In Chapter VII 
the problem of terms, words or categories is 
approached directly. Since this chapter was 
written a scholarly volume’? which marks the 
beginning of an inductive science of symbolism 
has appeared. If the above-mentioned chapters 


1The Meaning of Meaning, Ogden and Richards. 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, International Library 
of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method. 
20I 


were to be rewritten in conformity with the 
dicta of this work numerous revisions and par- 
ticularly numerous substitutions of terms would 
be necessary. However, the general theory of 
words as symbols which bear no causal relation 
to their referents as set forth in The Meaning 
of Meaning so closely approximates the theory 
underlying the present essay that it has been 
decided to allow the previously written chapters 
to stand as they are. The reason for this de- 
cision is based chiefly upon the assumption that 
the necessary comparisons which the reader will 
thus be obliged to make may prove to be help- 
ful in advancing the science of symbolism in 
connection with the social sciences. 

At this juncture it will prove helpful to re- 
capitulate several of the conclusions, theorems 
and rules which constitute the general theory of 
language as set forth by Ogden and Richards: 


A. The relation between a thought or refer- 
ence and its language symbol may be re- 
garded as a causal relation. 

B. The relation between a thought or refer- 
ence and its referent (the object referred 
to) may be regarded as a causal relation. 

C. The relation between a symbol and its refer- 
ent must be regarded as an imputed and 
not as a causal relation.’ 


2 This is excellently portrayed by means of a diagram 
on p. 14, The Meaning of Meaning. 
202 


Tilustration: 

If I think of a leader of a group and desig- 
nate him by the symbol leader, then my thought 
bears a causal relation to the symbol Jeader. 
My thought also bears a causal relation to the 
specific leader thought of, i.e., as an object of 
my thought. But the symbol “leader” bears no 
causal relation to its referent, the leader. 


D. Hence “there are three factors involved 
when any statement is made or interpreted. 
‘‘t. Mental processes 
“2. The symbol 
‘3. A referent—something which is 
thought ‘of.’ 
‘The theoretical problem of Symbolism is— 

“How are these three related? 

“The practical problem, since we must use 
words in discussion, is— 

“How far is our discussion itself distorted 
by habitual attitudes towards words and 
lingering assumptions due to theories no 
longer openly held but still allowed to 
guide our practise?” 

E. “In all thinking we are interpreting signs. 
Our interpretation of any sign is our psy- 
chological reaction to it, as determined by 
our past experience in similar situations 
and by our present experience.”’ ® 
The interpretation of a sign (symbol) is 
then a sign-situation. 

F. “In any discussion or interpretation of 


* Pp. 382, 383, 384. 
203 


symbols we need a means of identifying 
referents. [he reply to the question, 
‘What does a word or symbol refer to? 
consists in the substitution of a symbol 
or symbols which can be better under- 
stood. Such substitution is Definition. It 
involves the selection of known referents 
as starting points, and the identification 
of the definiendum by its connection with 
these.”’ * 


The importance of the above rules to the 
social sciences can scarcely be over-estimated. 
Words and terms are used less discriminatingly 
in this sphere probably than in any other phase 
of human thinking. Every student of the social 
sciences should pursue a preliminary study of 
symbolism before attempting to understand and 
interpret the terms to be utilized. ‘The lan- 
guage of these sciences may be refined only if 
the question, ‘What is it that I am referring 
to?’ is constantly reiterated. 


.2. Statement of Terms and Categories 


The point has now been reached in the 
present study to re-examine the categories of 
information to be utilized. As already in- 
dicated,° three categories are to be employed. 


* Pp. 386-387. 
5 Chapter VII. 
204 


aga 


Category I includes terms used as symbols re- 


ferring to 
1. Ihe Group 
2. Leaders and leadership 
3. Experts 


4. Observers and participant observers 


The terms under this category are symbols 
whose referents are persons or combinations of 
persons. 


Category IT includes terms used as symbols re- 
ferring to 
Group situations 
Group stimuli 
Group responses 
Representation 
Consent 
Discussion 
Use of Facts 
Interests 
Points-of-view 
Use of language 
Power. 


HOO DI QAnAW WD 4 


s+ 


The terms under this category are symbols 
whose referents are activities of the group or 
of individuals within or without the group and 
affecting its behavior. 


Category III includes terms used as symbols re- 


ferring to 
1. Customs 
2. Mores 


205 


Traditions 
Attitudes 
Ethics 

The Law 
Public Opinion. 


See 


The terms under this category are symbols 
whose referents are controls or modes of con- 
trol which modify and condition the group’s be- 
havior although they are descriptive of quali- 
ties more inclusive than the immediate member- 
ship of the group. 


Since the terms of these categories are sym- 
bols for the problems raised by this study, they 
cannot, obviously, be accurately defined. They 
are in fact at this juncture merely partial sym- 
bols. “Only occasionally will a symbolization 
be available which, without loss of its symbolic 
accuracy, is also suitable (to the author’s atti- 
tude to his public), appropriate (to his refer- 
ent), judicious (likely to produce the desired 
effects) and personal (indicative of the stability 
or instability of his references.’”’* ‘The author 
is aware of the ambiguity of some and the emo- 
tional flavor of other of the above terms. ‘Thus 
‘expert’ is a term which carries its own nega- 
tive connotations and may be used scientifically 
only if intensively or extensively defined. The 
categories also include terms which unavoidably 
betray the author’s knowledge of the “‘insta- 


®° The Meaning of Meaning, p. 371. 
20 


bility” of his references. The definitions then 
which follow are to be regarded merely as ten- 
tative efforts to designate certain symbols as 
bearing an imputed relation to the objects or 
phenomena (referents) for which they serve as 
signs. It is not presumed that professional 
sociologists and social psychologists will concur 
in these definitions; nor is such concurrence at 
this point desirable. Investigation along both 
lines—in the sphere of language symbols and in 
the sphere of the data which constitute the as- 
sumed basis of the social sciences—will need to 
go much further and deeper before anything 
like scientific concurrence may be expected. In 
the process of selection and elimination which 
accompanied the determination of categories, 
attention was directed toward terms which 
have already come into common usage in the 
field of one or another of the social sciences. 
Thus “consent” and ‘‘representation” are al- 
ready useful categories for political science, 
although carrying a different implication. 


3. Definitions of Terms in Category I 


a. The Method of Definition Illustrated: 
Definition of the Term “Group” 


(1) Group: Two or more persons con- 
sciously acting together for the pur- 
pose of advancing a mutual interest. 


The terms in this definition which are 
207 


symbols of specific referents are: two or 


more, consciously, acting together, pur-— 


pose, advancing, mutual and interest. — 
Those which are likely to give trouble are: — 


consciously, purpose, mutual and interest. — 


It will not be difficult to secure concurrence 
for the statement that a group is more than one © 
person and that this congeries or aggregate © 
acts—does something—as a group. Nor will | 
support be lacking for the statement that the © 
group is conscious both of its existence—its — 


group-ness—and of its activity... What the 
group indicates as the nature of its activity may, 
of course, be something entirely different when 
viewed from outside the group. 


Example: 

The Ku Klux Klan indicates its activity as 
being of the nature of support to religion, pa- 
triotism, et cetera. Viewed as a result and from 
the outside, these activities may be seene as 
inimical to religion and patriotism. 


That all members of a group are conscious of 
“acting together’ and of the ‘‘mutual interest”’ 
involved is questionable. Many groups are 
formed by skillful methods of propaganda which 
secure membership in the group but do not se- 


7 Whether or not a group really “‘acts” is also a de- 
batable question which will be dealt with later. 
208 


cure the consciousness of purposes and interests 
involved. But whether such marginal members 
of a functioning group can really be said to be 
actual members is doubtful; there will always 
be a small coterie within the group which is 
conscious of the “acting together” as well as 
of the interests concerned. Moreover it is 
highly doubtful if the ‘‘group”’ is capable of per- 
forming the functions which the definition 
ascribes to a group, without a certain degree of 
consciousness of activity and purpose. 

The chief implication of consciousness in the 
above definition is that members of a group are 
mentally affected by their group adherence. Be- 
ing a member of a group, e.g., is not merely a 
physiological phenomenon; it must sooner or 
later involve those aspects of behavior which 
are usually ascribed to consciousness or to 
mental activity. Mental activity is then the 
referent of the symbol “consciously.”’ 

Purpose and interest ought not under or- 
dinary conditions to be included in the same 
definition. Purpose * is here used as a synonym 
either for the reason which a person gives for 
his activity or the reason which may be dis- 
covered. The referent for which purpose is 
then the symbol is aim or intention. The raison 
d étre or the rationale of an individual’s mem- 


8 This use of the term “purpose” should of course be 
carefully distinguished from its use as a purely teleo- 
logical or philosophical symbol. 

209 


bership in a group may be roughly called his 
purpose. 

‘Advancing a mutual interest’? must first of 
all be considered as a single term. ‘Taken as a 
whole it is itself a referent of purpose. If it 
is desired to learn what a person’s real pur- 
pose in joining a group is, the particular or 
complex interest that the group advances for 
him must sooner or later be discovered. ‘The 
term “mutual” merely indicates that each group 
to which an individual belongs represents either 
the whole or some portion of what is to him 
an interest worth conserving or advancing (in 
groups which are more or less static the in- 
terest will be conserved and in dynamic groups 
the interest will be advanced or enhanced) and 
that this same interest is considered to be worth 
conserving or advancing by all members of the 
group. Whether or not the interest is consid- 
ered to be of equal value by all members of 
the group is unimportant for the purport of the 
definition. The means which an individual pur- 
sues in order to advance his interests may be the 
group. A brief definition of the group might 
therefore be: A means of advancing individual 
interests which involves joining with other in- 
dividuals who place value upon the same in- 
terests. 

We have still to deal with the term “‘in- 
terest.”’° As apart of the context of this study 

® The definition of the term “interest” given in the 

210 | 


the term has unusual significance. In fact the 
symbol “‘interest’’ is placed in such a pivotal 
position in the contextual arrangement of this 
volume that it deserves far more space than 
will be convenient and appropriate if the pres- 
ent study is to be kept within bounds. The use 
of the term will best be understood if considera- 
tion is given to the various ways in which it has 
been defined by others. 


A. Sociological Definitions: 


(a) “In general an interest is an un- 
satisfied capacity, corresponding to an un- 


Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (J. M. Bald- 
win) excludes the use of the term here suggested. 
“(Interest) loosely used for personal advantage or 
good; as in the phrase, ‘it is in his interest to do so.’ 
This meaning is not sufficiently exact to be technically 
useful,” p. 562, vol. 1. ‘This is regarded as a conserva- 
tive and hence intensive limitation of the term. ‘The 
term “interest”? should be looked upon apparently as 
a word with ambiguous possibilities. Once this is rec- 
ognized, it becomes a simple matter to distinguish be- 
tween psychological interest (meaning to be interested 
in), economic interest (meaning a payment for the use 
of capital), and sociological interest (meaning the ob- 
jectives for which the individual or the group exerts 
energy). If the method of limiting the term or refusing 
to recognize its diverse meaning as suggested above 
were followed, then all ambiguous words should be 
treated in the same manner; this would lead to a whole- 
sale pauperization of language since there are few terms 
which are not susceptible of ambiguous use. 
2II 


re ——— 


realized condition, and it is pre-disposition — 
to such re-arrangement as would tend to 
realize the indicated condition. 
The whole life-process, so far as we know 
it, whether viewed in its individual or in 
its social phase, is at last the process of 
developing, adjusting and satisfying in- 
teréstsn 7. | 

(b) “By interest we mean any aim or 
object which stimulates activity towards its” 
attainment. . . . An interest involves, | 
therefore, some consciousness, however 
vague, of a satisfaction to be attained and 
some resultant activity towards its attain- 
ment. . °.''. ‘An interest 1s any objech 
of the will.’ ™ 

(c) “Every form of phenomena from 
heavenly body to atom, and every organ- 
ism is a part of the original force with an 
interest appropriate to its particular de- 
velopment. . . . This inborn interest 
is the prime factor in attention, association, — 
purpose and will. . [hese interests% 
become in a sense forces.!i i.e., an interest@ 
unsatisfied is a condition of maladapta- 
tion and gives rise to a feeling of unrest” 
and of discomfort.” ¥ 

(d) ‘‘Beliefs rest on interest. Bue 


10 General Sociology, Albion W. Small, pp. 425-436. 
11 The Elements of Social Science, R. M. Mclver, 
pp. 64-65. 
12 Die Sociologische Erkenntnis, Gustav Ratzenhofer, 
pp. 28, 34, 252. 
7m rd 


what is interest? It is feeling. World 
views grow out of feeling. They are the 
bulwarks of race safety. You cannot 
argue men out of them. They are the 
conditions to group as well as to individual 
salvation. All interest is essentially eco- 
nomic, and seen in their true light, re- 
ligious interests are as completely economic 
as the so-called material interests.” ** 


These four definitions appear to summarize 
the sociologists’ approach to the problem of in- 
terests. Schaflle speaks a great deal about the 
“struggle of interests’; Spencer’s classification 
of diverse interests of the species, the parent 
and the offspring is given considerable import- 
ance; Mackenzie says, ‘‘though diversity of in- 
terests leads to conflict, ultimately the good of 
the individual and society are identical”; LeBon, 
in the rhapsodic style of his earlier work, ex- 
claims, ‘‘social groupings so united by a common 
physiological and psychological heritage, so 
bound together by common interests and ideals, 
and responding so alike to a common stimulus 
that we may well speak of such groups as having 
a soul”; Carver sees only one escape from the 
dilemma of interests and suggests that, “Even 
under the conditions of economic scarcity there 
would be no antagonism of interests between 
man and man if human nature were to undergo 


18 Applied Sociology, Lester F. Ward, pp. 45-46. 
213 


4 
a change by which altruism were to replace 
egoism’’; et cetera. 


B. Definitions from Jurisprudence and Polit. 
ical Science: 


(a) “Natural rights mean simply in- 
terests which we think ought to be secured; _ 
demands which human beings make which > 
we think ought to be satisfied. It is per-— 
fectly true that neither law nor state 
creates them. But it is fatal to all sound © 
thinking to treat them as legal conceptions. 

A legal system attains its ends 
by recognizing certain interests, individ- 
ual, public and social; by defining the limits 
within which these interests shall be recog- 
nized legally and given effect through the 
force of the state, and by endeavoring to 
secure the interests so recognized within 
the defined limits.”’ ** 

(b) “The idea behind the concept of 
interest is that of participation in some 
property or benefit or advantage, i.e., in 
some value whether tangible or otherwise. 
, The thing in question calls out a 
peculiar sort of mental attitude in the mind 
of the person interested; it has a bearing 
upon his action or judgment, and he has a 
share in it in the sense that it is a matter of 
at least potential value for him. He con- 


*4 The Spirit of the Common Law, Roscoe Pound, p. 


91-92. 
214 


cerns himself about it. . . . It will be 
readily seen, therefore, that the concep- 
tion of an interest is well designed to break 
down the exclusive character which at- 
tached historically to the conception of a 
pits)’. An (interest wew eds: a 
share and it carries with it the suggestion 
of other sharers. . . . A right is the 
attribute of a person, but an interest may 
be larger and more permanent than the 
person who possesses it. . . . An in- 
terest in some corporate group, like a polit- 
ical party or a church, means the accept- 
ance of the purpose of the group as a part 
of one’s own purposes.” *° 


The movement towards supplanting interests 
for rights in the field of jurisprudence and polit- 
ical science ** appears to have made consider- 
able headway among the thinkers but it is dif- 
ficult to believe that this is also true of the prac- 
titioners in these spheres. A comparison of 
the attempts at definition provided by the so- 
ciologists with those provided in the second 


18 The Modern Idea of the State, H. Krabbe, Trans- 
lators’ Introduction (Sabine and Shepard), pp. lvii, 
Iviii, lix. See also Chapter V on Interests and the Sense 
of Right. 

16 “We owe this way of thinking to Rudolph von 
Jhering who was the first to insist upon the interests 
which the legal order secures rather than the legal 
rights by which it secures them.” The Spirit of the 
Common Law, Pound, pp. 203-204. 

215 


group is convincingly unfavorable to the so- 
ciologists. ‘There is less subjectivism in the lat- 
ter group.” The thinkers in the field of juris- 
prudence evidently place great emphasis upon 
the objectivity of what they conceive to be 
an interest. For this reason their definitions 
prove helpful. 

Returning now to our task of defining “‘in- 
terest’ as a part of the context of our defini- 
tion of a group and keeping in mind the rules 
of symbolization as set forth by Ogden and 
Richards, we may make the statement: 4n in- 
terest symbolizes something which all the mem- 
bers of the group want, need, desire or wish for, 
and therefore strive to acquire. 


Illustration: 

One of the interests of a trade union may bé 
said to be the recognition of the union. ‘This 
is something which they consciously seek and for 
which they are willing to assume risks. (They 
is here used as a collective term for the mem- 
bership of the union. ) 


17 Ross (Social Psychology), McDougall (Social 
Psychology), Ginsberg (The Psychology of Society) 
make no specific use of the symbol “interest.” Ross 
does, however, make extensive use of the term else- 
where, e.g., in his Social Control. See also his use of 
interest as a social force, Chapter V, Principles of So- 
clology. It is also suggested that the reader review 
Chapters XI and XII, entitled, “The Enlisting of In- 
terest” and “Self-Interest Reconsidered,” respectively, 
in Public Opinion by Walter Lippmann. 

216 


The referent is still partially concealed. 
Why do the members of a trade union want 
recognition of the union? Why do they want 
it sufficiently to make sacrifices for it? These 
questions necessitate an expansion of the above 
definition. Apparently the trade union wants 
recognition because it places value upon such 
recognition. But what sort of value? At this 
point the term “‘interest’”’ takes on the inclusive 
and comprehensive connotation imputed to it 
in this study. Ward intensifies the term by 
concluding that all interests represent ultimately 
economic or material values. This simplification 
of behavior renders the economic interpretation 
of history attractive as a generalized theory of 
life. If all interests are at bottom economic or 
material, then the trade union seeks recognition 
only because this recogntion will bring increases 
in wages, or economic income. Recognition 
of the union merely strengthens the union’s 
capacity for bargaining. There can be little 
doubt that this is precisely the reasoning which 
goes on in the minds of most trade union lead- 
ers; recognition of the union is to them merely 
a means toward power, and power is merely a 
means toward a larger share of the products of 
industry. It implies further that this separa- 
tion is to be one of perpetual conflict. If the 
workers want power merely in order to wrest 
material goods from their employers, then, of 
course, there can never be any integration of the 


217 


workers with the industry as a whole. Industry — 
will then be destined to remain a divisive rather 
than an integral affair. * 
Experience indicates that the valuation of in- — 
terests which proceeds as workers secure col- 
lective recognition is an evolving process in 
which the narrow circle of economic interests 
gradually enlarges to include other interests 
which cannot legitimately be called economic. 
In Great Britain, for example, where trade 
unions experience no difficulty in securing recog- 
nition, the workers frankly state that their ul- — 
timate goal is a share in the control of industry. _ 
(That there is no comparable tendency among ~ 
trade unionists in the United States is probably 
to be accounted for by the fact that the Amer- 
ican Federation of Labor is committed to an 
opposite philosophy; outside the Federation, 
there are evidences of a tendency which is strik- 
ingly parallel to the British movement.) A 
share in the control of industry implies some- 
thing more than mere economic returns. It in- 
volves responsibility of various sorts, e.g., the 
responsibility of being intelligent. The British 
Labor movement long ago recognized the 
utility of an educational strategy. To be intel- © 
ligent involves additional effort and the use of — 
intelligence brings as a consequence added re- © 
sponsibilities. What are to be the compensa- ~ 
tions of this added effort and responsibility? 
The argument that the anticipated compensa- — 
218 


tions are to be wholly economic would entail 
serious difficulties. It would need to explain 
why the British Labor Party insists that its pro- 
gram would bring a more equable income to all 
workers; why certain persons choose academic 
rather than business careers; why certain em- 
ployers cling to their power of control when 
their incomes have already passed far beyond 
any possible economic needs; why any sort of 
business honesty prevails, et cetera. In short, 
to substantiate the argument of economic gain 
as the single motif of life it would be necessary 
to reduce personality to a single element. Be- 
cause of its apparent simplicity this is an allur- 
ing temptation to many who are bafiled by the 
complexities of behavior. ‘This would, how- 
ever, result not ina real simplification but rather 
in further complication. Aésthetics, religion 
and ethics would have no place in such a scheme 
of life, and yet they exist to be explained. Per- 
sonalities such as Socrates, Jesus, Tolstoi and 
Lincoln must remain forever beyond the limits 
of scientific interpretation of behavior if only 
economic values and motives are valid. If be- 
havior is the response of the total personality 
(organism), there is every reason for assuming 
that such responses are not made to single or 
simple stimuli. If this is true on the individual 
level, it must be equally or more true on the 
group level. 


219 


Illustration: 

In Holt’s Freudian Wish, under the discus- 
sion of personality, the question is asked: ‘‘Why 
does a boy go fishing?’ The answer given is: 

Because the behavior of the growing 
organism is so far integrated as to respond 
specifically to such an environmental object as 
fish in the pond. It too, admits that the boy’s 
‘thought’ (content) is the fish.” ?® Thus the 
exciting stimulus which causes the boy to go 
fishing is “‘fish,” or “fish in the pond.” But is 
there not some.reason to believe that this excit- 
ing stimulus may contain other facts? Fish, 
fish in the pond, the pond, relief from school re- 
sponsibilities, the companionship of other boys, 
solitude, the shade of a tree, the excitement of 
landing the fish—what is there in the boy’s be- 
havior that excludes any of these factors? 
Why is it not legitimate to say: The boy goes 
fishing because the growing organism is so far 
integrated as to respond specifically to such an 
environmental situation which includes every- 
thing that is associated with fishing? 


Returniag to the case of recognition of the 
union as one of the interests of a trade union, 
why is it not legitimate to infer that this in- 
terest involves the workers’ desire for control, 
their dignity and position in society, their per- 
sonal ambitions, their desire to put intelli- 
gence into use, et cetera? 
18 The Freudian Wish, E. B. Holt, p. 202. 
220 


~ 


An interest possesses value therefore because 
action on its behalf includes the total person- 
ality, and the total personality may be expressed 
in multiple ways, only one of which may be 
termed economic. The values inhering in an in- 
terest are such values as tend to elevate the 
personality. Hence the symbol interest used as 
the objective of group activity connotes any- 
thing that will enhance or elevate the person- 
alities of the members of the group under con- 
sideration. The group will react to anything 
in its environment which appears to conflict 
with its interests. Interests are then the 
‘‘motor-sets” which precipitate the group into 
action. (Motor-sets, of course, belong to the 
individual and not the group, and the term is 
here used in a purely analogical sense. ‘The 
term ‘‘motor-set” can be used in describing 
group action only if it can be proved that every 
individual in the group is stimulated to make 
the same response at the same time. Crowd or 
mob behavior appears at times to be made up of 
such responses, but we are not here concerned 
with crowds but rather with organized, func- 
tional groups.) ‘The referent of the term “‘in- 
terest” is then any object or activity which 
causes the group to act or respond with the aim 
of enhancing or elevating the personalities of 
the members of the group. 

Our definition now stands: 

221 


Symbol Referent 


Group: More than one person 

Consciously : Mental activity 

Acting together: As a unit 

Purpose: Reason 

Advancing: Enhancing, elevating 

Mutual: Common to all members 
of the group 

Interests: Values relating to per- 
sonality 


Or, A group is more than one person acting 
mentally as a unit for the reason that values of 
personality common to all members of the 
group will thus be enhanced. 


Further effort might avail to eliminate some 
of the ambiguities which still remain in this 
definition, but it is not to be hoped that anything 
approaching absoluteness is possible. The 
term “group” has been utilized as an illustra- 
tion of the method of definition and now that 
the method has been amplified it will not be nec- 
essary to go into details with the succeeding 
definitions. It is suggested, however, that the 
critical reader test the ensuing definitions ac- 
cording to the rules of definition as set forth 
in the beginning of this chapter. Such criticism 
will be helpful in the impending task of refining 
the nomenclature of the social sciences in 
general. 

b. Leader: An individual whose rationaliza- 

222 


tions, judgments and feelings are accepled (re= 
sponded to) by the group as bases of belief and 
action. 

This definition extracts from the concept of 
leadership all subjective qualities such as the 
“seer,” the “prophet,” the ‘“‘visionary’’; it also 
places such qualitative terms as “‘initiative,”’ 
“loyalty,” “resourcefulness,” et cetera, in the 
background. The definition is double-barreled: 
it assumes that the leader acts as a stimulus to 
group action, and also that the group accepts, 
i.e., consciously acknowledges the rationaliza- 
tions, judgments and feelings of the leader as 
its own. The implication here is that these 
very rationalizations, judgments and feelings 
of the leader may have been stimulated by the 
group. The leader is a stimulus but he is also a 
response. Leadership resides in the individual 
who is capable of rationalizing, judging, feeling 
in terms of the group and its interests. 

c. Expert: An individual equipped with tech- 
nological information and capacities who serves 
the group on behalf of its interests. 

The leader utilizes feelings, rationalizations, 
judgments; the expert utilizes logic and facts. 
The group is an organ or agent of adjustment 
and the expert is merely a tool used in the ad- 
justing process. The relation between the ex- 
pert and the group is one of fact, not feeling. 
If machines were capable of furnishing the 
same kinds of results furnished by experts, ma- 

223 


chines would be used; but since machines cannot 
possibly possess the selective capacity neces- 
sary for the changing technological environ- 
ment, experts will always be needed. The 
group acts in response to the expert’s facts, not 
in response to the expert.’® It reacts to those 
‘facts’ whether they are true or not. The ex- 
pert, considered in relation to the group is sui 
generis. 

d. 1. Observer: One who watches the be- 
havior (stimuli and responses) of the group 
from the viewpoint of scientific interest. 

il. Participant Observer: One who 
watches the behavior of the group from the 
viewpoint of a sharer of the group’s interests. 

Chapter VIII on Observation and the Par- 
ticipant Observer makes further elaboration of 
these definitions unnecessary. It should be kept 
in mind, however, that the distinction between 
the observer and the participant observer does 
not imply that the former has no influence upon 
the behavior of the group. The idea of a 
wholly exterior, ‘‘disinfected”’ observer is held 
to be unsound for the social sciences. What is 
implied in the foregoing distinction is that the 
observer is capable of watching certain aspects 

19 The definition of the “expert” as here given will 
need to be modified if some of the conclusions of the 
latter part of this study are valid. As a matter of ob- 
servation, the group does react to the expert as well as 
to his facts, but the presumption upon which modern 
group life proceeds is in harmony with our definition. 

224 


of the behavior of the group and that the par- 
ticipant observer is capable of watching others, 
and that both aspects are important for an ade- 
quate explanation of the group’s behavior. A 
diagram may now be useful in clarifying the 
initial stage of group-study as indicated by the 
definitions of terms in Category Number J. 


G—Group under specific observation. 
G', G?, G’—Other groups related to G. 
E—Expert. L—Leader. O—Observer. 
P.O.—Participant observer. 
X—Specific environment of group under ob- 
servation. Y—Total environment. 
225 


4. Definitions of Terms in Category II 


a. Group situation: A relation which the 
group sustains to its environment which necessi- 
tates release of energy or action on the part of 
the group. 

In the study of group behavior it is apparent 
that there are periods during which the group 
as a group is quiescent. When something hap- 
pens in the environmment of the group which 
affects the group’s interests, the group is placed 
in a position or situation which demands ac- 
tivity. Group situations are occasions when the 
group is about to act or is acting. 

b. Group stimuli: Changes within or with- 
out the group which are capable of evoking a 
response from the group. 

When the group leaves its quiescent stage 
and is about to act, there is somewhere a cause 
for changed situation. ‘The cause is a stimulus. 
In individual psychology a stimulus is inter- 
preted as having the function of arousing a 
neural impulse. The group, however, has no 
nervous system and hence cannot be stimulated 
exactly in this manner. It is true that the 
group is often stimulated through an individ- 
ual (leader) who has been previously stimu- 
lated by having a neural impulse aroused. Fre- 
quently the group stimulation may be traced to 
several individuals thus stimulated; these indi- 
viduals in turn transfer their responses to other 
members of the group to whom these responses 

226 


~~ ee 


become a stimulus. In an individual behavior 
is a function of some stimulus exterior to the in- 
dividual. Ina group the stimulus may be within 
the group. It may be correct to say in groups 
which utilize deliberative means of responding 
that there is never a direct or specific stimulus 
to action, but always a secondary stimulus. 
The event, activity, utterance, change which 
provokes the group to action—because of which 
it acts—may be regarded as the group stimulus. 

c. Group response: The activity by means of 
which the group responds to stimuli. 

The group seldom responds as a group and 
in direct causal relation to a stimulus. The 
stimulus incites the group to action and what- 
ever action results is a response of the group. 
‘The action, however, is not an immediate re- 
sponse; it is usually preceded by discussion, by 
voting, et cetera. Group responses are second- 
ary just as group stimuli are secondary. The 
group may respond with an activity which is 
favored by only a majority of the members. 
This is, obviously, not a response of the total 
group, but if the group has previously agreed 
to regard majority votes as conclusive this action 
may be considered as a group response. All of 
the means according to which the group arrives 
at the point of action are included in the group’s 
response. Its means of acting are its responses. 

d. Representation: A means whereby in- 


dividuals may act on behalf of the group. 
227 


If a committee is appointed from the mem- 
bership of the group to act on a special prob- 
lem, the action of this committee is generally 
assumed to represent, stand for, the action of 
the group. Checks are usually placed upon 
such action, e.g., the committee is required to 
report its findings to the group in the form 
of recommendations for action. Frequently 
groups in conflict with other groups find it nec- 
essary to allow leaders, officials or other chosen 
representatives to act wholly on their behalf. 
The method according to which such repre- 
sentatives acquire their representativeness is 
also a part of the general problem of repre- 
sentation. When leaders fail to represent the 
interests, or what are regarded to be the in- 
terests, of the group, they are invariably de- 
posed.”® Delegates from the group to meet- 
ings of larger codrdinating groups are as- 
sumed to be representatives of the group, and 
their votes are usually considered to be binding 
upon the members of the group. 

e. Consent: The means whereby all of the 
members of a group give sanction to the 
group’s policies, interests and activities. 

Consent is a form of approval. A function- 
ing group finds it necessary to alter policies, to 

20 "The group is a representation of its members’ in- 
terests. The problems of how many interests a single 
group can represent, how the representing is done, et 
cetera, are genuine problems but they must be ruled 
out under the intensive definition given to the term. 

228 


modify interests and to engage in activities 
through its officers, representatives, delegates, 
leaders, experts and committees. The validity 
of all of this activity is assumed to rest upon 
the sanction of the group. A group possesses 
integrity if the acts of its officials, representa- 
tives, et cetera, are approved by the group. 
Every act of representatives on behalf of a 
group cannot of course be submitted in advance 
to the group. Therefore methods are devised 
for securing what may be termed a priori con- 
sent. Frequently the terms of membership in 
a group—the conditions under which an in- 
dividual may become a member—include and 
prescribe the means of consent. 

f. Discussion: “The means by which the 
whole group is maneuvered into cooperative 
thinking, speaking and acting.” ** 

Discussion includes argumentation, debate, 
parliamentary rules, facts, opinions, feeling— 
all of the means by which an individual strives 
to express his personality (his interests) as a 
member of a group. The aim of discussion is 
not, of course, to get these individual personali- 
ties expressed but rather to get them expressed 
in terms of the whole—the group. The group 
stands to represent the common interests of all 
its constituent members, and only by means of 
concurrence upon the ‘‘common” element of 


"1 Joining in Public Discussion, A. D. Sheffield, p. 
vi, Introduction. 
229 


these interests can the group function. Discus- 
sion leads to new orientation of interests. 


Moreover, by means of discussion the group ~ 


comes to understand its specific interest and 
hence is better able to codperate on its behalf. 
The term “maneuver” in the above definition 
may give rise to serious questioning. Who 


does the maneuvering? ‘he chairman? ‘The — 


group itself? A clique within the group? No 


one who observes group discussions can doubt — 


that maneuvering of some sort takes place. 


Since this term precipitates so many pertinent ~ 


questions it may be left in the definition until a 
more accurate substitute symbol is discovered 
to describe what actually takes place. 

g. The use of facts: The means according to 
which the group attempts to supplant realities 
for opinions in its discussions and responses. 

To corroborate the validity of interests by 
the use of facts is always thought necessary. 
Not what the group ‘thinks’ but what the 
group “‘knows’’ is presumed to be the basis of 
its action. The methods according to which the 
group knows, the vicarious knowing of the 


group, and the ways in which the group uses: 


what it knows on behalf of its interests are all 
included under the use of facts. Technical 
knowing of the group refers to employed ex- 
perts. Therefore the expert must also be in- 
cluded under the use of facts. 

h. Interests: Any ‘object or achievement 


230 


which will enhance the personalities of the 
members of the group. 

The term ‘“‘interest’’ has already been dis- 
cussed under the definition of the group. It is 
only necessary at this place to emphasize the 
point that an interest is shared and that it is 
objective; it can be stated in terms of a specific 
desire, purpose, aim or wish. 

i. Point of view: The means according to 
which the group’s interests and activities are 
modified by perspective or the element of time. 

The term “point of view” as here used must 
be at once distinguished from its use asa 
method of stating bias or prejudice. Thus 
when a person says, “this is my opinion from the 
point of view of a banker,”’ he intends to convey 
the idea that his opinion has been modified by 
the fact that his interest is banking. On the 
other hand, when a person says, ‘“‘that repre- 
sents a shortsighted point of view,” he intends 
to convey the idea that a changing situation de- 
mands a point of view which will take into con- 
sideration the exigencies of the future. The 
railroad promoters of the last century, for ex- 
ample, are spoken of as men who possessed a 
far-sighted point of view; they took into con- 
sideration the situation, not as it then stood, but 
as they anticipated it might evolve. An indus- 
trial strike may be termed a short-time point of 
view since it succeeds in securing the immediate 
interest of the worker but it contributes nothing 


231 


toward an ultimate settlement of the essential 
conflict between the workers and the employers. 
In observing group behavior it becomes appar- 
ent that the short-time and the long-time points 
of view are always present and frequently in 
conflict. Groups in acute conflict invariably ap- 
peal to the public on the grounds of their long- 
time point of view. 

j. Use of language: The symbolic means 


with which the group communicates its interests — 


and activities. 

All interests and activities must ultimately be 
expressed by means of words and terms. As al- 
ready indicated, the words and terms used in 
group discussions and conflicts may become ef- 
fective barriers in submerging the real issues.” 
The use of language symbols in group be- 
havior performs other functions. Language 
expresses, or it vaguely expresses, or it mis- 
represents the real issues at stake. ‘The term 
is included in this category because it was dis- 
covered in the groups observed that a conscious 


22 “The first rule in any controversy should be that 
we talk the same language as the other fellow. ... 
Oratory seems to be a method whereby a man learns 
to conceal publicly what he thinks he knows. Burke’s 
essay on the sublime and the ridiculous is declared to 
be a masterpiece. Burke was an orator. Just what 
does it mean? Nobody knows. If my neighbor is deaf 
and I am blind, it doesn’t do any good for me to use 
a megaphone or for him to use colored fire. . . . The 
great difficulty with all of us, of course, is that when 

232 


methodology of the use of language existed. 
The term will be further clarified in succeeding 
chapters. 

k. Power: All non-intellectual and non- 
ethical means used by the group in attempts to 
attain and secure its interests. 

Power, as here conceived, is not a synonym 
for force. When it is said that a trade union 
has power over the employers, this does not 
mean that power is actually manifested in terms 
of force. It does mean that the trade union 
stands in a position of advantage which makes 
it unnecessary to arbitrate, discuss or conciliate 
differences. When in this position of advantage, 
the group may state its raw interest, make de- 
mands upon the basis of this interest and trust 
to a capitulation on the part of its opponents. 
Power thus becomes a form of coercion, a 
means by which the opposing group surrenders 
—not because it has given recognition to the 
reasonableness or justness of the interest in- 
volved but only because it has no other recourse 


we try to express ourselves, we have only the tools 
that the mind provides.” “Thomas L. Masson, ‘“‘What’s 
It All About?” in the Christian Century for Septem- 
ber 20, 1923. “This was obviously written as a hu- 
morous castigation of the fundamentalist-evolutionist 
controversy but it indicates a theory of language held 
by many, the theory being that all of our conflicts are 
merely conflicts over words and that if we could once 
agree on words there would be an end of conflict, i.e., 
that there are no real issues. 


233 


except that of cessation of activity. In many 
cases power does eventually translate itself into 
terms of force. When for example an employ- 
ing group succeeds in securing a court injunc- 
tion which halts the opposing group’s prosecu- 
tion of its interests, force is implied; back of 
the court injunction stands the police and the 
army—representations of force. In interna- 
tional relations power over another nation may 
be said always to imply force. In proportion 
to the implications of force involved in power, 
reasonable (intellectual) and moral (ethical) 
bases of conduct diminish. In group relations 
power is often measured on the crude basis of 
numbers—the assumption being that the larger 
group possesses the greater power. 


5. Definitions of Terms in Category III 


It will be remembered that Category III con- 
tains terms used as symbols whose referents are 
forms or modes of social control which modify 
and condition group behavior. ‘The anteced- 
ents of these forms of control lie in past ex- 
perience and are the accumulations of numerous 
changes and adaptations. 

Unfortunately many of the terms of this 
category have been viewed and explained as 
concatenations of instinctive or innate forces 
in behavior. Instinctive or innate forces hay- 
ing been abandoned in the present study, it be- 


234 


comes necessary to recast the interpretation of 
these terms. This unavoidably leads to a 
species of arbitrariness which may cause the 
whole or part of the category to be invalidated 
in the minds of many readers. ‘The experi- 
mental character—distinguished from the dog- 
matic—of the thesis set forth in this volume 
should, however, tend to prevent such whole- 
sale rejection. At any rate, the indiscriminate 
and often incongruous use of the terms of this 
category in the literature of sociology and social 
psychology is sufficient evidence of their sub- 
jective history. Any attempt to refine and de- 
fine such terms in objective situations should be 
welcomed. If the major implications of the 
present thesis are corroborated by further in- 
vestigation, it will be necessary to evolve new 
theories of social control for modern life. 
(a. Customs: Modes of conduct which have 
their antecedents in past group adaptations. 
When reference is made to a customary mode 
of conduct, the inference is that this mode does 
not arise out of the present situation, but is a 
response to the cultural heritage. Reflection 
and deliberation do not enter into a customary 
mode of conduct. The customary mode of be- 
havior is not challenged until there has occurred 
an abrupt change in the present environment. 
The tobacco farmers of the Southern states, for 
example, were accustomed to dispose of their 
crop on the basis of an individual bargain with 


235 


an individual buyer. The codperative market- 
ing movement constituted a change in the envi- 
ronment which challenged this custom. There 
is no moral element in customary behavior al- 
though an individual whose behavior runs 
counter to all or many of the customs of the 
community in which he lives will find himself 
thereby cut off from full participation in the 
community’s activities. Shaking hands as a 
form of greeting is a custom but no one is os- 
tracized from his social group if he merely fails 
to follow this custom. ‘The customs with which 
collective psychology is obliged to come to 
terms are those which are concerned with 
group interests. In such cases it is well to take 
the naive view of customs as modes of re- 
sponse which continue so long as the interests 
involved do not change so as to make a different 
response advantageous. 

b. Mores: Customary modes of behavior 
which possess moral content. 

Behavior is controlled by customs in a nega- 
tive sense. Adaptation to the customary modes 
of behavior of the group is merely a means of 
“getting on’’ with the group more amicably, 
with less friction. Violation of the mores on 
the other hand makes it impossible to get on 
with the group at all. ‘The individual who 
transgresses the mores is, in fact, no longer con- 
sidered to be a part of the group. In some 
communities, for example, monogamy may be 


236 


said to be one of the mores, and in such cases 
the person who openly practices polygamy is 
socially ostracized.** Customs may become 
mores, mores may become recognized ethical 
principles and ethical principles may in their 
turn become juristic mandates. The utility of 
the term “mores”’ lies chiefly in the fact that it 
represents forms of conduct which have moral 
implications which are not legally enforced, i.e., 
they represent forms of control which are not 
amenable to discussion. ‘To violate the mores 
may not be a crime but the person who does 
so is treated by the community as though he 
were a criminal. 

c. Traditions: Customary modes of be- 
havior which possess validity because of senti- 
mental reasons. 

Customs control behavior because they have 
been accepted by the community as being 
‘good form’’; mores control behavior because 
they have been accepted by the community as 
being “right conduct”; traditions control be- 
havior because they have been accepted by the 
community as being respectful obeisance to the 
sentiments of the past. Shaking hands may be 
regarded as a custom; monogamy as one of the 
mores; a wedding ceremony as a tradition. 


23 This illustration serves to indicate the ambiguity 
of the term “mores.” Monogamy, when enforced by 
legal measures, is a form of social control in the sec- 
ondary sense. 


237 


All three forms of control owe their validity 
to the past. [hey are obeyed, unconsciously 
for the most part, because they represent the 
ways in which things have always been done. 
For this reason these modes of response are 
frequently called “idea patterns,” “group 
habits.” The latter term, “group habits,” 
is a convenient symbol which embraces all 
three of the above terms. ‘The danger of 
its use, however, lies in the fact that habits 
in the individual are traceable to physiologi- 
cal adaptations; they represent the least pain- 
ful and most advantageous ways of perform- 
ing certain acts. Customs, mores and tradi- 
tions, on the other hand, may often be con- 
trary to the most advantageous way of per- 
forming an act. ‘The individual does not in- 
herit habits from his ancestors; the group does 
inherit customs, mores and traditions. Habits, 
strictly speaking, are physiological phenomena, 
and customs, mores and traditions are cultural 
phenomena. If these terms are viewed in this 
way it will be seen at once how futile it is to 
expect social control to become progressive by 
merely tracing back customary modes of re- 
sponse to their presumed historic origins. To 
end the search finally by accounting for these 
modes of behavior as responses to instincts or 
innate forces inherited by the species is equally 
misleading and fruitless. They are forms of be- 
havior which arose out of former situations 


238 


and they became culturally-inherited modes of 
response because some intrinsic value was at- 
tached to them in the adapting process. Many 
useless and contradictory customs, mores and 
traditions persist and exercise unusual social 
control for the simple reason that these modes 
of behavior have not been evaluated by succeed- 
ing generations. 

d. Attitudes: Predispositions guided by past 
experiences in which sentiments and feelings are 
so predominant as to modify the present re- 
sponse. (Fora fuller account of the use of this 
term as a group category see page 336, Chap- 
temic 1.) 

e. Ethics: Modes of behavior accepted by 
the group because they conform with the 
group’s “sense of right.” 

The phrase ‘‘sense of right’’ included in this 
definition should not lead to the conclusion that 
an innate or inborn sense of right is assumed. 
The sense of right here referred to implies 
those norms of behavior which have evolved 
and are evolving as a concomitant to activity. 
Each group does not press its claims to their 
ultimate limits because there is a sense or feel- 
ing that to do so would imperil or annihilate 
the interests of other groups. Some groups do 
press their claims to ultimate limits, but they 
seldom, if ever, achieve those claims. ‘Thus 
France may press her claims against Germany 
to certain ultimate limits but sooner or later a 


239 


point will be reached where such claims will vio- 


trol. The problems will then become, not 
how much can France get from Germany, but 


how much ought France to have? Ethics is one ~ 


late the sense of right of other nations. At — 
this point ethics will step in as a mode of con- © 


method of obviating the cruel necessity of — 


utilizing power in its crude manifestations. 


The term “‘ethics’? needs modification as a part _ 


of group categories. ‘he relations which in- 
volve the sense of right between individuals may 
be termed ethics; the relations which involve 
the sense of right between groups may be called © 
social ethics. This term also has its SbiccuoHaan 
since social ethics is already used as a term to 
denote the relations which involve the sense of 
right between an individual and a group. 

To trace the functioning of ethical principles 
in group relations is difficult, partly because of 
the place which ethics holds in religious con- 
cepts and partly because there are so few recog- 
nized means for evaluating ethical principles. 


5 


Another difficulty resides in the fact that there | 


is a wide gulf between ethical principles ac- 
cepted as right modes of conduct and the actual 
conduct of the same persons and groups who 
make the ethical professions. All of these dif- 
ficulties should lead toward an instrumental 
view of ethics as distinguished from a derived 
view. Ethics is one of the means according to 
which the group evaluates its interests and it 
240 


is an important means since it implies that the 
pursuance of the group’s interests must in gen- 
eralized manner conform to the sense of right 
of the inclusive social environment.”* 

f. The Law: A conscious means of evaluat- 
ing interests, assumed by the state in behalf of 
general justice. 

This definition assumes that all generaliza- 
tions concerning abstract justice have been aban- 
doned by thinkers and that justice can be dis- 
cerned only as a confronting of an actual situa- 
tion. The law no longer stands to protect cer- 
tain indefinite but cherished “rights” of in- 
dividuals or of groups. Its function has come 
to be an inductive method of evaluating in- 
terests. True, many laws are still in force 
which were originally stated as generalizations 
of abstract rights, but the actual cases which 
come under such laws are treated inductively. 
In addition, the last half-century has witnessed a 
remarkable accretion of new statutes whose im- 
port and purport are clearly derived from a 
conflict of interests. The assumption back of 
law is still the assumption of general justice, 1.e., 
equality for all individuals and groups before 
the law, but modern laws are written and inter- 
preted in the light of specific interests. A bet- 


24’The various ethical codes formulated and sub- 

scribed to by such bodies as newspaper editors, adver- 

tising agencies, Rotary Clubs, et cetera, are evidences 

of the need of conscious means for evaluating interests. 
241 


ter way of stating this change might be: the 
law now seeks to arrive at the validity of 
specific interests but it does so upon the assump- 
tion that valid interests lead toward justice for 
all. The law controls group conduct as a means 
of establishing the means as well as the ends of 
justice. 

g. Public Opinion: A means of controlling 
group behavior on behalf of the totality of in- 
terests. 

In a strict sense there is no public opinion; 
there are only public opinions. The so-called 
public is a composite of the various functional 
groups within it. Insofar as an individual has 
no group relations, no medium of expressing 
his interests through a common group, he is un- 
influential in affecting public opinion. In indus- 
trial disputes it is commonly said that there are 
three sets of interests to be considered: the 
workers, the employers, and the public. ‘This is, 
of course, an anomaly; the workers and the 
employers are as much a part of the public as 
any other individuals. What is meant by 
this sort of reference is that the conflict of 
interests between workers and employers must 
be settled in terms of the interests of other 
eroups. All other groups are conveniently 
grouped by themselves as the public. The pub- 
lic is the totality of interests. Public opinion 
merely implies that the totality of interests 
must be considered whenever two specific 

242 


groups are in conflict over their specific in- 
terests. Groups in conflict utilize various means 
of enlisting the interests of other groups not 
immediately concerned with the specific con- 
flict. Such enlisting of interest takes place 
largely through the medium of the public press 
whose traditions are favorable to the expres- 
sion of the totality of interests. When public 
interest was centered largely on political issues, 
the differentiation of the press was one of polit- 
ical predilections. Now that interests shift 
more and more to the economic level, the differ- 
entiation of the press proceeds upon the basis 
of economic predilections. ‘The modern press 
is conservative, liberal or partisan, and these 
adjectives are derived from economic interests. 
The conservative press advocates the status quo 
in economic and industrial affairs; the liberal 
press advocates changes which will elevate the 
interests of the less-privileged classes; the par- 
tisan press frankly advocates changes which will 
elevate only the interests of its particular class. 
Thus an adequate source of so-called public 
opinion in the so-called public press no longer 
exists. Public opinion can emerge only out of 
clashes of group interests. As a result of this 
new situation in relation to public opinion such 
projects as the public forum, discussion groups, 
et cetera, have arisen, i.e., substitutes for ar- 
riving at an evaluation of interests in lieu of or 
supplementary to the press. 


243 


CHAPTER X 


THE GROUP, THE LEADER, THE EX: 
PERT AND THE OBSERVERS 


THE reader is urged to keep constantly in 
mind the various limitations of the study upon 
which this volume is based. The observations 
extended over a period of less than three years, 
a term far too short to warrant anything more 
than tentative conclusions. Fortunately the 
period covered by the study was one of unusual 
opportunities. The farmers of the United 
States had just emerged from an era of un- 
precedented prosperity and were, at the begin- 
ning of the study, suffering acutely from the 
sudden deflation and ensuing collapse of prices 
for farm products. The result of this reversal 


1 Illustration: The burley tobacco growers of Ken- 
tucky received an average price of 46 cents per pound 
for the 1919 crop. On January 3, 1921, the markets 
opened to receive the 1920 crop, the price offered being 
ten cents per pound. ‘The cost of producing this crop 
was generally estimated to be about 30 cents per pound. 
The situation was similar in a lesser or greater degree 
with all other farm products. 


244 


was a general agrarian uprising. Farmers as- 
sumed a militant attitude. ‘Their anger was 
readily turned upon the traditional enemy, the 
“villainous middleman.” Experience pointed 
to two means of escape from the unbearable 
condition: one was to appeal to the govern- 
ment for aid and the other was violence. Both 
methods had been attempted in the past. Vio- 
lence in the form of the destruction of the 
crop and vengeance toward those who were as- 
sumed to be responsible for low prices had only 
resulted in suffering to the farmers themselves. 
Governmental aid was supported by many lead- 
ers but there appeared to be a general feeling 
that if agriculture could be successfully main- 
tained only by subsidies it was not worth main- 
taining. There was in addition a feeling 
against paternalism. In the end, neither of 
these methods was chosen.” A new leadership 
arose with new promises and a new program 
keeping alive the farmers’ resentment but di- 
recting it into new channels. In effect it said 
to the farmer: “You must lift yourself by your 
own boot-straps. You cannot be saved by 
others, but you can save yourself.” 

The new program centered about co- 
operative marketing according to a technique 


2 Governmental aid was, however, sought and se- 
cured on another basis in conjunction with the method 
chosen. Also the advocates of direct governmental aid 
were not silenced by the step finally taken. 


24.5 


which had already passed through certain ex- 
perimental phases in Denmark, California, 
and elsewhere. With almost incredible alac- 
rity the farmers grasped at this new program. — 
Within one year the membership in coopera- 
tive marketing associations leaped from a 
few straggling and disintegrated groups num- 
bering in the thousands to over one million. 
A federal statute legalizing such associa- 
tions was already available but state statutes — 
were also needed. Within a year 26 states 
had complied with the legal requests and had | 
enacted suitable laws.* Giant associations con- 
trolling 60%, 70% and 80% of the totals of 
various crops with memberships reaching as 
high as 80,000 may be said to have literally 
sprung into existence.* The rapidity with which 
this movement went forward during the first 
year of its impetus was fairly startling. This 
speed of movement made it wholly impossible 
for a single observer to keep abreast of all that 
was happening. But here was a unique labora- 
tory for the social investigator. 

The movement toward codperative associa- 
tions for marketing farm products presented a 
cinematographic picture in which conflict was in- 


or, ecm 


3 In Kentucky the legislature was convened in extra 
session and the law passed, all within six days. 

* For a factual account and partial interpretation of 
this movement, the reader is directed to Codperative 
Marketing by Herman Steen. 

246 


tense, leadership dramatic, joint action super- 
seded individual action—in which, in short, 
were combined all of the various factors which 
make life dynamic. The farmers’ interests 
were boldly pushed to the forefront of public 
recognition. The intrenched marketing system 
fought back, at first openly and fiercely, and 
then covertly, but none the less determinedly. 
Men unknown to the public were suddenly 
thrown into positions of great power. Modes 
of action which had become habitual and cus- 
tomary over long years of repetition were flung 
aside. Experts whose interests had been with 
the middlemen or the manufacturers trans- 
ferred their interests and their services to the 
cooperative association. ‘The stakes were 
enormous and the activities dynamic. 

Such.,was the situation which was chosen as 
the field of observation. The limits of the ob- 
servation and study must now be defined. The 
primary purpose of the study was not to in- 
vestigate the codperative movement as such, 
but rather to utilize this movement as the basis 
for evolving a technique for studying all forms 
of group behavior.’ The conclusions then 
should not be used as criteria for judging the 
cooperative movement. Many minute factors 


5 The original plan was to make similar observations 
of other group movements but this had to be abandoned. 
It is still hoped, however, that these other studies may 
' go forward in the future. 


247 


of the movement were left out of consideration 
since it was necessary to select such factors as 
came within the scope of the intention of the 
study. Some of these omitted factors would be 
entirely essential for a sound analysis of the 
cooperative movement and they were omitted 
only because it was thought that others were 
more important for the present undertaking. 

During the study four distinct codperative 
marketing associations were kept under ob- 
servation and for purposes of convenience they 
will hereafter be designated as Groups A, B, 
C and D. Other groups were also observed 
for particular forms of activity and for shorter 
periods; wherever these observations are re- 
corded they will be properly designated. Par- 
ticipant observers were of two kinds: those who 
were actually employed by the codperative asso- 
ciation as officials and those who were not so 
employed but who were considered as intimate 
advisers. 


1. Observations and Conclusions Regarding 


the Groups 


In this instance we are dealing with groups 
which are larger than any group to be found 
within a local neighborhood or community. 
They may be compared with political parties, 
international or national trade unions, i.e., 
with groups more comprehensive than any local 

248 


area. A term which has now come into com- 
mon usage, namely, ‘“‘the commodity group,” is 
fairly definitive. It implies that the basis of 
the group is the commodity produced. In one 
case it may be tobacco, in another, cotton, and in 
another, milk. ‘The membership then of the 
group is conditioned by the commodity; the 
commodity is in turn conditioned by soil, cli- 
mate, markets, et cetera. The older codpera- 
tive movement was based upon local neighbor- 
hood or community boundaries. In this sense, 
the new commodity codperatives are analogous 
to the industrial union. If all workers in the 
steel industry were, for example, organized into 
a single union regardless of geographical 
boundaries, this organization might be called 
a commodity union as distinguished from a local 
trade union. The United Mine Workers may 
be said to be a commodity group. 

A commodity group secures its power by at- 
taining control of all or enough of a single 
product to dominate the market. In the case 
of an industrial union, the control is, of course, 
over a particular kind of labor adapted to a 
particular commodity; the mine workers do not 
control the coal market but rather the coal- 
labor market. In each case the conditioning 
factor is the commodity. In the codperatives 
under observation it was assumed that success 
would follow if each group could enroll a suf- 
ficient number of members to insure control of 


249 


from 60% to 75% of the total product. The 
strength of these groups was originally meas- 
ured by ‘‘acres’’ and not members. One mem- 
ber may be of more value to the association 
than ten members providing he produces more 
than ten times the amount of the commodity 
that the other ten produce. The commodity 
basis of group organization is a diversion from 
the usual technique. Without too much attempt 
at niceties of distinction, it may be said that 
group organization in modern economic life 
now proceeds upon two bases, (1) in which the 
individual member is the measure of power, 
and (2) in which the commodity under control 
is the measure of power.® 

At the outset the observer is compelled 
to recognize that the newer form of commod- 
ity group organization constitutes a diver- 
gence from so-called democracy. In order to 
achieve rigorous consistency the commodity 
group should of course distribute voting power 
in proportion to acreage or commodity. ‘This 
step, however, has not yet been taken. The 


6 The reader with speculative inclinations might find 
it fruitful to expand this “commodity” view to such in- 
ternational conflicts as are involved in Upper Silesia, 
the Saar, and the Ruhr. It appears in each case that 
the situation is conditioned by a commodity or a group 
of commodities. In contrast is the apparently peaceful 
solution of the upper portion of Schleswig-Holstein, 
which was not an industrial but a mixed farming sec- 
tion. 

250 


traditional tenets of democracy are honored by 
the traditional one-member one-vote principle. 
An obvious discrepancy lies here. There are no 
logical grounds for the one-member one-vote 
principle in an organization which measures its 
power by commodity rather than by personality. 
But this is not the query which seems most per- 
tinent. ‘he more important problem for the 
present, from the sociological point of view, is: 
Can effective organization be maintained with- 
out recognition of multiple interests of the in- 
dividual member? 

Before any conclusions may be reached it is 
necessary to separate the above question into 
its constituent parts. ‘The multiple interests of 
the individual who becomes a member of a 
commodity cooperative group are for the most 
part expressed within his local neighborhood or 
community.” It is conceivable that this net- 
work of homely interests may at some time 
need to be evaluated in terms of the member’s 
allegiance to the commodity group. In fact, 
the commodity-group principle may be tested 
only when such an event has occurred. In one 
of the groups under observation the local com- 
munity has always been recognized; in the 


TIt is assumed that the groups under consideration 
conform up to this point to the definition of a group 
given on p. 207, Chapter IX. In fact, that definition 
emerged from the observation of these particular 
groups. 

251 


other three there were no local organizations 
in the beginning. (Representation on the 
executive committee was, however, arranged on 
a district basis.) Moreover, there were many 
leaders in the movement who denied the neces- 
sity and the utility of these local units. The 
technique of the movement did not include 
local organized units. One of these groups has 
now evolved a comprehensive scheme for local 
group organization, one has altered its policies 
so that local groups are partially recognized, 
and the third is at the threshold of a state- 
wide system of local community committees. 
In other words, each group has found it ex- 
pedient to develop local community cohesion. 
Observation was directed to determine why 
these steps were taken. 

Because of space limitations all of the ob- 
served reasons for the above-mentioned change 
of policy cannot be recorded. One illustration 
may suffice to indicate what happens in the 
functioning of these groups which sooner or 
later precipitates the demand for local organi- 
zation, 


Illustration: 

At an annual meeting of the executive com- 
mittee of Group C, the problem of contract vio- 
lations occupied the major share of attention. 
The discussion proceeded upon the basis of two 
mutually exclusive views. Some wanted every 

252 


member who had violated his contract sued 
under the law. Others desired the opposite, 
namely, no legal compulsion to hold members 
to their contracts. The deadlock caused con- 
siderable bitterness between the contending 
factions. It was finally brought out that the 
chief reasons for not desiring legal compulsions 
were involved with local community interests. 
Members objected to the sight of lawyers repre- 
senting the codperative coming into their com- 
munities for the purpose of summoning one of 
their neighbors. Among some of these were 
men who were members of the same church, the 
same lodge, et cetera. The decision ultimately 
agreed upon directed the association to sue no 
more violators for liquidated damages until 
the cases had been adequately reviewed by mem- 
bers living in the local community. Conse- 
quently it became necessary to establish local 
committees to do this reviewing. A new piece 
of social machinery with its center in the local 
community rather than at the headquarters of 
the commodity organization was thus set up. 


This problem will now be seen as one of com- 
plex bearings. The above illustration will 
again be referred to in connection with consent, 
responsibility, representation, et cetera. Here it 
is used merely to illustrate some of the reasons 
why large, centralized groups tend to decentral- 
ize. ‘This tendency may be stated in the form 
of a conclusion, or an inducted principle as fol- 
lows: 


253 


Principle: The group which represents an 
individual's specific interest must ultimately 
take cognizance of his diverse or inclusive in- 
terests. 


The psychological bearing of this principle 
lies in the theory that the individual behaves as 
a total personality. When he sells tobacco or 
cotton or milk he does not act merely with that 
portion of his personality which is related to 
tobacco, cotton or milk. When the individual 
becomes a member of a collective group through 
which one of his specific interests is to be repre- 
sented, he brings into that group his total per- 
sonality. Functionally this group may continue 
to represent the specific and solitary interest. 
To take cognizance of the inclusive interests 
does not mean that the group must function on 
behalf of all of these varied interests; it does 
mean that this function must not cut across or 
contravene any of the other interests. The 
corollary of this principle which is at once ap- 
parent is: 


Groups which represent specific interests 
must ultimately become integrated with other 
groups representing other interests. 


As an illustration of this corollary principle 
it should be noted that the commodity groups 
under observation, together with some eighty 


254 


or more other similar groups, have already 
formed a National Council of Farmers’ Co- 
operative Marketing Associations. This move 
constitutes an integration of groups represent- 
ing interests on the same level. A movement 
which appears to be leading toward integration 
with the American Farm Bureau Federation is 
now in process. The Grange, the oldest of the 
farm organizations, remains unintegrated, and, 
indeed, something more than a surface friction 
between the Grange and the commodity groups 
exists. he Grange is an organization which 
aims to represent the comprehensive and inclu- 
sive interests of the farmer. Group B of the 
groups under observation has gone so far in 
its attempt to take cognizance of other than 
economic interests as to employ a trained social 
worker in the field of child welfare. The sig- 
nificant aspect of all of this development is that 
it has taken place contrary to the earlier state- 
ments of the leaders. Indeed, many of these 
leaders are still emphasizing the fact that 
these commodity groups are purely commercial 
groups whose only business is to merchandise 
farm products. 

The above observations and conclusions have 
a distinct bearing upon the problems and the 
technique of social organization. Decentraliza- 
tion is seen to be a psychological phenomenon; 
at any rate, the psychological factors of be- 
havior bear a causal relation to the phenomenon 


255 


os 


i - 


of decentralization. In addition, this recogni- 


tion of behavior as response of the total per- 
sonality, when considered in connection with 
collective action, constitutes an important modi- 
fication of the definition of a group as stated on 
page 207, Chapter IX. A negative factor has 
been introduced: the group does not exist 
merely to advance a specific interest; it cannot 
permanently exist if its function contravenes 
other vital interests. There are groups admit- 
tedly which do not take this principle into con- 
sideration, i.e., groups of a highly centralized 
character which appear to function successfully. 
Unfortunately, sufficient data do not exist in re- 
gard to these groups. In several cases, how- 
ever, it has been noted that when decentraliza- 
tion is forced upon the groups, disintegration 
soon sets in. 

From the viewpoint of social organization 
the perennial question has been: should groups 
be organized from the “bottom up,” or from 
the “top down’? In less colloquial form, the 
question reads: Should social organization 
begin with local groups and gradually evolve 
overhead centralization, or should the over- 
head, centralized organization come first? In 
view of the principles discussed above, it ap- 
pears that this is not the essential question. 
Whether the centralized organization or the 
local group organization comes first or last is 
unimportant; what is important is the recogni- 

256 


« 


tion of the fact that the individual’s complex of 
interests must enter into the equation. 


2. Observations and Conclusions Regarding 
Leaders 


Out of the mass of material gathered in con- 
nection with the leaders of the groups under 
observation only a few conclusions may be 
hazarded. This material, in fact, raises many 
more questions. than it answers. ‘The leader- 
ship in this movement was perhaps more dra- 
matic than is ordinarily the case. The technique 
of organization employed by these leaders in 
accomplishing the marvelous task of galvaniz- 
ing a million individual farmers into codpera- 
tive action affords the chief clue. The methods 
used included: 


(1) Crowd stimulation; large gatherings 
of farmers addressed by orators. 

(2) The Justice symbol; farmers were told 
that the present marketing system was an in- 
justice and invaded their rights. 

(3) The Fight symbol; farmers were told 
that they could secure justice by fighting the 
middleman. 

(4) The Imitation of Success symbol ; the 
fruit growers of California and the dairy 
farmers of Denmark were pointed to as the 
symbols of success. 

(5) The Fear symbol; farmers were told 


257 


ye 


that if they did not become members, dire re- 
sults would follow. 

(6) Rapid sign-up; “whirlwind” cam- 
paigns for memberships which created an at- 
mosphere of excitability. 

(7) Enlisting the support of financial in- 
terests; this was done in order to assure the 
farmers of the stability of the movement. 

(8) Enlisting the support of governmental 
agencies; for the same reasons as above. 

(9) The Expert symbol; farmers were told 
that the leaders were experts who knew the 
science of cooperative marketing. 

(10) ‘The Impossibility of Failure symbol; 
farmers were told that this organization could 
not fail because each member was obliged to 
sign a legal contract which bound him to sell 
his crop through the association for a definite 
number of years. 


Some of these methods were obviously more 
creditable than others. From a purely prag- 
matic point of view, however, they must be con- 
sidered together since it was their combined use 
which resulted in success. In the beginning of 
the movement, the opposition, consisting of 
middlemen and their business and social allies, 
used practically the same methods. There 
were, however, certain significant exceptions. 
Whereas the codperative leaders used methods 
arousing confidence, the middlemen employed 
those leading to suspicion. The latter were 
258 


naturally more adaptable for personal work 
with individuals than for mass appeals with 
crowds. 

The farmers did not furnish their own lead- 
ership. Out of a selection of seven of the fore- 
most leaders of the earlier stages of the move- 
ment, three were journalists (proprietors of 
farm journals and a newspaper), one was a 
lawyer, one a former educator with farming in- 
terests, one a former middleman and grower, 
and one a former state employee. The two of 
this group who were farmers were not con- 
sidered to have farming as their primary in- 
terest. Sociologically, this situation may be re- 
garded as an incongruity. The traditional 
theory of leadership, being a quality inhering in 
some member of a group, appears to be sound, 
but it is not adequately grounded. All of the 
evidence gathered in this study tends to sub- 
stantiate the theory that the leader is nothing 
more nor less than a symbol for what the group 
is not. Rather the leader symbolizes what the 
group wants—powers and forces which the 
group does not possess. Hence as a symbol the 
leader need not be integral to the group which 
he leads. The old question, does the leader 
create the group or does the group create the 
leader, is also pointless. The group merely 
responds to the rationalizations, judgments 
and feelings of the leader. When it fails to 
make these responses, the leader disappears. 


259 


The leader is not always of the group; his rela- 
tion may be fo the group.° 

This situation changes, however, when the 
group assimilates the leader, i.e., when the 
leader’s interests become identical with the 
group’s interests. There are various gradations 
of this relation. A leader may be employed 
by the group either as a full-time official or as a 
part-time expert. In each case the individual 


8 The “of” and “to” relation as here described should 
be compared with the position of the leader in the dia- 
gram on page 225. Here the leader is given a posi- 
tion within the group. In view of what has been said 
above, it would be more accurate to place certain lead- 
ers outside the group. 

For a more intellectualistic interpretation of the 
leader and leadership see pp. 419 to 423, Social Psy- 
chology, by Floyd H. Allport. ‘Leadership produces 
social change.” “Leadership . . . means the direct, 
face-to-face contact between leader and follower.” ‘“The 
true leader also stands high in the group of traits de- 
scribed under sociality’—these and other phrases used 
by Mr. Allport offer the clue to his conception. 

Boss Platt and His New York Machine; a study of 
the political leadership of Thomas C. Platt, Theodore 
Roosevelt and others by Harold F. Gosnell represents 
a commendable effort to analyse the leader and leader- 
ship. In the illuminating introduction by Charles E. 
Merriam, this sentence appears: “‘Leadership is a func- 
tion of collective action and cannot be fully under- 
stood outside of its special setting.” 

See also Theodore Dreiser’s penetrating description 
of a political leader under the caption: The Michael 
J. Powers Association, p. 44, The Color of a Great 
City. 

260 


so placed automatically changes his strategy. 
In the dual capacity of leader and expert, his 
relation may be said to be still “to”? and not 
“of” the group. Inthe dual capacity of leader 
and official, his relation is partly ‘of’ and 
partly “to” the group. As an official, he can 
no longer rely upon maintaining his position as 
a symbol. His rationalizations and judgments 
must then become, not merely bases for belief, 
but intellectual integrations. 

In emphasizing the distinction between the to 
and of relation, it should not be overlooked 
that the stimulus-response operation works both 
ways; the leader stimulates the group, but the 
group also stimulates the leader. In the earlier 
stages of the movement under consideration 
practically the whole of the stimulation pro- 
ceeded from the leaders. When the actual 
functioning of the group began, the current 
shifted in the opposite direction and now the 
bulk of stimulation emanates from the groups. 

The majority of leaders ultimately accepted 
the decentralizing process described above. 
Nay, some of these leaders actually caused it to 
appear that they themselves had generated the 
process! ‘This simply indicates that when the 
groups’ activities lead to rationalizations which 
vary from those of the leaders, the leaders’ re- 
sponse must be a like rationalization if they are 
to maintain their leadership. Thus we come to 
see that the older sociological theory of leader- 

261 


ship is only partially justified. The group does 
not, to be sure, create the leader. But it ap- 
pears to be creating a leader when an individual 
is available who is able to epitomize the 
group’s rationalizations and feelings. Nor does 
the leader create the group. But conversely, 
the leader appears to be creating the group 
when he is merely synthesizing the group’s ra- 
tionalizations and feelings. [hese are merely 
surface appearances due to a lack of under- 
standing of the stimulus-response relation be- 
tween leaders and groups. 

As a theory of leadership this viewpoint 
clears away many of the difficulties which arise 
because of the failure to distinguish between 
the leader and the expert. A certain sort of 
expertness is required of the leader but it is the 
expertness of knowing what new activities de- 
mand new rationalizations. ‘The leader needs 
none of the refinements of technological knowl- 
edge. He may be uneducated (in the formal 
sense), apparently beneath the intellectual 
standard of many of the members of the 
group, and still maintain his position as leader. 


3. Conclusions Regarding the Expert 


Three types of experts were originally em- 
ployed by the groups under consideration: (1) 
experts who were skilled in the technique of co- 
operative marketing, (2) experts who were 

262 


= a 


skilled in the technique of testing, grading and 
standardizing the commodities, (3) experts 
who were skilled in social organization. Later 
three other types of experts were added, 
namely, (4) experts who were skilled in finance, 
(5) experts who were skilled in publicity, and 
(6) experts who were skilled in social organiza- 
tion of a new kind; that of perfecting forms of 
organization leading toward integrations of the 
whole. (The original organizers had been per- 
sons who were successful in securing member- 
ships in the organizations. ) 

During the early stages of activity, leaders 
were frequently mistrusted. It was assumed 
that some of them had interests above and be- 
yond the cooperative movement and that they 
were merely using this opportunity to gain posi- 
tions of power. The suspicion was, apparently, 
not present in regard to experts. In fact, one 
of the most advertised experts of Group B was 
secured by the simple process of offering a 
higher salary than that which he had received 
from his former employers. ‘This strategy was 
successful in spite of the fact that the former 
employers were known to be opposed to the co- 
operative marketing movement.’ Indeed, most 
of the experts needed to deal with the problems 
of receiving, grading and handling the crops 


® This opposition was later transformed into what ap- 
peared to be complete approval, but this conversion de- 
mands further observation and interpretation. 


263 


(tobacco and cotton) were recruited from the 
organizations of middlemen. In only one in- 
stance was a leader chosen from the camp of 
the enemy, and in this case, the leader soon 
became an official of the codperative organiza- 
tion. He has from the beginning been re- 
garded in the dual capacity of leader and 
expert. 

The experts under type (1) have thus far had 
little occasion to change either their strategy or 
their status; they are still regarded as experts 
who know the technical principles of codpera- 
tive marketing. 

The experts under type (2) have passed 
through a number of experiences which tend to 
throw light upon the whole problem of expert- 
ness. [hese experts were obliged to deal di- 
rectly with the members of the codperative as- 
sociations. [hey were stationed at local re- 
ceiving stations to which the farmers brought 
their products. For purposes of illustration, we 
may consider a group of experts—warehouse- 
men, graders, accountants—operating for 
Group A, a tobacco codperative. Before the 
organization of the codperative, the farmers 
were accustomed to bring their crops to a to- 
bacco center where there were numerous buyers 
prepared to bid on the value. The tobacco was 
presumably auctioned to the highest bidder. 
The auctioning process itself:-was of dramatic 
interest. In addition, the entire community 

264 


gave itself over to the tobacco market during 
the morning hours of auction. Street-hawkers 
established themselves on favored spots and 
sold dictionaries, patent medicines and other 
wares. Excitement pervaded the atmosphere— 
the sort of excitement which suspension en- 
genders in the drama. No one knew what 
the price for tobacco would be this morn- 
ing; no one knew how much his tobacco would 
bring, nor what grade it would average; no one 
knew who would be the “big’’ buyer on this 
particular day. And within an hour or two 
after sales, the growers stepped to a small 
window and received full payment for their 
product. Wagons could then be loaded with 
groceries and other necessities, as well as an oc- 
casional luxury, for the return journey. The 
day had provided excitement, thrills; there was 
something vital to talk about with all of the in- 
terest which can come only from uncertainty. 
Mixed with the various ingredients of the day’s 
occurrences was also a taste of awe; awe toward 
the “big” buyers who could with one gesture 
risk more money than was represented by an 
individual farmer’s total assets; awe toward the 
auctioneer who could without a second’s hesi- 
tation insert bits of wit between his reeling fig- 
ures; awe toward the banker who handed out 
sound currency in return for the buyer’s check. 

The above scene must now be contrasted with 
the same situation under codperative market- 


265 


ing. In this case the farmer brings his crop to — 
a warehouse where it is received, graded and — 
placed in position with other receipts of the . 
same grade; the farmer then takes from the ~ 
hand of an accountant or warehouse manager, 
neither of whom he knows, a slip of paper 
which guarantees future payment for his crop. 
Just what the price of his crop is to be, he does 
not know, nor can the experts tell him; this 
will be decided perhaps months later when the 
crop is finally sold. There is no excitement and 
there is no awe because these experts.are re- 
garded as employees of the farmers themselves. 
The uncertainty which comes from knowing 
that a race is soon to be run is absent, since the 
uncertainty now is one of postponed expectancy 
and hope. Questions of a disturbing nature 
soon arise in the minds of the farmers. Are 
these experts, after all, honest persons? Why 
are there so few grades when formerly there 
were somany? Is there any assurance that the 
farmer will receive more in the end for his crop 
than the man who has sold his crop outright at 
auction? Aided by the vigilant middlemen, the 
questions soon become suspicions. Hints spread 
about that certain experts are dishonest persons 
who were cast off by the middlemen. Disquiet- 
ing rumors begin to arise. Certain growers 
have already violated their contracts and are 
selling their crops either openly or covertly to 
the middlemen. 
266 


What has been described above as an actual 
happening affects the whole coéperative move- 
ment and not merely the place and function of 
the expert; these activities will, however, be 
used here only for the purpose of directing 
thought to the expert. The impact does even- 
tually fall upon the expert. A communication 
arrives at the headquarters of the cooperative 
demanding that a certain expert be removed 
from the warehouse in the community; the reso- 
lution has the signatures of 25 members. Now 
the situation begins to clarify; the officials stand 
in a representative relation to the members and 
the experts have simply a technical relation. 
When conflict between the expert and the mem- 
bers occurs, the members turn to their officials 
for relief. What action may be taken by the 
officials? 


4. Humanizing the Expert 


The problem of specialism has now been pre- 
cipitated. Once more we are confronted with 
a psychological question. This is in essence the 
same problem which was raised in considering 
the group which advances a specific interest and 
its relation to the multiple interests of the mem- 
bers. In that case it was pointed out that the 
individual in significant behavior responds as a 
total personality. Because of this total re- 
sponse the group must take cognizance of the 

267 


totality of interests. “The same general rule, 
with important modifications, applies to the 
functioning of the expert. The group may 
recognize the validity and the value of other 
interests by merely integrating with other 
groups which represent these interests; or it 
may itself broaden its program in such manner 
as to include other interests. ‘The expert’s 
task is not so simple. Once he begins to deal 
with interests outside his specialty, he begins 
to lose caste as an expert. A tobacco buyer is a 
specialist, an expert, because he knows tobacco. 
The query is, does he also need to know people? 
Does his equipment need to include a knowledge 
of the complex interests of the total personality 
of his clients, or does he need to know only the 
tobacco side of this personality? The initial 
responsesof the officials favored the latter quali- 
fication. They admitted that their own posi- 
tions depended upon their ability to understand 
the complex of the members’ total personalities, 
but they denied this criterion when applied to 
their employed experts. The expert, they held, 
must be kept free from what they termed “po- 
litical influence.’’ By this was meant that the 
“hiring and firing’ of experts was a technolog- 
ical problem and not a representational one. 
Where, they asked, will the authority of the 
expert be if once we grant to the membership 
the privilege of criticising and deposing experts ? 
This position is, of course, the usual one. The 
268 


expert is universally regarded as the last de- 
fendant of the citadels of autocracy. All others 
must ultimately bow to the will of the people, 
but the expert may remain above and aloof from 
- the people so long as he is an acknowledged ex- 
pert. Once he steps from his pedestal his 
priestly robes of expertness must be relin- 
quished. 

There is no sound reason for believing that 
experts will be able to maintain this position. 
In fact, all or nearly all observation of the 
past half-decade points in the direction of a 
process which may be called ‘“‘humanizing the 
experts.” By this term is meant the tendency 
to force upon the expert the recognition of the 
fact that life is whole and that the human being 
responds as a whole; that specialism in research 
is a convenient form of division of labor, but 
that specialism in function must become an in- 
tegrated form of division of labor; that the 
expert who divorces himself from people will 
sooner or later find himself so far differen- 
tiated that his expertness will be rejected. In 
condensed form, the principle which is hinted 
at in the above is: the expert in function (in 
applying his expertness to life in its activities) 
may integrate his function with the total life 
process only if his function becomes one of in- 
terpreting his expertness in terms of the 
people’s total personalities. ‘This is precisely 
what appears to be happening in all of the co- 

269 


operative organizations under observation and 
the means utilized for this purpose will be 


further dealt with under the discussion of the © 


use of facts. 
The experts under type (3) may scarcely be 


called experts. hey were men who possessed — 


that peculiar skill which usually goes by the 
name of salesmanship. ‘Their task, in the ver- 


nacular, was to “‘sell the codperative marketing — 


association to the farmers.” In a national 
gathering one of the most successful of this 
group was asked to define his technique for se- 
curing members. His reply was: “Wait until 
the farmers are about starved; then put on a 
whirlwind campaign.” Perhaps the less said 
about these so-called professional organizers, 
the better. he entire technique which they em- 
ploy is of doubtful character. Fortunately the 
associations under consideration soon came to 
this realization. The result is that this type of 
expert is rapidly passing into oblivion. ‘The 
only conclusions that are available concerning 
them are negative. Only in a small number of 
instances were the organizers capable of mak- 
ing the adjustment from the organization stage 
to the functioning stage. In these cases the or- 
ganizers were persons who utilized superior 
methods,”° 


10 Experts of type (4) have not been sufficiently 
studied to warrant conclusions. “Those of types 


270 


- 


5. Conclusions Regarding Observers and 
Observation 


The point has already been made that two 
kinds of observation were utilized in this study, 
one representing the observer who has no in- 
terests involved in the groups being studied and 
one representing individuals with interests. In 
evaluating both types of observation it is as- 
sumed that bias is the important factor. All 
observation begins with some form of bias. 
The mere fact that one is sufficiently interested 
in a particular object or process to spend time 
and energy on its study is evidence of one kind 
of bias. No inquiry is ever begun with a blank 
mind. ‘There are even examples of the conclu- 
sions of scientists in which both the individual 
bias and the presumed scientific findings which 
are in opposition appear in the same volume. 
Félix Le Dantec, in his L’Egoisme, enumerates 
biological evidences for the justification of force 
and war, but continues to insist that his own 
predilections are against both. The sort of 
egoistic pessimism which he adduces is also 
counterbalanced by the statement that he is 
himself quite contented with life and that it has 
dealt fairly with him. 

The integrity of the scientific method revolves 


(5) and (6) will be dealt with under more appro- 
priate headings. 


2a 


about distinctions. That Ais A, or all A is A, © 
is a logical statement. Science is capable of 
demonstrating that A is not A and that all A is 
not A, and this demonstration proceeds upon 
the basis of the scientist’s discovered distinc-— 
tions. Where objective measurements are pos- 
sible, these distinctions are leveled to the aver- 
age of general acceptance or concurrence. This 
does not mean that each scientist sees the same 
thing which is thus leveled. ‘The statistical 
average blurs distinctions; accurate scientific ob- 
servation increases distinctions. Where the 
method used is largely that of observation, the 
problem of making distinctions is the chief de- 
sideratum. ‘The assumption at the beginning of 
this study was that values might be discovered 
by comparing the distinctions occurring in ob- 
servations of the two kinds mentioned above. 
It was also assumed, naturally, that the two 
types of observers would of necessity see dif- 
ferent processes and not merely that they would 
see the same processes from different points of 
view. 

One of the earliest distinctions revealed in 
the two types of observation turned out to be of 
peculiar significance. One of the “‘inside’’ ob- 
servers of Group A was cumulatively impressed 
with the sinister and dishonest methods used by 
the opposition— the middlemen. This impres- 
sion grew until he found himself minimizing the 
strength of the opposition openly while he at 


272 


the same time gave it maximum importance se- 
cretly.* With this conflict raging in his own 
mind, he finally came to cast suspicion upon 
numerous officials and experts within his group. 
This conflict ultimately caused him to sever his 
connections with the organization. The ex- 
planation of this incident is so elementary and 
so simple that it might easily have been fore- 
told. The person who is fighting for a group 
and its interests will naturally exaggerate the 
importance of every one who is fighting against. 
This is undoubtedly what accounts for the fact 
that atrocity propaganda is easily distributed 
and receives ready acceptance during wars. 
The simplicity of the explanation should not, 
however, be a barrier to its practical applica- 
tion. Illusions of this sort play such an im- 
portant role in the conduct of groups that they 
must be interpreted if conduct like this is ever 
to approach the fact level. What groups think 
they are fighting for is probably of more im- 
portance than that for which they are really 
fighting. In fact, what they are really fighting 
for is scarcely ever an adequate justification for 
fighting. It is thus not mere verbalism to say 
that what groups think they are fighting fot is 
that for which they are fighting. The “‘outside”’ 
observer in his search for objective facts may 
minimize the tactics of the opposition. If he 

11’The effect of this attitude on the use of facts and 
the use of language will be noted later. 


273 


were on the inside he could not easily scoff at 
the group’s anxiety. What appears as illusion ~ 
from the outside is reality when seen from the — 
inside.** And if the attempt is to'arrive at an 
interpretation of group behavior, the illusion is 
no less a fact than the so-called reality. 


12 The United States is said to have entered the late 
war for the purpose of “making the world safe for 
democracy”; some people claim also that the purpose 
was merely self-protection. ‘The adherents of the for- 
mer view are called idealists; the latter, realists. But 
whe is to decide? The “inside” observers of our na- 
tional behavior, who scouted the ‘“‘making the world 
safe for democracy” idea, found it very difficult to be 
heard during the period when the nation thought it was 
fighting to “make the world safe for democracy,” 


274 


CHAPTER XI 


GROUP SITUATIONS, GROUP STIM- 
ULI, GROUP RESPONSES, REPRE- 
SENTATION AND CONSENT 


The term “Group Situations,” which appears 
first under Category II, was devised as a con- 
venient mode of expressing or defining occasions - 
when the group is about to act. Using the 
terminology of functional psychology, there 
were numerous occasions when the group ap- 
peared to be “‘set’’ for some particular action. 
In some cases the particular “‘set’’ was carried 
into overt action and in other cases it was not. 
In both instances the phenomenon observed was 
designated as a group situation. 


Illustration: 

Group C was at one period of its existence 
forced to meet the problem of contract viola- 
tions. The preconceived method of dealing 
with this problem had been provided in the 
contract itself and in the law validating it. 
Discussion, however, revealed that this precon- 
ceived method was not adequate, and the group 
was compelled to consider alternatives. ‘The 


275 


discussion terminated in a decision to try one of — 


the alternatives. A group situation was thus 
precipitated. 


A composite picture of the group’s status at 
any specific time is the totality of situations 
through which it has passed. Such situations 
are not isolated circumstances; on the contrary, 
each situation, whether it is carried into overt 
action or not, becomes a part of the total evolv- 
ing situation which is the group’s function. The 
preparation of the contract, the signing of the 
contract, the validating of the contract, and the 


activities covered by the contract are all ante- { 


cedent parts of the situation presented by the 
violation of the contract. ‘The only adequate 
means of evaluating the total situation is to ob- 
serve the separable situations as evolving parts 
of the whole. In this connection, the partici- 
pant observers proved to be of exceptional 
value. They were of course in better position 
to know when the group was in a situation which 
presaged action. The participant observers 
were, however, quite incapable of forecasting 
possible future situations. A constant compari- 
son of the observations of the participant ob- 
servers whose tendency was toward immediacy 
of situation with those of the outside observer 
whose tendency was largely toward situations 
further removed ensued. 


276 


Illustration: 

The outside observer at one period suggested 
that Group A would find itself in a situation 
which would necessitate an adjustment to the 
wives and families of its members. Several in- 
side observers derided this suggestion and only 
one entertained it as a remote possibility which 
could not become critical until the group was 
placed upon a sound financial footing. As a 
matter of fact the group did find itself in this 
situation within six months after the prediction. 


Observation must then be directed to both the 
situation and the evolving situation. Changes 
in the group are the reflections of changing sit- 
uations. What alters the situation and by what 
means situations are controlled are problems to 
be considered next. 


1. Group Stimuli 


In attempting to discover what changes the 
situation for the group, the observer is obliged 
to use behavioristic approaches. In the illustra- 
tion given above, the group was called upon to 
meet a situation which involved contract viola- 
tions. It was assumed that this contingency 
had been provided for in advance but the actual 
situation indicated that the prearranged means 
were inadequate. The fact which caused the 
new situation is called a stimulus. An im- 
portant consideration has now arisen. In the 


277 


definition of group situations as set forth on 
page 226, Chapter IX, it was stated that the 
group situation is a relation which the group 
sustains to its environment. We now come to 
see, however, that the cause which precipitated 
the above situation came from within the group. 
Contracts were violated by members of the 
group in such numbers as to make some action 
imperative. The stimulus then which placed 
the group in a new situation was an activity of 
members of the group itself. Upon first im- 
pression this appears to mean that the group 
is its own environment. The paradox is not as 
difficult as it seems to be in this reduced form. 
The difficulty lies chiefly in the ambiguity of the 
term “stimulus.’’ A stimulus may be anything 
which evokes action on the part of the group. 
The situation plus the impending action is still 
a relation between the group and its environ- 
ment. ‘To what does the group react? The 
specific and immediate stimulus in this case may 
be termed “contract breaking on the part of its 
members.’ But when this whole is broken into 
parts, it becomes apparent that contract break- 
ing bears a definite relation to factors outside 
the group and the adjustment which the group 
finally makes is an adjustment to all of the af- 
fected factors whether within or without the 
group. The contract violators may have re- 
sponded to friendly middlemen, to the banker 
278 


pressing for payment upon a loan, or to the 
appeals of a non-member. ‘This response be- 
comes a stimulus to the group, but as stimulus, 
it carries along that portion of the outside en- 
vironment to which the response was made. In 
this sense, there is no incongruity in asserting 
that the group is at times its environment. 
The difficulties involved are those incident to 
the task of making ideas clear by the use of the 
language medium. 

That the term “stimulus” as used in the con- 
text of this essay is to be differentiated from its 
usual physiological connotation has already been 
pointed out. The chief distinction is that group 
stimuli are always complex (with the possible 
exception of those affecting crowd behavior) 
and physiological stimuli may be simple. In the 
latter case it is difficult to conceive of stimuli 
coming from within the behaving organism 
unless one is to consider, e.g., the activity of 
eating as a response to hunger rather than as a 
response to food. Very few, if any, forms of 
the stimulus-response relation as applied to 
groups may be stated in this simplified manner. 

The behavior of the group is a response to 
stimuli,” but at this point collective psychology 


1 See p. 226, Chap. IX. 

2 Certain introspective psychologists quarrel with this 
statement even when applied to individual behavior but 
the dispute is largely an academic form of verbalism. 


279 


must part company with individual psychology. 
The behavior of the group cannot be reduced to 
isolated stimulus-response situations.* The 
group, because it is composed of individuals 
with numerous and varying interests, can re- 
spond only to complex stimuli. Moreover, the 
stimuli which cause the group to act are in- 
variably deferred stimuli. Immediate action on 
the part of the group is possible only when 
representative authority has been vested in 
some individual. Even in such instances, the 
stimulus which appears to be simple is made to 
appear so only by reason of the immediate re- 
sponse. A noteworthy fact in this connection is 
the increasing reluctance on the part of groups 
to vest complete representational capacity in an 
individual. The tendency of the group to make 
such reservations is an indication of its aware- 
ness of the complexity of stimuli. 


2. Group Responses 


The group’s response is a changed attitude or 
a changed policy resulting eventually in a 
changed activity. Such responses represent a 
continuum of the group’s functioning. The 
evolving situation is a continuous series of stimu- 
lus-response situations. When a cooperative 
association changes its attitude toward contract 


8 Many psychologists question this possibility even for 
individual behavior. 
280 


violators it has made a response to the stimulus, 
of which contract-violating is the major com- 
ponent. This response is an evolution of the 
previous situation and in turn affects the total 
situation. The mechanics of responding inhere 
in the group’s legal status, the authority vested 
in its officials, the authority vested in its experts, 
the use of discussion and the mode of represen- 
tation. Since the stimuli are complex, the re- 
sponses must also be complex. This may now 
be illustrated: 


Stimuli Responses 


Pressing creditor ....++.. 
Opposition of middlemen.. 
Suspicions engendered by | Contract violations. 


non-members ......006 Increase of marginal mem- 
Doubt regarding constitu- bers. 

tionality of law ....... 

Family meeds ...sscccee 
Contract violations ...... 
Increase of marginal mem- 

RR eS Pt Oe Changed policy and activ- 
Opposition of middlemen.. ity on part of group. 
Bad feeling over use of 

Legal OrCew. ., cae ee 


Changed policy involving 
Increased local responsi- 


dS) REE RS Lessening of contract vio- 
Organization of local com- Tanita: 

MILES. | i visie cu ds ees eas ear dis 
Acceleration of initial pay- Peoiaiaher, opp osition from 

GL.) AE Det te : 
Education to supplant co- 

MPOURUDe cede dsteeus 


It will be seen from a study of the above illustrations of 
stimulus-response situations that the evolving situation 
might be represented as a circle, or rather as a series of 


281 


interlocking circles in which the overlapping sectors might 
be regarded as the succeeding incidences of new situations, 
i.e., the points at which responses of the previous situation 
come to be stimuli for ensuing behavior. 


The distinction between separate and isolated stimuli and 
multiple stimuli with the corresponding responses might fur- 
ther be illustrated by the following method: 


Stimulus Response Behavior 
I eae 2 tek 
2 yh 2xb 
3 tie 3xC 
4-5-6.. Ee RM ee ee ake gig 
1-2+3 = a (1 + 2-+3)x(a) 
r+2+3 = a+b (1-2 -+ 3)x(a + b) 
r+-2+3 = a+b+ec (1+42-+43)x(a+b-+c), ete. 


The use of the sign (=) in the above does not indicate 
that a stimulus is equal to its response but merely that one 
activity or a group of activities has been isolated and re- 
garded for analytical purposes as the cause of succeeding 
activities. A stimulus calls forth a response and the stimulus 
regarded in relation to its response constitutes a situation; 
the situation in process is behavior. 


3. Representation 


Group organization usually includes mechan- 
ical provisions for the representation of every 
individual. In the groups under observation 
this was accomplished by the ordinary method 
of allowing the members of a certain geograph- 
ical area (district) to elect members to the 
boards of directors. The individual thus 
elected is considered to be the representative of 
the members residing within his district. A 
marginal member of a group is one who pos- 

282 


sesses in some degree the feeling that the group 
or his representative does not adequately repre- 
sent him and his interests. “Two observations 
are to be recorded: (1) how representation is 
affected by changing situations of the group’s 
status and function and (2) how the modes of, 
representation change in proportion to in-. 
creased intelligence regarding the group’s ac- 
tivities. 


Illustration: 

(Group C) At one period of the existence 
of this group the marginal members constituted 
approximately 38% of the total. ‘That is, out 
of every one hundred members, thirty-eight had 
indicated either disapproval of the group or in- 
ability to conform to its contracts and had sold 
portions of their products in violation of the 
contract. (These figures do not, of course, in- 
dicate the total number of marginal members 
since a member may continue to abide by his 
legal obligations and still feel that his interests 
are inadequately represented by the group.) 
The discussion of the situation thus precipitated 
led to the conclusion that the distance between 
the individual member and the group was too 
great and that some more intimate means of 
establishing relations with marginal members 
was needed. The final result was the creation 
of local committees who were to function mid- 
way between the individual member and the or- 
ganization’s officials. 


283 


From the above illustration we see that after 
a group begins to function, its mode of repre- 
sentation is conditioned by the number of its 
marginal members. Representation may thus 
be loosely conceived at the beginning but its 
modes must ultimately conform to the satisfac- 
tion of the potential and actual marginal mem- 
bership. As was demonstrated in Group A fixed 
representational schemes lead to political man- 
euvering. Here in the second year methods ap- 
proaching coercion were employed in order to 
influence the elections. If such methods may be 
utilized by the officials who happen to be in 
power, they will consequently be used by those 
who seek ascendancy. As intelligence among 
the members of the group increases, a diminu- 
tion of blind faith in the officials and experts 
follows. 


Illustration: 

(Group A) No provisions were made in 
this group for the control of experts by the 
membership, the control being vested by as- 
sumption in the officials. In the case under ob- 
servation, an expert warehouseman was dis- 
liked by the members living in the district which 
he served. A group of these members pre- 
pared a resolution, secured twenty-five signa- 
tures, and delivered it to the officials with the 
demand that the expert be removed. ‘The 
ofhcials decided that this was not a representa- 
tional problem and that the experts were re- 

284 


sponsible to the officials and not to the mem- 
bers. 


At first glance this appeared to be merely a 
problem of personal friction, but further in- 
vestigation disclosed the fact that the real ob- 
jections of the members were based upon tech- 
nical points of knowledge rather than upon 
emotions. Their primary dissatisfaction grew 
out of the disposition of grades. The members 
claimed that the expert was not following a 
proper method of grading and that they were 
suffering as a consequence. ‘The emotional fac- 
tor entered into the equation but the original 
conflict arose from the level of intelligence. 
Under the older marketing system the individ- 
ual grower had nothing to say about grading; 
the grades were fixed arbitrarily by the buyers. 
The codperative marketing movement contains 
within its process the germs of an educational 
release. When the grower becomes his own 
intermediate buyer, he must either acquaint him- 
self with the technique of buying (which in- 
cludes grading), or he must delegate this func- 
tion completely to experts. And if he delegates 
this function to experts, he must either share in 
the control of these experts or find himself at 
the mercy of his representatives, the officials. 
The expert cannot remain sui generis in a truly 
cooperative association. ‘That he must remain 
outside the representational process is, however, 


285 


the contention of the leaders and officials of the 
groups under observation. Therefore what is 
said here and under the discussion of the expert 
in the previous chapter is a projection of theory 
and not a statement of practice. 


4. Representation Psychological, not 
Mathematical 


Representation has hitherto been considered 
as a mathematical problem in which no shadings 
of representativeness are permissible. The 
principle of ‘‘one-member one-vote”’ is adhered 
to in theory in practically all forms of social 
organization * and is undoubtedly a survival 
of political egality, resulting from _ the 
French and American revolutions. Labor or- 
ganizations have found it expedient to introduce 
forms of representation which are virtually a 
recognition of the marginal member theory ad- 
vanced above. Thus the International Sea- 
men’s Union of America in its annual conven- 
tion call for 1924 quotes from its constitution: 


‘Article IV, Section 2. Representation at 
the convention shall be based upon the per 
capita tax paid during the year. For the 
purpose of determining the number of members 
in a district or local union, the monthly rate of 
per capita tax shall be multiplied by twelve and 
the total amount paid during the year shall be 


4 See pp. 250 and 251, Chapter X. 
286 


divided by the product of such multiplication. 
District or local unions shall be entitled to one 
delegate for 200 members or less, two dele- 
gates for 500 members or more, three delegates 
for 1000, and one delegate for each additional 
thousand members.” ° 


In this instance a member 1s considered to be a 
real member, i.e., deserving representation, 
only when his annual dues have been paid. ‘The 
marginal member is one whose dues are in 
arrears. ‘This is of course an arbitrary, mathe- 
matical means of determining the basis of repre- 
sentation. Psychologically the real member is 
one who actively contributes to the behavior 
of the group either through opposition or agree- 
ment. The marginal member has already sub- 
tracted all or a portion of his interests from the 
group and therefore cannot be represented by 
the group, its experts, officials or delegates. 
From the psychological point of view the “‘one- 
member one-vote”’ principle is valid only when 
there are no marginal members. When the 
group is viewed as a representation of interests, 
representation cannot be considered as a purely 
mathematical formula. 

Social organization in general will probably 
proceed upon the mathematical basis of repre- 
sentation but this should not deter those possess- 
ing the experimental point of view from at- 


5 The Seaman’s Journal, November, 1923, p. 11. 


287 


tempting other modes. In the sphere of polit- 
ical representation this was approached in 
the so-called extra-governmental cabinet of the 
Czecho-Slovakian Government, when the agra- 
rian party received sufficient votes to assure a 
controlling majority of parliament in the 1921 
elections. Under ordinary conditions all par- 
ties with representatives in parliament would 
have been considered as marginal groups; the 
function of these parties would have been those 
of a mere opposition. ‘There were, however, 
certain reforms, particularly those related to 
the division of the land, which it was thought 
could not be made effective without the support 
of some of the minority groups. All political 
parties, numbering thirteen, were requested to 
elect a representative to serve as their delegate 
on the extra-governmental cabinet. The body 
was given power to initiate legislation and to de- 
bate on the floor of parliament. ‘Thus the 
smallest political party with only one or two 
representatives in parliament was given an op- 
portunity to participate in the constructive and 
active work of government. ‘This constitutes 
an approach toward functional as distinguished 
from mere mathematical representation. From 
a psychological point of view the approach ap- 
pears to be wholly sound. The voice of the 
opposition does become a part of the equation 
which is usually designated as the majority de- 
cision in any case. To recognize this contribu- 
288 


tion of the opposition is merely to bring mar- 
ginal groups into active functional relation to 
the whole. 


5. The Problem of Consent 


The group as a representation of interests 
acts on behalf of its members and their in- 
terests. [he individual who becomes a member 
of a group must in some manner give sanction 
to the activities of the group. The nature of 
this sanction is one of the most baffling problems 
involved in group studies. The dissatisfaction 
with political representatives and their ac- 
tivities became so intense a few decades ago 
that a distinct movement to alter the traditional 
modes of political consent arose. The promises 
of the candidate were unsafe; when the can- 
didate came to be an office-holder he invariably 
found himself in the control of forces which 
negatived his well-meant preélection promises. 
The assumption that the electorate had once 
and for all given its consent to any possible fu- 
ture activity of the office-holder was seen to be 
undependable. The behavior of the office- 
holder was a response to organized groups rep- 
resenting definite interests; these interests fre- 
quently contravened other interests held by 
other groups or held to be for the general wel- 
fare. Some means was sought whereby the 
electorate or any discontented portion of the 

289 


electorate might withhold consent to the activi- 


—= 
> =a 


ties of elected officials. The referendum and — 
the recall were the suggested means and in some | 
of the western states where these methods have | 


been in use for a number of years, an adequate 


body of fact upon which certain conclusions may ~ 


be formed is now available. Observers appear 
to agree that the actual use of the referendum 
and of the recall is not indicative of unusually 
fruitful results but they also agree that the 
mere existence of these powers has greatly in- 


creased the responsiveness of office-holders to — 


their respective constituencies. The referen- 
dum, for example, may be as easily manipulated 
as an election.® The same ‘“‘crowd’”’ methods 
are applicable to both and the organization 
which is capable of manipulating an election is 
equally capable of invoking its methods in a 
referendum. Political experience, however, 
does not greatly aid in the analysis of the prob- 
lem of consent as it has evolved in the multiple 
functional groups of modern civilization. 

The farmers’ codperative marketing associa- 
tions have invented a novel and formal method 
of securing the consent of members to the ac- 
tivities of their group. Each member is re- 
quired to sign a legal contract called a market- 
ing agreement which binds him to deliver all of 


6 This is even more true of the initiative which was 
a political innovation belonging to the same category 
although involving a different form of consent. 
290 


the products of his farm to the association.” A 
sample wording follows: 


“The Association agrees to buy and the 
Grower agrees to sell and deliver to the Asso- 
ciation all of the cotton produced or acquired 
by or for him in North Carolina during the 
years 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925 and 1926.” 


Twenty-three special legislative acts in twenty- 
three respective states have legally validated 
such contracts. Each act contains a section 
dealing with contracts which is either a replica 
or a simple variation of Section 17 of An Act 
to Encourage the Cooperative Marketing of 
Farm Products and to Authorize the Incor- 
poration of Cooperative Marketing Associa- 
tions, Public Laws of North Carolina, Session 
of 1921, making the following provisions: 


“Section 17. Marketing contract. 


‘““(a) The association and its members may 
make and execute marketing contracts, requir- 
ing the members to sell, for any period of time, 
not over ten years, all or any specified part of 
their agricultural products or specified commodi- 


7 “All” is here intended to designate the total of the 
particular product commodity which the association 
proposes to market. If a single farmer is a member of 
more than one commodity association, he will of course 
be obliged to sign contracts for each commodity. 

291 


ties exclusively to or through the association or © 
any facilities to be created by the association. 
The contract may provide that the association 
may sell or resell the products of its members, 
with or without taking title thereto, and pay 
over to its members the resale price, after de- 
ducting all necessary selling, overhead, and 
other costs and expenses, including interest on 
preferred stock, not exceeding eight per cent 
per annum, and reserves for retiring the stock, 
if any; and other proper reserves; and interest 
not exceeding eight per cent per annum upon 
common stock. 


‘““(b) The by-laws and the marketing con 
tract may fix, as liquidated damages, specific 
sums to be paid by the member or stockholder 
to the association upon the breach by him of 
any provisions of the marketing contract re- 
garding the sale or delivery or withholding of 
products; and may further provide that the 
member will pay all costs, premiums for bonds, 
expenses and fees in case any action is brought 
upon the contract by the association; and any 
such provisions shall be valid and enforceable in 
the courts of this State. 


‘“(c) In the event of any such breach or 
threatened breach of such marketing contract 
by a member, the association shall be entitled 
to an injunction to prevent the further breach 
of the contract, and to a degree of specified per- 
formance thereof. Pending the adjudication 

292 


of such an action, and upon filing a verified 
complaint showing the breach or threatened 
breach, and upon filing a sufficient bond, the 
association shall be entitled to a temporary re- 
straining order and preliminary injunction 
against the member.” 


The leaders of the cooperative movement 
frequently referred to the contract and the law 
as instruments possessing “teeth, meaning 
thereby that the agreements were legally bind- 
ing and that it would therefore be difficult for 
the opponents of codperation to influence mem- 
bers to desert the associations. This form of 
consent, they affirmed, was lasting and sub- 
stantial with all of the force of the law as its 
support.* Groups A, B and C operate under 
five-year contracts similar to the one cited; 
Group D operates under a contract which is 
binding for one year and is renewable at the 
close of this period. In each case the form of 
consent is the same in that it is dependent upon 
the signature of a member to an enforceable 
contract. | 

The methods utilized in securing signers for 
contracts have already been alluded to ° under 


8 The law above quoted has been declared constitu- 
tional by a decision of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina in Tobacco Growers’ Codperative Association 
versus W. T. Jones of Nash County, Spring Term, 
1923, No. 62. 

®°P. 257, Chapter X. 


293 


the discussion of leaders. It was noted that 
some of these methods were less creditable than 
others, and the reference now calls for further 
amplification. The so-called “psychology of 
getting signatures on the ‘dotted line’” with 
scant regard for the means employed was an 
inevitable consequence of two factors included 
in the initial campaigns. In the first place, the 
campaigns were conducted with great speed, 
and in the second place, persons were employed 
to secure contracts. The rapidity of the cam- 
paign in some areas counteracted the influences 
of the employed canvassers so that signed con- 
tracts were secured at an astonishingly low cost 
in most cases. The chief defect of the methods 
utilized in the campaigns was obviously the im- 
possibility of securing intellectual conviction. 
The cooperative movement presaged many sig- 
nificant changes in habits, customs and tradi- 
tions, and these changes demanded rationaliza- 
tion. But there was no time for rationalization. 
‘The organization committees of (the names 
of two codperative associations inserted here) 
were given until January 8, 1922, to complete 
the sign-up of growers of 50% of the tobacco 
and growers of 2,000 bales of cotton in 1920 
in order to make the contracts valid. The liv- 
ing history of these great campaigns waged by 
the farmers themselves in the face of the vicious 
opposition by certain of the speculative interests 


294 


will never be blurred in the minds of any who 
took part therein.” *° 

The paragraph quoted above was written, not 
in the midst of the excitement of the campaign, 
but almost one year later. Significance attaches 
to the following items: (a) the necessity of 
haste in securing contracts, (b) the emotional 
nature of the descriptive sentences in which such 
terms as “living history,” “great campaigns 
waged,” “‘in the face of vicious opposition” ap- 
pear. These two points of emphasis afford the 
clue to the methods utilized in securing farmer- 
consent to the process of codperative market- 
ing. Farmers were instructed that there was 
an evil to combat and that its dangers to them 
were imminent. They were exhorted to fight 
and to strike their blows without delay. The 
farmers were giving consent to something 
quite different from codperative marketing; 
they were in reality giving consent to battle. 
Significant consent probably always includes 
some aspect of combat or conflict. It is im- 
portant to recognize this factor of the con- 
sent-equation since it bears a definite relation to 
the latter stages of consent on the motor level. 
Complete consent, real consent must eventually 
be an expression whose components include 
emotional direction, intellectual correction and 
motor activity. [he order of this sequence is 

10 Handbook on Cooperative Marketing, p. 9. 

295 


undoubtedly of importance, but in the cases 
under observation activity on the motor level 
succeeded emotional direction.** Contracts 
were signed in the spring and summer and © 
products were actually delivered to codperative — 
warehouses in the autumn and winter. ‘The 
character of agricultural production naturally 
imposed this cycle of events upon the situation. 
The activity of delivering the crop necessarily 
succeeded the promise of delivery implied in the 
signed contract. The nature of this form of 
consent, which, incidentally, appears to be gen- 
eral when groups are involved, may be further 
illumined by a brief classification of its stages: 


(a) Emotional consent was either given 
under the influence of public speakers at mass 
meetings or under the influence of canvassers 
employed to secure signed contracts. 

(b) Intellectual consent represented a series 
of rationalizations continuing under one form 
or another between the period of signing the 
contract and the period of delivering the prod- 
uct. 

(c) Motor consent was represented by the 
overt act of delivering the product to the co- 
operative warehouse. 


11 Signing the contract is not considered to be a mo- 
tor activity although in a strict sense it obviously is; 
the chief components of this activity were emotional in 
character and therefore the term motor activity is re- 
served for the description of those activities which ac- 
tually involved codperative marketing. 


296 


Total consent may then be described as an in- 
tegration of emotion, reason, and activity. If 
each of these factors of the equation may be 
kept in a state of proportionate readiness, the 
result will be an unquestioned and reliable form 
of consent. The strategy of the leaders of the 
groups under observation was directed to this 
end with varying success. 

The test of real consent, total consent, occurs 
at the period of motor activity. If emotion and 
reason are in agreement, the resultant action in- 
volves no conflict. Numerous events occurring 
between the initial and the latter stages of con- 
sent serve to condition the final results. In 
Group A there were many contract violations, 
the total reaching as high as one hundred in a 
single county; in Groups D and B there were 
only a few violations; in Group C, the viola- 
tions at one period were so numerous as to en- 
danger the success of the entire movement. 
In another group, not under definite observa- 
tion, practically no violations occurred. Ac- 
tivities tending to produce these varying degrees 
of harmony will be discussed in the following 
chapter. The pertinent task at this point is to 
propose generalizations explanatory of the na- 
ture of consent. The discovery of generaliza- 
tions which direct attention to the complexities 
of the total equation of consent will advance 
the technique of group organization and group 
process. 


297 


The validity of the interests involved condi- 
tions the validity of consent.” If, at the time 
of marketing, the member of a codperative asso- 
ciation has the conviction that adherence to the 
contract is a contradiction of his interests, no 
valid consent may be expected of him. He may, 
of course, follow out the terms of the contract 
because of fear of the law but consent of this 
type is coercion and not true consent. True 
consent is possible only when emotions and rea- 
son are in harmony with activity. Neglecting 
to give recognition to this principle accounts for 
the numerous failures of quasi-legal forms of 
group organization. There is a higher form of 
consent than is implied in the placing of a sig- 
nature on a legal contract. Reliance upon legal 
consent too frequently acts as a barrier to the 
discovery and the creation of this higher con- 
sent. But what is this higher consent? No 
promising answer can be given to this query 
until added experimental data are available. 
Upon the basis of the meager material at hand, 


12 Political scientists often complain of the seeming 
impossibility of constructing a scientific tariff law. 
‘These complaints are founded upon the charge that all 
affected parties contend for their particular interests 
regardless of the interests of others. ‘This constitutes 
an assumption that real consent is possible even if the 
consequences contravene interests. What is needed, 
obviously, is not the cultivation of false consent run- 
ning counter to valid interests but rather a method for 
evaluating interests. 


298 


principles may be suggested only in the hope 
that they may be verified or discarded. Two 
considerations, however, which may be tenta- 
tively designated as facts, have emerged from 
the present study: (1) real consent is an in- 
tegration of emotion, reason and activity; (2) 
the integrity of real consent depends basically 
upon a balancing of interests. A candidly ex- 
perimental attitude toward these two principles 
might contribute toward the liberation of 
modern social organization from its shackles of 
propaganda and hypocrisy.** 


18 A trivial although symptomatic illustration of the 
evils of sham consent is at hand. A county baseball 
league holds an annual meeting at which the various 
communities are represented. Every year they agree 
that only two professional players may be engaged by 
each team and that the maximum amount to be ex- 
pended upon such players is to be $50. And every year 
they go forth from the meeting with the full knowledge 
that they will spend much more than this amount if it 
is in the interest of winning the pennant. ‘The conse- 
quences of this hypocrisy have at last brought their 
penalties, not merely to the respective representatives 
but to the teams, the communities and to the game it- 
self. Thus far all attempts to base the agreements 
upon honest interests have failed and the league itself 
has reached the stage of disintegration. 


299 


CHAPTER XII 


DISCUSSION, USE OF FACTS, POINTS- 
OF-VIEW, USE OF LANGUAGE, 
AND POWER? 


AN individual’s response to a new situation is 
partially conditioned by the knowledge which 
he possesses of the factors involved in it. 
Scientific method may therefore be regarded as 
a recognition of the utility of knowledge or of 
deliberation. ‘That man rises in the scale of 
civilization in proportion to his increasing use 
of deliberation has been generally assumed. 
When the scientist isolates the new elements in 
his problem, he is, in a sense, deliberating over 
their qualities. Instruments of precision are 
merely aids to the process of deliberation. In 
ordinary behavior the individual draws upon 
the common stock of information which he has 
absorbed or in which he is immersed before con- 


‘The term “interests” which logically belongs to 
this section of the Categories is not to be isolated for 
separate consideration since the implications of the 
term have been so fully revealed in conection with all 
of the other terms. 

300 


sidering his behavior a rational step. The con- 
sequences of the step are always rationalized. 
If, for example, a person is confronted with the 
opportunity of having $5,000 to invest, he will 
ordinarily deliberate before making the invest- 
ment. He may do this by means of knowledge 
which he possesses or he may accept the de- 
liberations of others whose judgments he val- 
ues. After the act he will find reasons to sup- 
port its rationality, irrespective of whether the 
investment resulted in gain or loss. 

An act of behavior begins with a bodily stim- 
ulus, is reinforced by habits and emotional 
complexes, and is either ratified or rejected 
by deliberative processes. Most psychologists 
have assumed that simple acts of behavior, re- 
flexes, are performed without completing this 
circuit. The term ‘“‘behavior,” however, is now 
applied more definitely to acts which include the 
possibility of deliberation or thinking. All psy- 
chologists, whether they adhere to a strict in- 
terpretation of the James-Lange theory or not, 
make room at some stage of behaving for a 
process which makes knowledge a desired pre- 
requisite for acting. Between stimulus and re- 
sponse a period of time elapses during which 
the act-in-process may be temporarily arrested. 
Overemphasis of the effectiveness of this de- 
liberating process has led to untenable theories 
of choice, the power of consciousness and free 
will. Analysis of the method by which the in- 

301 


dividual arrives at judgments preceding acts re- 
veals that these judgments are still circum- — 
scribed, conditioned and controlled by the stim- 
ulus itself and the bodily organism as a whole. 
The act-in-process is not brought to a standstill 
by deliberation and what transpires during de- 
liberation is confined within the sphere of stim- 
ulus, habits, emotions—all of which contribute 
to the knowledge which the deliberation is as- 
sumed to discover. “Deliberation is a dramatic 
rehearsal (in imagination) of various compet- 
ing possible lines of action.” ? The complete 
act will be an integration or a partial integra- 
tion which has merely been temporarily sus- 
pended. Continued deliberation means inaction 
and consequently disintegration. 


1. Discussion as Joint or Group Deliberation 


Groups must act and hence they must choose 
between conflicting lines of conduct. Activity 
is always a step into the unknown, a choice bes 
tween a line of conduct which has already been 
tried and one which is still to be ttied. When 
confronted with the necessity of adjustment to 
a new situation the group may (a) follow its 
leader, (b) consult experts, (c) imitate pre- 
vious action on the part of the group or some 
other group, or (d) resort to the attempt of ar- 
riving at a conclusion by means of joint delibera- 

2 Human Nature and Conduct, John Dewey, p. 190. 

302 


tion. Frequently the resultant action of the 
group is a combination of all of the above fac- 
tors. The President of the United States reads 
a message to Congress which includes specific 
recommendations for legislation. Experts are 
consulted for the purpose of discovering the 
facts relevant to the proposal. The proposed 
legislation is evaluated in terms of its relation 
to the traditional aspects of governmental 
theory. And finally Congress attempts to ar- 
rive at a decision which will embody portions of 
the President’s stimulation as a leader, the 
bearings of the experts’ facts, traditional pro- 
cedure and the values created by debate. 
Farmers have been much-tutored by experts 
and leaders but unfortunately they have had 
slight experience in the methods of discussion. 
This condition may be accounted for by the 
facts incident to isolation, meager means of, 
communication, and the highly individual char- 
acter of farming as a vocation. The codpera- 
tive movement, in spite of its leisurely approach 
during the past half-century, finally enlisted 
farmer support with extreme suddenness. Col- 
lectivism arrived, but no collective means of 
dealing with collectivism accompanied its ar- 
rival. Many meetings were held but these were 
addressed by speakers who were themselves un- 
trained in discussion methods. Speakers always 
gave opportunities for questions but discussion 
implies much more than giving answers to ques- 


393 


tions. Viewing the codperative movement as a 
whole and limiting the view to the past three 
years, it is safe to say that it arose upon the 
fulcrum of leadership and expertness, emotional 
allegiance and credulity. Leadership has al- 
ways been the center of gravity of farmer or- 
ganizations but expertness was in this case a 
new factor which exercised a powerful influence 
in counteracting the customary suspicions of 
farmers. The absence of emphasis upon local 
units for discussion purposes, or of discus- 
sion in any form during the early days of organi- 
zation, was marked. ‘he expert, however, was 
never forgotten. ‘“The employment of experts 
of the best type for the handling, grading and 
marketing of the commodity, and for perform- 
ing every service necessary, is a final essen- 
tial to success in codperative marketing.” ° 
“We are big enough to hire experts to run 
our business and serve us.’ * ‘The leaders were 
aware of the farmer’s prejudice against high- 
salaried officials and experts and with this 
undoubtedly in mind they attempted to emo- 
tionalize the expert and his services. ‘‘Co- 

8 Handbook on Commodity Cooperative Marketing, 
published by the American Cotton Growers’ Exchange, 
p. 8. Italics used by the author to indicate the inclu- 
sive concept of the expert. 

* Handbook on Cooperative Marketing, published 
jointly by the North Carolina Cotton Growers’ Co- 


operative Association and the Tobacco Growers’ Co- 
operative Association, p. 5. 


304 


operatives can afford to pay as much for ex- 
pert service as any other form of business or- 
ganization, based on the quantity handled, but 
so fascinating is the work of helping solve the 
problems of this remarkable economic move- 
ment that in many cases men of the broadest 
experience and the highest ability prefer to 
work with codperatives for less remuneration 
than they could obtain in purely private em- 
ployment.” ° 

The need for discussion among the members 
became apparent to the leaders only when the 
cooperatives commenced functioning. In fact 
the principle of deciding important questions by 
means of discussion has never been fully con- 
ceded. If the farmers can, in view of their 
lack of training and other obstacles, succeed in 
adjusting themselves and the codperative move- 
ment to a discussion technique they will have 
accomplished much to validate the theory of 
discussion as a mode of group deliberation. 
In all of the groups under consideration dis- 
cussion has appeared as one of the “tools” 
which the members propose to use in making 
themselves vitally important to their respect- 
ive organizations. In two of the groups, sit- 
uations have arisen which have caused the 
officials to make provisions for discussion pro- 
cedure. The fruits of codperative acting are 


5 Handbook on Commodity Cooperative Marketing, 


pp. 8, 9. 
305 


codperative rationalizations which lead to the 
acceptance of principles and beliefs. ‘Thus far 
discussion among the members of cooperatives 
is largely of this rationalizing type. 


Illustration: 

When it was discovered by the officials of 
Group D that the loyalty of members depended 
in no small degree upon the support of their 
Wives, a new expert was employed for the pur- 
pose of generating discussion groups among 
farm women. ‘This project is designated as 
‘morale’ work, or an effort to retain the 
loyalty of the men by securing the support of 
the women. 


The above is a fair illustration of the meth- 
ods by which discussion has been initiated in 
all of the groups. The motive is obviously to 
utilize discussion as a means of ratifying or ra- 
tionalizing what the group has already done. 
Evidently any form of collectivism based upon 
this formula will in the end become static and 
incapable of calling forth a spirited loyalty on 
the part of its members. The continuance of 
discussion on this plane will, in point of fact, 
lead inevitably toward a baulked constituency 
which will form the seed-bed for suspicion and 
dissension. 

If discussion is to be vital, something more 
than a series of ratification meetings, it must 
partake of creativeness. What happens to in- 

306 


spire the group must ultimately germinate in 
the nutritive capacities of the group. ‘‘A for- 
ward movement in the spiritual life of society 
may be sought in two ways. We may look to 
leadership, to great spokesmen of the spirit, 
who shall draw a people onward by the sheer 
power of championed ideals to compel assent; 
or we may look to a creative social process, to 
a lifting of many voices that take counsel to 
achieve in the common experience a winnowing 
of ideals and a reordered life. . . . For so- 
ciety to-day we shall probably rest our hopes 
chiefly in the second way of progress.” * The 
broader concept of progress may for present 
purposes be overlooked. ‘The present search 
is for an objective technique of group action 
which will insure the cohesion and continued 
functioning of the group without regard to 
whether or not the interests which are thereby 
enhanced are in accordance with a theory of 
societal progress. Can a collective group with 
a collective function evolve a sound technique 
of behavior which excludes creative participa- 
tion on the part of its constituents? No an- 
swer is possible to this query since the groups 

6° The Way of Group Discussion, A. D. Sheffield. 
Pamphlet published by the Conference on the Chris- 
tian Way of Life. Professor Sheffield follows up this 
statement with excellent reasons for placing hope in the 
values of group discussion, but his are not the precise 


reasons which seem most pertinent to the above discus- 
sion. 


397 


under observation have existed too short a 
time to have been brought to an acuteness of 
situation capable of demonstrating the utility 
of discussion. Thus far discussion has been, 
as it so frequently is in business types of or- 
ganization, merely a form of maneuvering by | 
which the members are made to appear in har- 
mony with the activities and policies of the of- 
ficials and experts. ‘There are, however, nu- 
merous indications that periods of acuteness 
are soon to appear. Moreover, clear indica- 
tions exist that no adequate preparation is be- 
ing made for these situations. 


2. The Use and the Misuse of Facts 


During the rise of the codperative groups 
under consideration a more or less general re- 
action against propaganda and its methods ap- 
peared. People everywhere were requesting 
facts, not opinions. ‘The rapidity with which 
the codperative movement advanced rendered 
accurateness of facts impossible. It was never- 
theless sought and claimed both by the codper- 
ative leaders and the leaders of the opposition. 
‘Three queries were uppermost: 

(a) How many farmers have signed co- 

operative contracts? 

(b) What proportion of the crop is included 

by these contracts? 

(c) Has the price paid by the middlemen in 

in the past been unfair? 
308 


Claims and counterclaims were made by 
both sides with equal insistence upon accuracy. 
The claims of both parties to the controversy 
were, of course, inaccurate. In most cases this 
inaccuracy may be attributed to zeal and en- 
thusiasm rather than to malicious intent. 
Group A grossly overstated both its member- 
ship and its acreage in one area where the op- 
position was particularly effective. On the 
basis of strategy this group also made a pur- 
poseful understatement of its total member- 
ship at one point in the controversy. “he op- 
position maintained a rare consistency with one 
set of facts together with a pronounced incon- 
sistency and inaccuracy with another set of 
facts. Naturally the statistical method of sup- 
porting statements of fact was prominently 
utilized. Both the codperatives and the oppo- 
sition secured statistics published by the United 
States Department of Agriculture and by an 
ingenious method of rearranging year-period 
groupings arrived at contrary and conflicting 
results. An overzealous organizer in a public 
address stated that the United States Govern- 
ment, through its War Finance Corporation, 
had loaned the codperative association in 
whose interest he labored the sum of thirty 
million dollars. In spite of correction by other 
leaders this statement circulated and in at least 
one case produced an amusing result. A mem- 
ber of the Association wrote to the office of 


399 


its headquarters to request a loan of $400 for 
his personal needs—not an exorbitant demand 
in view of the amount which he believed the 
Association had procured from the Govern- 
ment.’ 

Facts are of greatest value when the group 
is about to act in relation to a situation for 
which the facts are relevant, i.e., when they 
enter into the behavior equation. The tempta- 
tion to misuse facts synchronizes with the 
period of greatest value. The tendency is al- 
ways to believe those purported facts which 
lend weight to an already preconceived preju- 
dice or mode of action. When conflict is most 
intense, both within the individual and between 
groups, facts become most important and most 
dangerous. The rise of experts and the inabil- 
ity of private citizens to control the sources of 
facts are consequently movements of great sig- 
nificance to modern social theory, social organi- 
zation and social control. 

The use of facts constitutes a mode of con- 
trol. This is readily discovered when the mo- 
tives for the use of facts are analysed. During 
the organization phase, facts were used (a) 
to encourage non-members to sign contracts, 
(b) to discourage the opposition, and (c) to 


7 The War Finance Corporation as a matter of fact 
did assist in the financing of these codperatives with 
extended advances, but the advances were made upon 
products actually in the possession of the associations. 

310 


influence public opinion. Facts, then, were 
used as a means of controlling responses on the 
part of members of the group, opponents of 
the group, and the public. Considered in the 
larger sense, facts were used to control spe- 
cific situations. The relation between this use 
of facts and the process called group delibera- 
tion is obvious; facts are projected for the pur- 
pose of making deliberation unnecessary. ‘The 
logic of facts is self-evident. 


Illustration: 

Certain organizers employed for the pur- 
pose of securing signatures to contracts made 
statements to the effect that 80 per cent and 90 
per cent of the growers of a particular area 
had already given their signatures. ‘The pal- 
pable conclusion to be drawn from this fact was 
that an insufficient quantity of the commodity 
would remain to warrant the existence of pri- 
vate buyers, and that therefore the grower 
who still refrained from signing a contract was 
depriving himself of a market. 


For present purposes it is not important to 
know whether the statements made in these 
cases were accurate or not, i.e., whether they 
were in reality facts; they performed the func- 
tion of facts, the function being to compel a 
conclusion without discussion or deliberation. 
A counterfeit coin serves exactly the same func- 
tion as a legal one. When its spurious charac- 
ter is discovered its function ceases. 


207 


effective use of facts and in order to lend scien- 
tific weight to their counter-facts, they con- 
ducted canvasses and surveys. The conclusions 
which might logically be drawn from these sets 
of facts were as self-evident as in the former 
case. But these conclusions were diametrically 
opposite. It is not safe to draw the easy in- 
ference that this illustration merely indicates 
willful and purposeful misuse of facts, or un- 
truth. On the contrary, both parties to the 
fact-battle were convinced that their respective 
facts represented the truth. The newspapers 
in many sections printed both sets of facts with 
the justification that with both sides before them 
the farmers and the public could arrive at log- 
ical and satisfactory judgments. The fallacy 
of this “both-sides’” argument is apparent. 
Facts are not discussable. If one person in- 
sists that there are ten apples in a basket and 
another is equally certain that there are eleven, 
no amount of argument or no refinement of 
logic can determine how many apples are really 
in the basket. “Che only method by which the 
exact number can be determined is by joint 
counting. 

From the viewpoint of social theory it must 
be admitted that contemporary group behavior 
is far removed from the possibility of a fruit- 
ful use of facts. The use of facts cannot be- 
come a wholesome aid to rational group re- 

3r2 


= | 


The opposition was quick to appreciate this | 
| 


: 


sponses until something has been accomplished 
by way of refining the methods of acquiring 
facts. [he present use of facts is not only 
analogous to headquarters’ communiqués issued 
by armies engaged in warfare; it is the same 
process. Facts are utilized in intergroup re- 
lations as weapons of coercion. The assump- 
tion that fact gatherers are scientists and hence 
neutral is of little assistance. If the use of 
facts is left to the groups in conflict, such use 
will be determined by protective impulses. Neu- 
tral fact-gathering does not appear to be the 
solution of the fact problem. The analogy of 
the apples in the basket is pertinent. Facts 
may be gathered by joint fact-gathering bodies, 
and from thence onward the use of facts be- 
comes amenable to discussion. If a codper- 
ative association and an association of middle- 
men together state that there are 500 growers 
in a certain area and that 400 of them have 
signed codperative marketing contracts, it is 
perfectly legitimate for each party to the con- 
troversy to arrive at its own conclusions. Logic 
and discussion may then begin to function. 
When the facts themselves are agreed upon, 
discussion may proceed to analyze the various 
possible meanings of these facts. Logic, with 
its modern empirical implications, may then be 
utilized. The same motives and incentives to 
interpret the facts in terms of interests will ex- 
ist, but in the realm of interpretation there are 


313 


no self-evident conclusions. Codperative fact- 
gathering does not in any sense lead to the 
inference that the codperating groups will 
thereby be induced to adopt a cooperative 
mode of action on behalf of the interests at 
stake. It does imply, however, that the futil- 
ity of discussing facts has been eliminated and 
that therefore time and energy may be devoted 
to a discussion of the meaning of facts. The 
way will have been opened for a rational and 
logical ventilation of interests. Claims and 
counterclaims, statements and _ counterstate- 
ments, facts and counter-facts leave the partici- 
pators of discussion in the quagmire of doubt 
and suspicion. Nothing can be discussed save 
the truth or untruth of the facts or the honesty 
or dishonesty of the groups utilizing the facts. 
If, on the other hand, the group may respond 
to facts by means of its own logical processes, 
both a motive and a beginning technique for 
group discussion will have been brought into 
existence. 

But this treatment of the use of facts has 
led into the perilous regions of prophecy. 
Nothing that was discovered in the fact-using 
methods employed by the groups under ob- 
servation warrants the prophecy of joint fact- 
gathering. ‘The essence of what was discov- 
ered merely points to the conclusion that facts 
have little importance in contemporary group 
interrelations. 


314 


After the codperative associations com- 
menced to receive commodities at their respec- 
tive receiving stations, facts again came into 
prominence. The pertinent query then was, 
not how many farmers have signed contracts, 
but the far more significant one: how many 
farmers who signed contracts are actually de- 
livering their products to the codperatives? 
The two contending groups (the codperatives 
and the middlemen) were then obliged to pro- 
ject their conflict to a new level, namely, the 
level of world markets and world influences. 
A new interest was involved. In the former 
illustration, the interest at stake was the con- 
trol of a definite proportion of the commodity 
by means of signed contracts in the hands of the 
cooperative associations. As the commodity 
began to flow to market, the interest at stake 
came to be the control of prices. ‘The control 
of prices, naturally, was conditioned by the con- 
trol of the commodity. 


Illustration: 

‘The officials of Group A consistently refused 
to state the amount of products received at one 
of their important stations. A state statute 
required the publication of precisely this fact. 
The law was technically evaded; it required the 
publication of the amounts of the particular 
commodity received (bought) together with the 
average prices paid during each week. The co- 
operatives affirmed that they bought none of 


315 


the commodity but merely received it and in 
turn sold it on behalf of the members of the 
association and consequently did not feel them- 
selves bound by the provisions of the law. 


The officials of the codperative association 
insisted that their chief motive for withholding 
these facts was to baffle the middlemen. If the 
middlemen knew exactly how much of the com- 
modity was in the warehouses of the codpera- 
tive association, this information could be util- 
ized in influencing prices. The middlemen in- 
sisted publicly and by repeated appeals to the 
state authorities upon the publication of these 
facts. This insistence appeared to be genuine, 
but it was later discovered that the non-publi- 
cation of facts by the coGperative might be 
used profitably. The middlemen then pro- 
ceeded to disseminate statements upon their 
own responsibility. They naturally placed the 
amounts in control of the codperatives so low 
as to induce a general opinion that the codper- 
atives had failed and that their chief motive 
in withholding facts was to escape the admis- 
sion of weakness. 

The above illustration does not differ in es- 
sence from the previous one. Facts were used, 
not to assist any group in making rational re- 
sponses, but in reality to produce responses 
which would enhance the interests of one or the 
other of the contending groups. Facts were 

316 


used, not in the interest of facts, but in the 
interest of interests. 


3. Points of View as Activities Influencing 
Group Responses 


A point of view is not a generalized attitude 
resulting from previous experiences and incor- 
porated as a behavior-pattern. The attitude of 
Gentiles toward Jews is not a point of view in 
the sense in which the term is employed in this 
study. The differentiating point in the present 
use of the term is that a point of view as util- 
ized in group relations carries a distinct conno- 
tation of time. An attitude, like a prejudice 
or bias, has nothing to do with time, with the 
exception that it is likely to be tempered in time 
by succeeding experiences and influences. A 
point of view specifically makes reference to the 
_ future, to perspective. It is utilized in group 
behavior as a means of inducing a response 
which includes values for the present as well 
as cumulative values for the future. 


Illustration: 

While the cooperative associations were be- 
ing organized, both the codperative leaders and 
the leaders of the middlemen’s group projected 
and emphasized the fact that they represented 
a long-time point of view. Thus the codpera- 
tive leaders said in effect: “Support the codp- 


317 


erative association because it proposes to build 
up the community by means of a scientific sys- 
tem of marketing.’”’ And the middleman said 
in effect: ‘‘Remain loyal to us; we have already 
demonstrated that we can build up the com- 
munity. ‘This cooperative venture may succeed 
temporarily but in the long run your interests 
will be better conserved by supporting us.”’ 


Both groups believed apparently in the long- 
time point of view as an argument for support. 
Psychologically considered, this emphasis upon 
time is comparable to the appeals which bank- 
ers make when urging their clients to save. 
Slow but sure interest on capital is better, they 
insist, than sudden investments in speculative 
ventures where the profits may be exceedingly 
large or where there may be a loss. The long- 
time point of view is put forth in the interests 
of security, safety. But the long-time point of 
view is based upon the assumption that indi- 
viduals respond more readily to an activity thus 
founded than to activities involving the short- 
time point of view, i.e., that the long look ahead 
is characteristic of human behavior. What is 
taken to be a look ahead is probably largely a 
conservative habit-pattern. Those who implore 
others to act in accordance with a long-time 
point of view are continually acting on the 
basis of a short-time point of view. Activities 
of the codperative groups which violated the 
empirical data of social theory and social or- 

318 


ganization illustrate the short-time point of 
view. 


Illustrations: 

The short-time point of view as illustrated 
in activities of the codperative groups may be 
discovered in the following instances: ° 

a. Ihe rapid campaign for securing signa- 
tures to contracts represents a short-time 
point of view since it secures a form of 
non-rational consent which receives its 
severest test when the time arrives for 
carrying out the terms of the contract. 

b. The erection of a comprehensive over- 
head administrative organization with- 
out adequate attention to the relations 
between this organization and members 
in isolated local communities represents 
a short-time point of view since the over- 
head organization can function perma- 
nently only when there exists a vital and 
wholesome interrelation between it and 
the members. 


® The officials responsible for these activities argue, 
and with considerable logic, that these steps were es- 
sential and inevitable since they were the only terms 
upon which the organizations could begin to function. 
This, it will be recognized, was also the argument of 
the proponents of the Treaty of Versailles. The fal- 
lacy is obvious; activities which bear even slightly useful 
results are invariably rationalized later in terms of prin- 
ciples. The simplest trick in logic is to make a past act 
fit a generalized principle. “This is again the fallacy of 
confusion between means and ends. 


319 


c. The emphasis placed upon government 
loans and loans by wealthy individuals 
represents a short-time point of view 
since the associations can in the end be 
stabilized only by their own resources. 

‘d. The emphasis placed upon the legal con- 
tract as a means for insuring the solidar- 
ity of the associations represents a short- 
time point of view since no legal sanction 
is adequate when psychological, sociolog- 
ical and ethical sanctions are absent. 


Whether or not these activities seemed nec- 
essary for the strategic situations in which the 
newly-organized groups found themselves is ir- 
relevant. The fact remains that people who 
urge a long-time point of view upon others en- 
gage in activities which represent a short-time 
point of view.® An abbreviated term for the 
short-time point of view might very well be 
“expediency.” The expedient activity must 
later be transformed into what may be termed 
the fundamental activity. Herein lies the chief 
difficulty. “The change from a short-time point 
of view (activities based upon the short-time 


® []lustrations are available from the observations of 
the behavior of the middlemen groups. In fact, most 
of their activities violated the whole of what is accepted 
as sound social theory. Because of the author’s assump- 
tion that these middleman groups are largely protective 
organizations with few constructive functions and hence 
without continuity, they are not given the same promi- 
mence as the cooperative groups. 

320 


ee 


point of view) to the long-time point of view 
involves a double integration. The changed 
activities will not be fruitfully rationalized un- 
less these are accompanied by a changed atti- 
tude. A turn-over in personnel is frequently 
necessary before this integration can take place. 


4. The Use of Language as a Group Response 


Words serve as symbols for ideas, emotions 
and activities. ‘Therefore new organizations 
bring into usage new terms. A new emphasis, 
weight or connotation is also added to old terms 
when these terms come to be used as slogans. 
Altogether too little attention has been given 
to this relation between words and group be- 
havior and it should be admitted that this prob- 
lem originally formed only a minor and inci- 
dental place in the present study. It was noted, 
however, that words exerted a marked influence 
over the behavior of not merely the groups 
whose immediate interests were at stake, but 
on the behavior of those vague groups usually 
included under the term “‘the public.” The im- 
portance of this phase of group behavior was 
revealed when one of the codperative groups 
took official cognizance of the use of language 
in one of its executive meetings. 


Illustration: 
In order to create a “fight image’’ in the 


} 321 
y ) 


minds of members of the codperative associa- 
tions, such opprobrious terms as ‘‘auction- 
gang,” ‘‘auction-crowd,” ‘‘our enemies’ and 
“pin-hooker,” ‘‘pin-hooker’s paradise’’ were 
used to designate the middlemen. The time 
came when it appeared to the officials that 
nothing more could be gained by the continu- 
ance of this terminology, and the field workers 
and employees were instructed to modify their 
language. 


Analysis of the above illustration led to the 
conclusion that the officials were mainly con- 
cerned about the attitude which would be cre- 
ated in the minds of the so-called disinterested 
groups if these contemptuous terms were to 
create an overdrawn picture. Respectable 
people lived and had dealings with these mid- 
dlemen; if the language inference painted them 
too darkly, these disinterested persons would 
naturally tend to discount other statements of 
the cooperatives. 

Numerous illustrations are also available 
where the opposite, or favorable impression 
was sought by means of terms which carried 
the implications, or at least the overtones, of 
accepted values. 


Illustration: 

a. The middlemen consciously emphasized 
the use of the terms “independent mar- 
ket,’’ “open market,” and ‘‘auction-as- 

322 


usual” to designate the established mar- 
keting system.”° 

b. The officials of the codperatives con- 
sciously cultivated the use of the terms 
“our,” ““we,” and “us” when speaking of 
the cooperative association to indicate 


the collective nature of the organization. 


The three terms, ‘independent,’ ‘‘open,”’ 
and ‘‘as-usual’’ were of peculiar significance in 
the Southern states where all save one of the 
cooperatives under observation were organized. 
Each carried its pertinent implication of value. 
The opposite of an independent and an open 
market is, obviously, one in which the grower 
is in bondage, unfree. To market products ‘‘as- 
usual’”” means to avoid the risk of engaging 
upon a new and untried method. ‘The influence 
of such terms upon the behavior of individuals 
and groups is readily revealed when observa- 
tions are conducted on street corners and in 
homes as well as in public meetings and the 
press. In one locality, at least, it is apparent 
that the use of language has played an impor- 
tant if not the deciding role in defeating the 
cooperative movement. 


10’They also followed the lead of the codperatives 
in using reproachful terms, such as “‘the higher-ups” to 
designate the politicians and citizens who were support- 
ing the codperative movement; the implication, obvi- 
ously, was that these “higher-ups” were merely using 
the codperative movement as a means of achieving some 
sinister end. 


323 


5. The Use of Power as a Group Response 


The very concept of power, used to indicate 
a relation between groups, produces a sense of 
futility. “The connotations of power are the 
antitheses of the most cherished political and 
ethical principles. “Might does not make 
right,” ‘“‘government by the consent of the gov- 
erned,” “‘turn thy left cheek also,’’—these are 
principles in opposition to power, but alas, when 
we speak of an international organization it is 
still called a “league to enforce peace.” Thus 
are principles divorced from activities and thus 
are we exposed to the ironical thrusts of a 
Nietzsche who says: “As a general rule, those 
who govern to-day only exercise power with a 
kind of inner remorse, to such an extent are 
the values of slave morality universally admit- 
ted. To defend ourselves from their bad 
conscience, they have recourse to hypocritical 
sophisms and endeavor to make their privileged 
situation harmonize with the precepts of the 
prevailing morality: they regard themselves as 
the executors of orders emanating from a 
higher power (tradition, law, God), as the 
‘first servants of their country,’ or ‘the in- 
struments of the common weal.’”’** The only 
alternative for a frank and brutal execution of 
power which occurs to Nietzsche is a ‘“‘coming 
together of clever gregarious men,’’—a process 

11 Beyond Good and Evil. Aphorism 199, 

324 


which he scorns. Yet a thorough-going analysis 
of the result of the ‘‘coming together of clever 
gregarious men’”’ leads to the distasteful con- 
clusion that this has merely resulted in an ex- 
change of the seats of power. Where once the 
common man was dominated by the power of a 
single individual, we are now all in the grip of 
the power of organized groups. ‘The transfer 
has provided us with no new insights into the 
nature of power and leaves us as helpless as 
before. Nor are we saved by subscribing to 
the Baconian dictum that ‘“‘knowledge is power”’ 
which under the terms of modern group life 
may merely mean that the group which can af- 
ford to employ the shrewdest experts will pos- 
sess the greatest power. 

Power, when considered as a factor in the 
stimulus-response equation between groups, may 
be reduced to the forms in which it is expressed. 
In connection with the groups under observation 
these may be enumerated as follows: 

Power over another group is expressed in 
terms of: 


a. Numbers 
i. Control over the commodity 
ii. Membership 
ill. Financial support 
et cetera 
Diese restice 7° 


12 For historical illustrations of the prestige theory of 
power, see Social Psychology, E. A. Ross, Chapter X. 


375 


i. Prominent supporters 
ii. Government support 
iii. Prominent members (influential) 
et cetera 
c. A Superior Technique 
i. Cooperative marketing as a more 
economical and scientific system 
than auction-marketing 
11. Co6dperative marketing as a_tech- 
nique which provides for the high- 
est use of experts 
et cetera 


Numerous other expressions of power were 
discernible in the interrelations of these groups 
but the above classification accounts for the ma- 
jor forms. The phrase ‘“‘power over” is ad- 
visedly used in the above for the purpose of 
conveying the attitude toward power manifested 
by the groups involved. This attitude may be 
stated in simple terms: the groups valued 
power as a means of causing other groups to 
act in a specific manner, i.e., a manner which 
would enhance the interests of the vower- 
group.’* Power in control of one group was 


Professor Ross’ assertion that “the direction of the cur- 
rent of imitation reveals the seat of power” (p. 167), 
although wholly inadequate as an explanation of the 
function of power, still marks the point of departure 
for a socia: theory of power. 

13 Groups not directly concerned with the conflict 
between the two major groups frequently made at- 
tempts to neutralize power; as the conflict settled down 


326 


looked upon as the cause which might produce 
a disintegrating effect upon the opposing group. 
This appears to be the more or less generic 
concept of power in all of its manifestations, 
namely, power as a causal factor. The power 
of circumstances,’* the power of money, the 
power of heredity, the will to power, conscious- 
ness of power—these are phrases which have 
all been used in the cause-effect formula. 
Baldly stated, this concept implies 

‘“That they should take who have the power, 

And they should keep who can.” *® 


6. Power Over versus Power With 


The rise of the codperative movement was 
not without incidents which point to a higher 
concept of power. It was not always assumed 
that ‘power over” was the only means of reach- 
ing a desired end. 


Illustrations: 


a. In one community, the middlemen, the 
cooperators and a small group of interested 
citizens agreed to avoid the conflict and its con- 


into its more permanent phase these attempts were 
abandoned and the so-called disinterested groups were 
obliged to assume allegiance to either one side or the 
other. 

14 As used by Lester F. Ward in Applied Sociology, 
pp. 267-276. 

15 Wordsworth, Rob Roy’s Grave. 


327 


sequent disruption of the community by work- 
ing out a plan whereby some of the middlemen 
were taken over by the codperative, the ware- 
house control was equably determined, and the 
problem solved by conserving the essence of 
both conflicting interests.*® 

b. A manufacturing corporation using a 
large amount of the commodity covered by one 
of the codperatives decided, after a preliminary 
show of antagonism, to codperate fully with 
the codperative marketing association. One of 
its leading experts is now employed by the co- 
operative. 


Whether or not the above adjustments were ac- 
complished with understanding and therefore 
with permanent profit is an open question. At 
any rate, illustration (a) offers an example of 
the fruitful results of even a partial integration 
on the plane of activities. In this community, 
cooperation has resulted in codperation and 
not in a series of new conflicts. 

On the whole, however, the observations of 
this study do not warrant promise of an evolv- 
ing and creative mode of group accommodation. 
There appears to be as little difference between 
the use of power between interest-groups as be- 
tween nations. ‘Both parties to a fundamental 
conflict, just insofar as they possess power, tend 


16 For a description of this event see ‘‘Codperation 
in Tobacco,” by E. C. Lindeman in The New Republic, 
September 6, 1922. 

328 


to be impatient, apprehensive and_head- 
strong.” *’ ‘That it is possible to devise a tech- 
nique of group relations which supplants ‘‘power 
_ over” by “power with’ must be the faith of 
the social scientist, else his science can have no 
significance for the ever-increasing group rela- 
tions which are destined to exercise control over 
so large a share of our lives. This technique 
must be reared upon the foundations of pro- 
longed empirical studies and in order to under- 
stand the nature of power it will be necessary 
to re-evaluate all that the biologists, the physi- 
ologists, and the psychologists are capable of 
revealing.** With this material digested, the 
social scientist may begin to rear his own foun- 
dations with the materials gathered from the 
social or group level. This will not be easy but 
unless social theory and social organization are 
to remain empty phrases the task cannot be long 
evaded. 


17 The New Republic Idea, Herbert Croly. 

18 Consider, e.g., the “lead’’ which is offered by Dr. 
Edward J. Kempf in his provoking monograph en- 
titled The Autonomic Functions and the Personality: 
“The healthy individual is a dynamic entity that has 
an elastic though limited quotient of energy, hence the 
tendency to attain a maximum influence upon the en- 
vironment with a minimum expenditure of his resources 
conserves the unused resources for further extension of 
power and influence. In commerce men are constantly 
striving to find methods of reducing the waste of power 
and of extending the control of power.” 


329 


CHAPTER XIII 


GROUP BEHAVIOR AND CUSTOMARY _ 


MODES OF RESPONSE 


Aut forms of social organization act as ir- 
ritants which disturb customary modes of be- 
havior. Organization is a conscious, rational 
effort to achieve. Attitudes, customs, traditions 
and mores are non-rational ways of conforming 
—the statics of group behavior. Social organi- 
zation therefore invariably sets up a conflict be- 
tween the way of life which has been accepted 
and the way which is to be learned. In essence 
this conflict is comparable to the struggle which 
takes place in individual behavior when a habit 
inhibits a new activity. The analogy has led 
many writers to designate customs as ‘“‘group 
habits.’’ Many individual habits are, of course, 
the by-products of group customs. Social psy- 
chology has been mainly concerned with the dis- 
covery of those ways of individual behavior 
which are impositions of the group, and al- 
though this process may enlighten the study of 
individual behavior, it contributes little to an 
understanding of the group. 


339 


The functional groups under observation ini- 
tiated ways of behavior which in one form or 
another came into conflict with generalized and 
specific customs, attitudes, traditions and mores. 
For purposes of convenience all of these ways 
of behaving are grouped under the title “cus- 
tomary modes of response.’ ‘The distinctions 
ordinarily drawn between customs, traditions 
and mores are distinctions of tone rather than 
of kind; these terms constitute concepts which 
aim to describe attributes of the group which 
are components of the group’s culture as de- 
rived from the past. The bases of conformity 
are the essential points of differentiation. It is 
commonly assumed that all of these customary 
ways of responding are founded upon some util- 
ity, some value cherished by the group. ‘Thus 
custom may be said to be of value merely be- 
cause it indicates adherence to the group; tradi- 
tion represents a value belonging to the group’s 
(individuals within the group) affective, feel- 
ing, sentimental concepts; and the mores possess 
a distinctly moral or ethical significance. At- 
titudes may be regarded as the idea-systems re- 
enforced by sentiments which form the mental 
background for customary modes of behavior. 
Taken together the customary modes of be- 
havior constitute the statics of group behavior 
and social organization represents the dynamics. 
Studied objectively, it is important to know 
what interactions take place between the static 


331 


and dynamic aspects of the group’s behavior 


when new stimuli call forth new responses.’ 


Illustration: 


Codperative marketing lends itself more 


readily to the merchandizing of localized prod- 
ucts. [his means that the farmer who pro- 
duces a single cash-crop is more likely to become 
a member of a codperative association than is 
the farmer of diversified commodities. The 
one-crop farmer is likewise more likely to be- 
come accustomed to certain stereotyped meth- 


ods of production, financing, and marketing, 1.e., © 


he is likely to move in the circle of a larger 
number of customary modes of behavior. This 
appears to be true of Groups A, B, and 
C, in each of which it has been observed that 
the codperative marketing of commodities has 
come into conflict with customary modes of be- 
havior. 

The nature of these custom-conflicts is more 
clearly revealed in the form of particular in- 
stances, some of which were: 

(a) In Group A members of the codpera- 
tive association found it difficult to accommo- 
date themselves to the personalities of new of- 
ficials and experts. This appeared at first to be 


‘Tt is also important to study customary modes of 
response from the point of view of origins since the 
assumption underlying social control is based upon the 
objective of changing non-rational into rational ways 
of behaving; if the non-rationality of a particular cus- 
tomary mode of response may be revealed in its origins, 
the way toward progressive behavior becomes easier. 


332 


——-—- 


merely the usual suspicion of the stranger, but 
upon further observation and as the result of 
numerous interviews it became apparent that 
the newer activities occasioned “‘pain’”’ of a pe- 
culiar sort. Under the older dispensation a 
form of companionship and good humor had 
evolved between farmers and middlemen which 
may be said to have constituted a marketing 
custom. Under the new order marketing be- 
came a simple and single operation; the farmer 
transported his products to the codperative re- 
ceiving station where he was brought into con- 
tact, not with his old and familiar group, but 
with officials or employees who relieved him of 
his products and presented him in return with a 
receipt. ‘hus it was that the farmer was asked 
to forego the old custom and nothing compara- 
ble to its amenities was substituted in the new 
activity. 

(b) Credit and financing customs; definite, 
although doubtful, modes of credit and financ- 
ing had developed among the one-crop farmers 
under consideration. These methods were ex- 
ceedingly simple; merchants advanced credit to 
their customers throughout the year, taking as 
security a legal lien upon the farmer’s crop. 
When the crop was sold, the initial proceeds 
were used to pay debts. Under cooperative 
marketing the member who delivered his prod- 
ucts received only a part-payment, the remain- 
der being distributed throughout the ensuing 
year and in ratio to continuing sales. It will 
be seen in this case that the abandonment of the 
older custom implied a new adjustment on the 


333 


part of merchants and bankers as well as farm-_ 
ers. The adjustment implies more than a mere © 
substitution of adequate credits since it is clear 
that this custom involved specific personal rela- 
tionships. | 

(c) Farm management customs; in some of © 
the older codperative organizations (particu- — 
larly in California) increase in production fol- 
lows regularly upon increase in prices. Since 
the chief aim of the codperative association is 
to secure advantageous prices the curves of pro- 
duction naturally follow the curves of prices 
with the result that over-production becomes 
periodic and prices consequently fall no matter 
how efficiently the marketing agency performs 
its functions. The implication of this procedure 
is that the codperative association must ulti- 
mately influence, if not control, production; but 
production has been and is influenced and con- 
trolled largely by customs. It is difficult to see 
how the codperative associations can fulfill their 
objectives and promises of providing an even 
flow to market and an average fair price unless 
production customs can be modified. Thus far 
the codperatives have sought mainly to change 
the customs of consumers by increasing con- 
sumption but this process has clearly very defi- 
nite limits imposed by the physiological food- 
consumption capacity of man and animals. In 
addition the proposal to control production runs 
counter to an accepted politico-economic prin- 
ple which has been incorporated into statute 
aw. 


334 


The above illustrations have been selected be- 
cause they represent types of custom-conflicts 
precipitated by this particular form of social or- 
ganization. A study of various forms of groups 
would, no doubt, reveal a wide range of types 
—all of which would need to be understood if 
social organization is to proceed upon rational 
lines. A considerable literature which is de- 
voted to the refinements of customary modes 
of behavior in which the observed responses are 
compartmentalized and differentiated is now 
available. How much of this literature is sound 
can be determined only if the assumptions are 
“put to work” on definite situations. In what 
way are the customs of a group affected by a 
new activity, a new form of social organiza- 
tion? Customary modes of behavior are or- 
dinarily presumed to be inhibitors of progress. 
Is the inhibition due to the custom or to the 
failure of leaders and technicians to take ac- 
count of its force? 

The types of customary behavior illustrated 
above may be roughly classified as follows: 


(a) Customary modes of behavior which 
when disturbed necessitate an adjust- 
ment on the part of a single group. 

(b) Customary modes of behavior which 
when disturbed necessitate adjustments 
on the part of several groups. 

(c) Customary modes of behavior which 


335 


bear a relation to the inclusive social 
process. 


This classification at once raises numerous ques- 
tions which give direction to future research. 
The task of the social scientist is to discover © 
how specific custom-conflicts may be utilized in — 
furthering a more adequate technique of social 
organization. Habits are no longer derided by 
the educational psychologist; on the contrary, 
they have been incorporated in the technique of 
education. A similar development may be an- 
ticipated in the sphere of social technique al- 
though this advance cannot be expected until 
students have made available an extensive body 
of materials sifted from objective studies. 


1. Attitudes as Conditions to Customary 
Responses 


The term ‘‘attitude”’ as currently interpreted 
cannot be legitimately considered as appropri- 
ate to the group. “An attitude is the type of 
sentiment which the individual manifests upon 
the recurrence of a given situation. It is a be- 
havior-pattern with reference especially to the 
‘feeling’ side of response.” ? When considered 
in relation to the individual, attitudes may not 
be said to condition the responses; they are 

2 Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method, 
A. B. Wolfe, p. 9. 

336 


the responses. It does appear, however, that 
the effect which attitudes exert upon group 
responses may be considered as a conditioning 
factor. 


Illustration: 

It is generally presumed that farmers as a 
class possess attitudes which are consistently 
conservative. [he codperative movement ts po- 
tentially radical insofar as it aims to eliminate 
speculation from the marketing process. The 
leaders of the movement, evidently persuaded 
that the attitudes of large groups of farmers 
could not be changed, proceeded to enlist them 
for a radical activity while at the same time 
leaving their traditional attitudes undisturbed. 
More than that, the traditional attitudes were 
bolstered by repeated assurances from the lead- 
ers of the fact that there could be nothing radi- 
cal about the codperative movement. 


This illustration precipitates numerous im- 
portant questions. How far can a form of so- 
cial organization proceed upon the basis of radi- 
cal action plus conservative attitudes? Was 
the conservative attitude of the farmers in real- 
ity a conditioning factor of their response? Or 
was the whole matter merely a piece of strategy 
on the part of leaders? Is it essential for 
real progress that attitudes and activities be- 
come integrated? Does traditional attitude 
plus radical activity preclude education? From 


337 


the behavioristic point of view, these are im- 
portant queries, but they must be left unan- 
swered. The mere raising of the questions 
should lead to further intensive study in the re- 
stricted sphere of attitudes. 

In the foregoing discussion, attitudes have — 
been interpreted from the psychological point — 
of view, i.e., as attributes of individuals which — 
condition and modify group behavior. Atti- 
tudes are thus capable of subordinating social 
values. From the sociological point of view, © 
the social values are ordinate and the attitudes 
subordinate. A proposed resolution on this ap- 
parent conflict due to diverse approaches has 
been put forth by Professor William I. 
Thomas. ‘The attitude is thus the individual 
counterpart of the social value; activity, in 
whatever form, is the bond between them.” * 
This is an important suggestion for the study 
of functional groups. The constantly recurring 
emphasis upon distinctions between means and 
ends which underlies Professor Thomas’ Meth- 
odological Note tends to defer ready acceptance 
of his postulate. He appears to regard science 

3’ The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, Wil- 
liam I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki. Methodo- 
logical Note, p. 22. In order to differentiate between 
the method of psychology and that of the social sci- 
ences, the author further states: “The psychological 
process remains always fundamentally a state of some- 


body; the attitude remains always fundamentally an 
attitude toward something.’ P. 23. 


338 


itself as an end and it is therefore reasonable to 
believe that his “bond’’ between attitudes and 
social values is viewed as a separable activity 
between the two. But means are always creat- 
ing ends, and social values expressed in group 
organization are always changing attitudes. 


2. Ethical Norms as Customary Modes 
of Response 


A movement possessing wide-spread possi- 
bilities of affecting important phases of life, 
such as the codperative movement under consid- 
eration, is almost certain to exert pressure upon 
accepted norms of behavior. In one sense, eth- 
ics may be regarded as a continuing evaluation 
of changing activities; in quite another sense, 
ethics may be regarded as a static set of rules 
to which new activities must conform. In this 
latter sense ethics may be considered as a con- 
ditioning factor in response. When individual 
farmers become members of a coéperative as- 
sociation they automatically sever a customary 
relationship which involves the ‘“‘sense of right.” 
The private buyer has in the past befriended 
the farmer; he may even have been responsible 
for the credit arrangements which have made it 
possible for the farmer to become a successful 
producer. In this situation the middleman does 
not insist upon legal obligations but rather upon 
personal obligations. He asks: ‘Is it right that 


Sag 


‘you should now desert me after the many favors — 
which have been extended in the past?’ The — 
usual reply of the farmer is also stated in ethical — 


terms. He counters: ‘Perhaps I am now vio- 
lating your sense of right, but in the past you 
have derived large profits from the sale of my 


products which is also a violation of my sense of — 


right. Your past series of wrongs is now com- 


pensated by my present wrong.’ Justification © 


of this sort is not always sufficiently strong to 
maintain loyalty to the codperative association. 

Leaders of the movement were, obviously, 
aware of the part which the “sense of right” 
was to play. Their chief weapon of justifica- 
tion was a vigorous insistence upon the past 
sins of the middlemen. ‘They were pictured 
so darkly that any slight aberration from the 
ethical code on the part of farmers appeared 
negligible. 

Ethics as applied to the behavior of the 
group became an important item soon after the 
groups began merchandizing. The relation 
then came to be one between codperative groups 
and large manufacturing institutions. The co- 
operatives possessed the products which the 
manufacturers needed. How was the price to 
be determined? Price-fixing was held to be not 
merely unethical but illegal. Nor was price-fix- 
ing entirely possible, since the codperatives con- 
trolled only a portion of the total product. In 
one case the price demanded by the cooperative 


340 


was considered unfair by the buyers. They de- 
murred and refused to buy. The price was 
again raised in order to determine the extent of 
the manufacturer’s needs. ‘This process was 
continued through three bargaining periods un- 
til the product was finally sold at a price which 
was almost fifty per cent higher than the initial 
offer. From this illustration it is plainly seen 
that the ethics of price is in reality nothing 
more nor less than the ethics of power. The 
abstract relation between supply and demand 
was altered into a relation between possession 
and need. 

New forms of ethical relations between vari- 
ous cooperative marketing associations are be- 
ing constantly revealed. The citrus growers of 
California and the citrus growers of Florida 
are cooperatively organized; they are also com- 
petitors for the same markets. One of the 
cardinal principles of commodity codperative 
marketing is to increase consumption by means 
of extensive advertising campaigns. If con- 
sumption of one edible product is increased ex- 
tensively, a decline in the consumption of some 
other product ensues.. Thus cooperative or- 
ganizations merchandizing different products 
come into competition with each other. Limita- 
tion of production is, obviously, the answer to 
over-production or under-consumption (as the 
cooperative leaders prefer to call it), but again 
the ethical assumption that control of produc- 


341 


tion is wrong appears. In this case the wrong 


is in relation to the ultimate consumer. 


This very brief consideration of ethics as a 
factor in group behavior leads unmistakably to — 
the conclusion that a traditional ethics tends to- — 


ward a reversion to power technique. In lieu 


of satisfactory ethical norms, groups naturally © 
turn to the use of power as a means of advanc- — 


ing their interests. 


3. The Law as aCustomary Mode of Response — 


When power supplants the sense of right, 
either between individuals or groups, the ap- 
propriate situation for legal intervention is cre- 
ated. ‘The law aims to distribute power, to re- 
strict power or to interpret power in terms of 
the so-called public good. So profound were 
the ethical implications of the farmers’ codpera- 
tive marketing movement that a new and spe- 
cialized federal statute and more than thirty 
state statutes were enacted into law during its 
rise.* The new laws constitute a departure from 
customary modes of response. Changed eco- 
nomic processes have necessitated fresh sanc- 
tions, and these the law has supplied. The se- 
quence of the above procedure may be stated: 


* Both the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act 
give non-stock coéperative associations of agricultural 
and horticultural producers relief from unfair applica- 
tions of the anti-trust laws. 


342 


(1) a new form of social organization, (2) a 
new economic process, (3) anew legal sanction. 
The important fact in this total series is the 
manifest relation between social forms and the 
law. Without new laws the new social form 
could not have functioned; these forms would 
then have been conditioned by customary modes 
of response learned through existing law. 

In spite of the new statutes, responses were 
still conditioned by customary interpretations of 
the law. “If an organization purporting to be 
for the benefit of the farmers is to be permitted 
to enjoy these extraordinary privileges, we see 
no reason why they should not be extended to 
the textile workers, railroad employees, clerks, 
or any other class of our citizens.’’*> In this in- 
stance it appears that those whose interests were 
affected by the codperative association under- 
stood clearly how to utilize the appeal of tradi- 
tional and customary legal responses. A study 
of the legal proceedings growing out of the co- 
operative movement’s function presents abun- 
dant evidence of the above point of view. In 
another defendant’s brief, this statement of the 
argument appears: ‘‘(1) That the defendant 
was induced to sign the contract by fraud. (2) 
That the marketing contract upon which this 


5 From Defendant’s Brief; Tobacco Growers’ Co- 
operative Association versus Mangum; Supreme Court 
of North Carolina, Seventh District. No. 250, p. 7. 
(Italics added.) 


343 


action is based creates a monopoly and is in re- 
straint of trade, and is, therefore, unenforce- 
able. (3) That trade in tobacco is a part of 
interstate commerce and the attempt of plain- 
tiff to monopolize such trade is a violation of 
the act of Congress, known as the Sherman Act. © 
(4) That the Codperative Marketing Act of | 
North Carolina is violative of the Fourteenth — 
Amendment of the United States Constitution 
in that it denies to persons, other than growers — 
of agricultural products, the equal protection of 
the laws.” ° 

None of these contentions of the defendant 
was upheld by the Court in the case under dis- 
cussion. There were localities, however, where 
adherence to the customary responses to law 
was so intense that clear cases were not even 
brought to trial. Thus, although the law may 
still be regarded as a customary mode of re- 
sponse, it is not always so interpreted. The 
law may give sanction to new ways of acting 
which are for the present in opposition to cus- 
tom and tradition, but in such instances public 
opinion is so unmistakably favorable to the new 
sanction as to constitute acceptance of a new law 
or its reinterpretation. Thus, the creative role 
of law, cannot be said to have gained sufficient 
ascendancy to remove jurisprudence from the 
category of customary modes of response. 

6 Tobacco Growers’ Codperative Association versus 
W. J. Ball; Seventh District. No. 253, pp. 1 and 2. 

344 


An example of the relation between the law 
and modern social organization as represented 
by functional groups is presented in the case of 
the Sun-Maid Raisin Growers, a cooperative 
association of California. ‘The contract of this 
association aimed at complete control of the 
raisin crop; even the land of the member was 
bound to the association for a fifteen year pe- 
riod. At one time price-fixing was an accepted 
policy. The association, which was in reality a 
stock-company and not a true coéperative, came 
to be looked upon as a monopoly and its disso- 
lution was called for by the United States De- 
partment of Justice. The suit was dropped in 
lieu of a promise to sell 20,000 tons of raisins 
at a price of five dollars per ton below the 
market and to outside packers. ‘The offer was 
accepted but the results of this compromise are 
still in process. ‘The association was reorgan- 
ized in conformance with the new cooperative 
marketing law; a new contract was drawn up 
and substituted; officials of the organization 
were deposed; the industry suffered to the ex- 
tent that financial aid was sought, not merely 
through the local banks but through the large 
banking houses of the nation. This is but a 
partial list of activities which have resulted since 
the association and the law came into conflict, 
but it is already evident that a shift of power 
has occurred, a new technique of organization, 
a new responsibility to non-local financial agen- 


345 


cies, a demoralization of the market, a new 


orientation to the law, et cetera, et cetera.” ~ 


With all of these factors in mind, it would be — 
uy 
| 


absurd to insist that the law is merely an ap- 


i 


proved and customary mode of response; it is © 


both a customary mode of response and a stimu- © 


p 


lus leading to new responses. Those who stead- — 
fastly refuse to grant any validity to the group © 
as a reality might profit by a study of how the — 
law has itself been forced to deal with group © 
concepts since the rise of corporations. The 


above illustration is a case in point. 
4. Public Opinion as a Customary Mode 
of Response 


The assumption which underlies this Chap- 
ter, namely, that what is usually called social 


control is, when analyzed, a customary mode of 


response either slightly or rigidly organized, is 
supported by a consideration of public opinion. 


The question: “Does public opinion control — 
group activities?” contains only a partial mean- 


ing. If the question aims to inquire whether or 


not the generalized attitudes of numbers of © 
people intellectualized into opinions affect the 


activities of individuals or groups, the meaning 
implied becomes apparent. Public opinion af- 


7 For an account of this episode which is both short 


and impartial, see pp. 21-29, Cooperative Marketing, — 


Herman Steen 


346 


fects activity in much the same manner as ethics 
and the law affect activity. In the individual, 
the new activity must always come to terms 
with the older habit. With the group, each new 
activity must in like manner run the gamut of 
the accustomed modes of previous response. 
Those who lay stress upon the individual as 
distinguished from the group insist that ‘‘pub- 
lic opinion is merely the collection of individual 
opinions.” * The simplest experiments refute 
this naive conception. 

When discussion is taken seriously and when 
the interchange of opinions is observed, the 
term ‘collection of individual opinions’’ be- 
comes meaningless. A collection of individual 
opinions represents an impossible mathematical 
diversity; no action can proceed upon individual 
opinions collected. The common denominator 
of diverse opinions is not public opinion. ‘This 
is the fallacy of forcing agreement upon uni- 
versals as a pre-requisite to further agreement 
upon particulars. If all Christians could be 
brought to agreement upon the proposition that 
war is unchristian, would wars cease? ‘The 
question need only be raised in view of modern 
- doctrines of behavior to reveal the impotence 
of agreement upon universals. But public opin- 
ion is not a universality. Continued linking of 
public opinion with crowd-mindedness, or the 
so-called crowd psychology, is probably respon- 


8 Social Psychology F. H. Allport, p. 396. 
347 


sible for this tendency to begin all discussions 
with mass words and universals.°® ) 
If public opinion is to be retained as a useful © 
category for the study of the behavior of — 
groups, it will be necessary to depart abruptly — 
from the older notions which cling to the term. 
Does public opinion create activity? Does ac- 
tivity create public opinion? Does the press 
control public opinion? Are groups influenced 
by public opinion? Those are still ambigu- 
ous questions which can be answered only with — 
conceptual fictions. The first step in analyzing 
public opinion is, obviously, to extract the mys- — 
tical and inclusive concepts which regard the © 
public as some unified over-whole, an irresistible — 
mass greater than the individuals who constitute 
its composition. ‘The group considered as a 
representation of interests is a useful implement — 
for this process of deflation. Effective public 
opinions, i.e., phases of collective opinion which 
are important in the functional relations be- 
tween groups, are functions of the groups. A 
cross-sectional view of public opinion, if this 
were possible, would reveal series of shadings 
and differences which are traceable to specific 
sroup interests. A generalized public opinion 
can come into being only when a technique for 
the relations between groups which aims at an 


See 


—— Se 


® Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion is, of course, 
an exception. Also the greater portion of President 
Lowell’s Public Opinion in Peace and War. 


348 


evaluation of conflicting interests is made avyail- 


able. 


Illustration: 

In observing Group A in relation to its total 
environment, an opinion was discovered current 
among middlemen and merchants that certain 
officials of the codperative association were dis- 
honest. ‘The effort was made to generalize this 
opinion, i.e., to ‘create’? a general opinion in 
the community that codperative officials were 
dishonest. If this opinion could be sufficiently 
generalized, it would include, ultimately, mem- 
bers of the codperative association. Lack of 
confidence on the part of members would in 
turn lead to contract violations. So long as this 
opinion was circulated privately, it was cumu- 
latively effective. Once the opinion became a 
matter for public discussion, it was evaluated 
in terms of interest. The generalized opinion 
then became an attribute of the group in whose 
interest it was circulated. The initial attack of 
the codperatives was, of course, a counter-opin- 
ion which was again interpreted in terms of the 
interest involved. ‘This conflict of interests re- 
volving about generalized opinions compelled a 
revaluation of the opinion in terms of facts. 


If, in the above illustration, the generalized 
opinion of dishonesty had prevailed, it would 
have undoubtedly been said that “public opin- 
ion killed the codperative,’” when, as a matter 
of fact, what might have been said with fairness 


349 


was merely that one set of interests succeeded 
in securing a hearing and the opposing interests 
did not. 

In a larger and more inclusive sense, public 
opinion may be regarded as one of the controls 
affecting group functions whenever the interests 
of a group appear to negative or violate the 
legitimate interests of the totality of groups. 
Thus, if the codperatives attain too great a de- 
gree of power, they may exercise control over 
commodities which affect (more or less) the to- 
tal complex of groups which is the public. Does 
the group, in such instances, comply with the 
dictates of “‘public opinion,”’ i.e., does public 
opinion then represent a customary mode of 
response? Is the activity forced into compati- 
bility with this generalized interest of all 
groups? A cursory review of cases of this type 
leads to the conclusion that the equilibrium of 
interests between specific groups and the public 
is achieved only after the interests of the public 
(public opinion) have sufficiently crystallized to 
be expressed as law. The instability of even 
legal equilibrium is patent to all who have given 
attention to the evolution of anti-trust legisla- 
tion in its actual functioning. Equilibrium of 
interests founded upon a generalized public 
opinion is probably as undesirable as it is im- 
practical. The concept of equilibrium is non- 
creative; it fixes ends to activity when there are 
no ends. ‘The philosophy of ends is fit compan- 


350 


jon for the concept of equilibrium. Progressive 
revaluation of interests in terms of progres- 
sively integrating sequences of group opinions 
—this has been the process in jurisprudence and 
it offers an excellent clue to the social sciences. 

The doubts which lie scattered throughout 
the foregoing Chapter are perhaps sufficient 
evidence of the author’s skepticism regarding 
the validity of customary modes of response as 
adequate categories for the study of groups. 
The terms are still to be defined as symbols for 
objective referents. It is probable that these 
terms will be abandoned altogether because 
of the difficulties involved in giving them 
scientific definitiveness. This will not, however, 
mean that the search for adequate symbols used 
to describe those controls over group action 
which are more inclusive than the particular 
groups under observation will also be aban- 
doned. ‘The separation of the group from its 
total social environment is based purely upon 
functional grounds. The group cannot be fully 
understood unless it is observed in relation to 
its total environment. The aim of the circui- 
tous approach of this Chapter has been to bring 
the considered terms under fresh scrutiny. ‘The 
task of improving methods of social discovery 
is destined, unhappily, to a long labor whose 
main results will be the removal of verbal ob- 
structions. Language is not merely a tool which 
human beings manipulate; alas, it frequently 


351 


becomes an instrument which manipulates hu- 
man beings. How simple it is to answer per- © 
plexing questions by the time-saving process — 
of selecting a ready label! Customs, traditions, 
ethics, public opinion are “blanket-terms”’ which, 
as now used, impede thought and investigation. 
What do they mean in and for the social sci- © 
ences? : ' 


352 


CHAPTER XIV 
EMPIRICAL SOCIAL THEORY 


SOCIAL inventiveness is dependent upon work- 
able hypotheses and the summation of these 
hypotheses constitutes social theory. Within 
the range of its own variability such theory 
should be as reliable as the Mendelian theory of 
inheritance. The structure of social theory 
must likewise evolve as the result of objective 
observation correlated with experimentation. 
The factors constituting a genuine hypothesis 
in every sphere of science are objects and proc- 
esses. he sequence of hypothesis may be for- 
mulated as follows: 

(a) What is the object? 

(b) How does it behave? 

((c) What are its capacities? 

(d) What will it do in a given situation? 

The objects of the social sciences are human 
beings in relation; when such relations become 
formally recognized, the resultant organization 
may be called a group. The term “group” may 
in the future be reserved for those relations be- 
tween individuals which are both recognized 
and functional and therefore organized. Be- 


353 


havior is social from early infancy onward, and 
in fact, it may be said that behavior is biologi- 
cally social in all species for which partheno- 
genesis is not the normal mode of reproduction. 
But not all social behavior is group behavior. 
All human beings are social. When the indi- 
vidual’s behavior is socially abstracted, he is’ 
regarded as abnormal, i.e., less human. From_ 
this point of view psychology may be regarded 
as a social science. An important distinction 
needs to be made if there are to be social sci- 
ences differentiated from psychology. In this 
volume, the distinction is based upon functional 
groups, as distinguished from genetic groups. 
All behavior has social implications; the beha- 
vior with which this volume is concerned is ex- 
plicit. The functional group (codperative as- 
sociation) exhibits explicit social behavior; the 
genetic group (family) exhibits implicit social 
behavior. Within the family, behavior is so- 
cial, whereas within the functional group, be- 
havior becomes social by virtue of interests and 
purposes. The older sociology regarded the 
social process as a relation between individuals 
and hence social theory revolved about this re- 
lation. The present thesis is that a pragmatic 
sociology must regard the social process as a 
relation between groups. Social theory which 
stops with the relation between individuals is 
inadequate for the conditions of modern life. 
Two tendencies have deterred social scientists 


So 


in their efforts to evolve a satisfactory body of 
social theory: (a) the tendency to describe the 
group in terms of mystical entities and (b) the 
tendency to utilize non-sociological categories 
in describing the group’s processes. ‘The for- 
mer tendency has led toward various forms of 
analogical reasoning, all of which have de- 
tracted from a rigorous investigation of the 


_ group on its own level. Analogical reasoning 


may also account for the attempts to describe 
the social process in terms of categories which 
designate non-observable activities. The nat- 


ural consequence of the above procedure has 
_ been a variegated and impractical social theory 


consisting of convenient labels and reflecting the 


_ individual caprice of particular thinkers. 


a. ee 


The generalizations which have resulted from 
this method (or lack of method) have occasion- 


ally led to fruitful investigations but all too fre- 


- quently such investigations have tended merely 
to substantiate prior generalizations. Mr. G. 
_D. Hz. Cole,* in his admirable attempt to for- 
-mulate a social theory, discriminates between 


three forms of social theory: (a) that which 
emanates from a study of institutions, (b) that 
which flows from a study of human motives and 


impulses as expressed in associative life, and 


_(c) that which is formulated a priori as uni- 
versal principle. Unfortunately he then pro- 
P ceeds to delimit the first method by ascribing to 


1 Social Theory, G. D. H. Cole, pp. 17-20. - 
355 


it only historical significance. He is himself — 
‘concerned principally with social theory as the ~ 
social complement of ethics, with “‘ought” rather 

than with “‘is,” with questions of right rather 
than of fact.” The frankness with which Mr. 
Cole assumes his position is disarming and his 
functional point of view is clearly in harmony 
with the more recent tendencies in all of the so- 
cial sciences. These agreements make it more 
necessary to apply critical discriminations to 
his methodology. The important deficiency of 
Mr. Cole’s method is his rejection of the objec- 
tive study of human groupings. He does not 
of course insist upon a complete rejection but 
he restricts such studies to the historical sphere, 
intimating that “more or less scientific princi- 
ples” may be based upon such historical re- 
searches.* The opposing contention is that the 
study of the behavior of human groupings is 
not necessarily confined to historical method; 
that, moreover, the very validity of the social 
sciences is dependent upon discovering a method 
which is capable of revealing the significant as- 
pects of group behavior. ‘The biologists have 
devised methods whereby they may 'study or- 
ganisms and their functions, not historically, but 
factually and contemporaneously. To assume 
that human organisms and their relations are 
not amenable to a similar method is to place 


di ok & 
i agelgd ee 


356 


human nature outside the circle of nature. Mr. 
Cole’s insistent emphasis upon the efficacy of 
the human “‘will” well-nigh achieves this sepa- 
ration. 

The psychologists and the social psycholo- 
gists (under their present discipline) must be 
looked to for a revelation of adequate method- 
ology for the study of human motives, purposes, 
interests, et cetera, as these are related to the 
group. The philosophers may well lay claim to 
the province of generalization and both deduc- 
tive and inductive principle.* Social scientists, 
if there is to be a social science, cannot escape 
the compulsions of a differentiation which 
clearly imposes upon them the obligation of 
furnishing factual and objective materials con- 
cerning human groups as functional realities. 
A satisfactory social theory will undoubtedly 
emerge from a synthesis of principles derived 
from the results of these differentiated ap- 
proaches. There can be no adequate synthesis, 
however, until the various results are validated 
by adequate methods of discovery. 


1. The Direction of Social Research 


The tentative hypotheses of present social 
theory must be held in suspension until students 
_ *In this connection the reader is advised to read 
Scientific Method in Philosophy, Bertrand Russell; a 


monograph published by the University of Oxford 
Press. 


357 


have contributed a more satisfactory body of 
information regarding the behavior of groups. 
For purposes of convenience in investigation it 
may be expedient to commence by distinguish- 
ing between the various types of groups to 
which individuals give allegiance and through 
which they strive to secure their interests. It 
may be revealed that important distinctions be- 
tween groups may be correlated with cor- 
responding studies of personality. A distinctly 
functional group, such as a trade union or a co- 
operative association, enlists the individual’s 
participation for reasons which may have a 
meaning different from that implied in mem- 
bership in a partially symbolic group such as a 
church or a secret society. “The composite in- 
dividual which is constructed by cross-sectional 
analysis of his group adherences is apparently 
not the complete individual. His remaining, 
unfulfilled and unorganized interests may con- 
stitute the basis for future social organization. 
The potential revolutions in society may be 
revealed when it is more fully known how 
certain groups thwart legitimate human inter- 
ests and how other groups, through faulty 
function, leave important interests unrecog- 
nized. With information of this character at 
hand it should become possible to view human 
needs realistically. Invention will proceed when 
the vital needs are made manifest. The appeal 
is once more for a pragmatic and a unifying 


358 


social science—a science which frankly consents 
to be the handmaiden of all who earnestly 
search for practical solutions of the problems 
of social adjustment. Empirical social theory 
implies experience plus experiment. Not “‘plan- 
less empiricism’? but empiricism which gives 
validity to plans is the aim of social theory. 


2. Postulates of Empirical Social Theory 


It is not to be expected that so meager and 
limited a study as that upon which this volume 
is based shall be adequate as the foundation for 
a statement of social theory. On the other 
hand, no investigator can devote years to a 
specialized study without being forced to aban- 
don many presuppositions and hypotheses; nor 
can he evade the impelling intellectual task of 
formulating new suppositions and hypotheses 
as the basis of further investigation. A candid 
avowal of these newer positions constitutes an 
invigorating challenge to the investigator, and 
it is to be hoped that their formulation will 
in turn serve to challenge others. In fact, 
most of the critical portions of this essay, to- 
gether with its occasional dogmatism, are in- 
tended to challenge, not to assert. 

The ensuing propositions represent the pres- 
ent status of the author’s comprehension of the 
preliminary hypotheses upon which (in his opin- 

359 


ion) a future social theory may be based. He 
therefore proposes or postulates: : 


iY 


Bt. 


Ill. 


That total behavior is an integration of © 

activity and thought, and that observa- 

tion of behavior, whether of individuals — 

or groups, should be based upon the 

formula: 

tie ENCUVICY 

Behavior = Thought 

Or, | 
Overt Acts 


Behavior — ) 
Rationalizations 


That objective observation of group be- 
havior should be supplemented by (in- 
tegrated with) the rationalizations of 
the group’s activities as revealed by 
participating observers whose interests 
are at stake. 

That the concepts utilized in observing 
the behavior of groups should consist of 
three categories: 


(1) Terms to serve as symbols for 
persons and groups. 

(2) Terms to serve as symbols for 
activities and thought processes. 

(3) Terms to serve as symbols for 
controls exterior to and more 
comprehensive than the group or 
groups under observation. 


360 


IV. 


VI. 


VII. 


VIII. 


IX. 


That the group is not a new entity but 
rather a new relation, and that re- 
latedness is an appropriate sphere for 
scientific investigation, especially in the 
realm of human affairs where related- 
ness may be accompanied by conscious- 
ness. 
That the group (all forms of associa- 
tion or communication) is a means and 
not an end, and that it is the important 
means utilized by the individual in 
achieving his ends. 
That the behavior of the group is an 
adjustment of as well as to the total en- 
vironment. 
That the behavior of the group is a 
function of its environment and that the 
environment as a stimulus must be in- 
terpreted in terms of human purposes. 
That the leader is a function of the 
group. (Important exceptions ap- 
parently impair the usefulness and in- 
tegrity of this postulate although it is 
the only one which appears to cover the 
majority of cases.) 
That the stimulus-response formula as 
applied to the study of group behavior 
should be regarded as a continuum and 
not as an accurate statement of a brack- 
eted situation; its chief utility lies in the 
fact that by its aid the observer may 
361 


XII. 


XIII. 


XIV. 


differentiate between a defined situation 
and the evolving situation. 
That the group is a relation between 
individuals which represents a vital in- 
terest common to all members. 
That the efhicacy of the group is condi- 
tioned by its marginal interests or by 
the proportion of its marginal mem- 
bers. 
That interests tend to increase in num- 
ber in proportion to their security; that 
is, new interests appear when old inter- 
ests are secured. The evolving person- 
ality may be regarded as a series of en- 
larging interests and since these interests 
may be secured only through collectivity, 
the area of social organization must be 
the limiting factor for personality. 
That opposing interests ultimately ap- 
pear in the form of group conflicts and 
that the group manifests its more com- 
plete behavior at these intersections of 
interest. (In order to make this postu- 
late fit the conditions for studies of in- 
stitutions, it must be added that when 
groups become institutions the conflict 
over primary interests often eventuates 
into a conflict to perpetuate the group 
—in this case the group itself becomes a 
vested interest. ) 
That the interests for which groups 
362 


stand as representations can never be 
adequately evaluated unless conflict is 
precipitated. 

XV. That public opinion, the law and ethics 
are means whereby the interests are 
evaluated in terms of values common to 
all persons likely to be affected by the 
activities of the contending groups. 


The above postulates and propositions con- 
stitute nothing more than an attempt to formu- 
late the beginnings of a redirected method in 
the social sciences. Agreement among social 
scientists regarding their integrity and value 
will probably be slight although there are evi- 
dences that at least five of the above postulates 
have already gained acceptance in certain cir- 
cles. Some will be thoroughly opposed and 
others will be regarded, it is hoped, with skep- 
ticism. Numerous criticisms are already at 
hand, and it was at one time considered ad- 
visable to include objections (those raised by 
critics and those which the application of the 
method itself revealed) either in the body of the 
text or as foot-notes. This plan would, how- 
ever, tend to lessen criticism by disarming the 
critics; in addition it would tend to diminish any 
elements of cohesion which the essay as a whole 
may possess. 


363 


3. Social Ethics and Social Philosophy 


The impact of the foregoing chapters con- 
sidered as a unit is unmistably critical, realistic, 
and perhaps without that element of inspiring 
impulse for which readers ordinarily and justi- 
fiably turn to the social sciences. The exclusion 
was inevitable. Truth is whatever is found to 
be general “within a clearly defined part of ex- 
istence’’; this essay purports to aid in the search 
for truth by directing thought and investigation 
toward a method which may help to define a 
highly important part of existence. The good 
life is irretrievably bound up with and condi- 
tioned by the modern complex of group organi- 
zations in which we live and have our being; it 
cannot be released until this complex is scien- 
tifically and intellectually unravelled. Whatever 
is potentially beautiful in the relations between 
human beings lies partially dormant because 
these relations remain as mystifying and falsify- 
ing barriers. Whatever capacities for freedom 
lie within the scope of human nature now lie 
inert, nay, are atrophied by increasing and 
blind obeisance to collectivism considered as an 
end. How may life generate expressions of 
the true, the good and the beautiful? ‘There is 
no answer in wishing, believing, exhorting. 
There is no answer save one: the truth is that 
which is understood and the good is that which 
has been tested in the light of understanding. 


364 


INDEX OF REFERENCES 


Allport, Floyd H., 167, 260, 
347 
Aristotle, 52, 82 


Bacon, Francis, 82 

Baldwin, J. M., 211 

Beal, W. J., 11 

Bowley, Arthur L., 179 
Burns, C. Delisle, 111, 121, 


195 


Carver, Thomas Nixon, 213 

Casey, Fred, 78 

Cole, G. D. H., 355, 356, 357 

Comte, Auguste, 19, 51, 85 

Cooley, Charles H., 26, 98, 
163 

Cram, Ralph Adams, 46 

Croly, Herbert, 43, 118, 329 


Darwin, Charles, 24, 25, 26 

Dewey, John, 9, 22, 32, 355 
43, 82, 83, 137, 138, 149, 
150; 163, 302 

Dickinson, Z. C., 118 

Dreiser, Theodore, 260 


Einstein, Albert, 24, 97 
Ellis, Havelock, 24, 25, 115 
Ellwood, Charles A., 163 


Faraday, Michael, 24, 25 
Follett, Mary P., 114, 115, 


195 
Frazer, J. G., 41 
Galton, Francis, 24 


Giddings, Franklin H., 20, 
58, 85, 86, 104 


Ginsberg, Morris, 162, 167, 
216 

Goldenweiser, A. A., 127 

Gosnell, H. F., 172, 260 


Hamilton, Sir Wiliam, 53 
Hegel, G. W. F., 150 
Hobson, J. A., 118 

Holt, E. B., 43, 144, 183, 220 


James, William, 52, 70, 95, 
137 

Jarrett, Mary C., 142, 143 

Jhering, Rudolph von, 215 


Kant, J.,).3%) 83, 185, 216 
Kempf, Edward J., 329 
Kepler, Johann, 24 
King, Wilford I., 84, 103 
Kohler, Josef, 187 

Kolb, ay rH 26 
Korzybski, Alfred, 13, 16 
Krabbe, H., 146, 215 


LeBon, Gustave, 131, 213 
Le Dantec, Félix, 141, 271 
Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm 
von, 24 
Leonardo da Vinci, 24 
Lindeman, E. C., 76, 328 
Lippmann, Walter, 4, 
159, 160, 216, 347 
Lowell, A. Lawrence, 348 


118, 


Mackenzie, J. S., 213 

Malthus, T. R., 25, 26 

Martin, Everett Dean, 51, 55, 
131 

Marx, Karl, 46, 150, 151 


365 


Masson, T. L., 233 
McDougall, William, 
13I, 162, 216 
Maclver, R. M., 212 
Mecklin, John M., 14 
Meiklejohn, J. M. D., 31 
Merriam, Charles E., 


129- 


171, 
260 

Mill, John Stuart, 53, 54, 56, 
6 


9 
Mitchell, C. A., 40 
Motley, John Lothrop, 17 


Nietzsche, Friedrich, 151, 324 


Ogburn, William F., 
18, 19 

Ogden, C. K., 201-204, 206, 
216 

Ouspensky, P. D., 58, 159 

Overstreet, Harry, 155 


755126, 


Page, E. D., 156 

Parker, Carlton, 117 
Paul, Jean, 159 

Pavlov, I. P., 43 

Pearson, Karl, 28 

Peirce, Charles S., 83, 97 
Perry, R. B., 45, 80, 81, 82 
Pitkin, Walter B., 75 
Pound, Roscoe, 214, 215 


Ratzenhover, Gustav, 212 

Richards, I. A., 201-204, 206, 
216 

Robinson, James Harvey, 14, 
16, 19 

Ross, Edward Allsworth, 131, 
162, 216, 325 

Russell, Bertrand, 13, 80, 357 


Sabine, George H., 215 
Schaffle, Albert, 213 


Sheffield, Alfred Dwight, 83, 


229, 307 
Shepard, Walter J., 215 


Sidgwick, Alfred, 77, 83, 160. 


Small, Albion W., 38, 212 
Southard, E. E., 142, 143 
Spaulding, Edward G., 75 
Spencer, Herbert, 20, 51, 
213 
Spurrell, H. G. F., 46, 67 
Steen, Herman, 246, 346 
Stock, Charles Wharton, 99 


85, 


Tarde, Gabriel, 131 
Tawney, R. H., 118 

ML ay ts ©.» C., 920 
Tead, Ordway, 117 
Teggart, F. J., 48 
Thomas, William I., 338 


Vaihinger, Hans, 24 


Wallas, Graham, 118, 163 
Ward, Lester F., 213, 327 


Watson, J. B., 21, 129, 130, 
182, 186 

Westergaard, Harald Lud- 
vig, 90 


Whipple, George C., 90, 94, 


95 
White, W. A., 62 
Whitehead, Alfred North, 80 
Williams, James Mickel, 157, 
167 
Wiscler, Clark, 15, 53 
Wolfe, A. B., 135, 138, 157, 
336 
Wordsworth, William, 327 
Wundt, Wilhelm, 130 


Zimmerman, C. C., 26 
Zuberkloss, 34 
Znaniecki, Florian, 338 


366 


GENERAL INDEX 


Acquisitive Society, 118 
Activity, 113, 347, 348, 360 
Objective, 197 
Adjusting Process, 39, 145, 
146 
Adjustment, 12, 148, 200, 278, 
335, 361 
Group, 146 
Aims, 163, 168, 170 
Altruism, 140, 141, 214 
Amalgamated Clothing Work- 
ers, 73, 74 
American Farm Bureau Fed- 
eration, 255 
American Federation of La- 
bor, 218 
Analogical Method, 107 
Methods, 51 
Analogies, 50, 93, 140 
Analogy, 48, 52, 54, 56, 57; 
§8, 108, 123, 125 
Analysis, 74, 75, 107 
Animal Societies, 141 
Antagonism, Universal Prin- 
ciple of, 156 
Anthropologists, 46 
Anthropology, 53, 67, 68 
Artists, Scientists as, 24 
Association, 162 
Attitude, 280, 317, 336 
Generalized, 317 
Attitudes, 206, 330, 331, 338, 


339 
Defined, 239 
Traditional, 337 
Average, 87, 88, 90, 
104 
Absolute, 87 
Validity of the, 87 


103, 


Baconian Dictum, 325 
Behavior, 127, 130, 144, 145, 
219, 331, 332, 335 
Collective, 168 
Group, 153, 164, 330, 338, 
342, 354, 360 
Progressive, 332 
Significant, 267 
Social, 354 
Total, 147, 360 
Behavior of the Group, 146, 
361 
Behavior-Pattern, 128, 
317, 336 
Behaviorism, 186, 187 
Behaviorists, 182, 183, 185 
Bias, 231, 317 
Individual, 271 
British Labor, 
218 
Party, 219 


193, 


Movement, 


California, 246, 257, 334, 341, 


345 
Capper-Volstead Act, 342 
Categories, 125, 126, 128, 
158-176, 192, 201, 206 
Of Social Psychology, 161- 
168 
Cause, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 164 
Causes, 42 
Characteristics, National, 162 
Racial, 163 
Class Conflict, 150 
Classification, 143 
Class Struggle, 133 
Clayton Act, 342 
Collective, Behavior, 21, 168 
Group, 307 


367 


Collective Psychology, 22, 194 
Collectivism, 303, 306 
Commodity, 315 
Coéperative Group, 251 
Codperative Marketing, 341 
Group, 249 
Organization, 253 
Communities, 133 
Community, 76, 162, 248, 251, 
328 
Committees, 252 
Interests, 253 
Compromise, 162 
Conceiving, 59 
Consensus of the Competent, 
31 
Concept, 95 
Empirical, 56 
Conception, 115 
Concepts, 158, 159 
Accident, 12 
Conceptual, 96 
Conclusion, 64, 71 
Conclusions, 69, 76, 78 
Concurrence, 229 
Conduct, 130 
Conflict, 142, 143, 
330, 363 
Class, 150 
Group, 139-157 
Reality of, 151 
Theories of, 150 
Theory of, 155 
Conflicts, Custom, 332, 335, 
336 
Group, 362 
Consciousness, of Kind, 58 
Social, 163 
Consent, 126, 153, 154, 172, 
173, 190, 205, 253, 289, 


295 
Defined, 228 
Emotional, 296 
Intellectual, 296 
Legal, 298 
Motor, 296 
Real, 299 


145, 162, 


Consent, Total, 297 
Validity of, 298 
Consumption, 341 
Continuum, 361 
Contract, 276, 293 
Legal, 173, 290-292, 320 
Marketing, 291 | 
Violations, 252, 275, 276, 
278, 297, 349 7 
Violators, 279 
Contracts, 296, 308 
Controversy, 153, 159 
Conventionality, 162, 168 
Conventions, 169 
Cooperation, 144 
Codperative, Acting, 305, 358 © 
Association, 332, 334, 339, 
340, 342, 345 
Association, Farmers’, 189 
Commodity Group, 251 
Groups, 165, 166 
Codperative Marketing, 124, © 
236, 245, 294, 295, 332, 
335. 
Association, 173, 246 
Commodity, 341 
Law, 345 
Codperative Movement, 123, 
126, 170, 303, 337 
Correlations, 89, 90, 93, 94 
Correspondence, 89, 90, 93 
Counting, 85 
Crowd, 81, 162, 163 
Behavior, 51 
Methods, 290 
Mind, 23 
Mindedness, 347 
Psychology, 347 
Stimulation, 257 
Crowds, 55, 56, 131 
Cultural, Forms, 130 
Groups, 133 
Lag, 15 
Culture, 126 
Custom, 162 
Conflicts, 332, 335, 336 
Marketing, 333 


—— 


368 


Customs, 126, 163, 168, 169, 
193, 205, 235, 236, 330, 
331, 332, 352 

Defined, 235 

Credit, 333 
Farm-Management, 334 
Financing, 333 
Production, 334 

Czecho-Slovakian 
ment, 288 


Govern- 


Darwinism, 150 
Definiendum, 203 
Definition, 160, 204 
Method of, 207 
Deliberation, 163, 235, 300, 
302 
Group, 302 
Denmark, 124, 246, 257 
Description, 40 
Desires, 77, 113, 
170, 194 
Determinants, 70, 114, 115 
Determinism, 114 
Biological, 46 
Economic, 46 
Discussion, 83, 203, 205, 230, 
305, 306, 313 
Defined, 229 
Group, 196 
Disinterestedness, 24 
Dispersion, 103, 104 
Disposition, 163 
Dissociation, 155 
Dogmatism, 27 
Dynamics, 331 


126, 163, 


Education, 17, 18, 134 
Psychology of, 134 

Effect, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 164 

Egoism, 140, 141, 214 

Egotism, 137 

Emotional Complexes, 301 

Emotions, 25, 162, 193 

Empiricism, 52, 359 

Ends, 44, 137, 338, 339, 36% 
Philosophy of, 350 


Environment, 122, 144, 146, 
147, 163, 36% 

Total, 351, 361 
Equilibrium, 350, 351 
Errors, 88 
Ethical Codes, 241 
Ethics, 135, 206, 219, 240, 339, 

342, 352, 363 

Defined, 239 

Of Power, 341 

Social, 240 
Ethnology, 57, 58 
Events, 36, 38 
Examples, 52 
Experience, 3, 10, 34, 61, 66, 

72, 95 
Expert, 77, 92, 206, 261-264, 
266-270 
Defined, 223 
Integration of Function of, 
269 

Observers, 184 

Symbol, 258 
Expertness, 262 
Experts, 122, 174, 185, 190, 

247, 303 
Control of, 284, 285 
Humanizing the, 267 


Fact, Concurrence, 79 
Codperative Gathering, 314 
Gathering, 313 
Neutral, Gathering, 314 

Facts, 4, 77, 78, 84, 100, 103, 

174, 183, 186, 190, 229, 
310-312, 316 

Misuse of, 308 

Opposing, 312 

Use of, 308, 312-314 

Use of, Defined, 230 

Families, 27 

Family, 45, 133 

Fallacy of Yes-or-No An- 

swer, 178-180 

Farmer, 111, 173 
One-Crop, 332, 333 

Farm Organization, 196 


369 


Farmers, 121, 124, 165, 166, 
169, 170, 181, 244, 245, 
259, 266, 295, 303, 337s 
339, 340 

Danish, 125 
Coodperative 
189 

Fashion, 162 

Fear, 163 

Feeling, 113, 229 

Feelings, 163, 259, 262 

Florida, 341 

France, 78, 239, 240 

Freedom, 163 

Function, 144, 146, 147, 361 

Functions, Group, 174 

Sociable, 197 


Association, 


Gary, 123 

Germany, 78, 239, 240 
Grange, The, 255 

Great Britain, 218 

Group, 81, 82, 111, 127, 136- 


139, 146, 152, 169-171, 
205, 222, 331, 351, 353, 
361, 362 


Activities, 346 
Adjustment, 146 
As Means not End, 135 
Behavior, 113, 131, 146, 
153, 164, 170, 330, 338, 
342, 354, 360 
Behavior of, 361 
Collective, 307 
Commodity, 249 
Conflict, 139-157 
Conflicts, 362 
Codperative 
251 
Defined, 207 
Deliberation, 302 
Discussion, 196 
Formation, 153 
Functional, 358 
Functions, 174 
Habits, 238 
Interests, 348 


Commodity, 


Group, Mind, 23, 131, 162, 
164 
Power, 326 
Psychology, 168 
Response, Defined, 227 
Responses, 205 
Situation, 205, 226, 275 
Stimuli, 205, 277, 278 
Stimuli, Defined, 226 
Studies, 132 
Symbolic, 358 
The, as representation of 
interests, 289, 348 

Thinking, 195 

Groups, 132, 190 
Accommodation, 133 
Behavior, 134. 
Conflict, 133 
Cooperative, 165, 166 
Cultural, 133 
Functional, 354 
Functioning, 131 
Genetic, 354 
Interest, 328 
Social, 131 
Social Service, 197 
Territorial, 133 
Voluntary, 171, 172 


Habit, 162, 163, 330 
Category, 68 
Habits, 70, 153, 163, 193, 238, 
301, 336 
Group, 238, 330 
History, 30, 34, 37, 108, 122 
Economic Interpretation of, 


37 
Historical Method, 106 
Hostility, 163 
Human Association, 135 | 
Hypothesis, Sequence of, 353 


Idea Patterns, 238 

Idea Systems, 126, 331 

Ideas, 115 
Introspective, 114 
Objective, 117 


379 


ee pl ea a 


Ideas, Subjective, 114, 117 
Illustrations, 52 
Imagination, 26, 35, 72 
Imitation, 162, 163 
Impulse, Neural, 226 
Impulses, 163 
Individual, 20, 81, 128, 132 
Industrial, Evolution, 63 
Organization, 172 
Technique, 63 
Industry, 218 
Innate, Tendencies, 162 
Forces, 234 
Instinct, 141 
Gregarious, 141 
Self-Assertive, 166 
Self-Preserving, 141 
Instinctive Forces, 234 
Instincts, 162, 163, 164, 165 
Gregarious, 165, 166 
Institutions, 162, 362 
Integrated Organism, 134 
Integrating Process, 198 
Integration, 197, 200, 
360 
Of Function of Expert, 269 
Integration, Partial, 328 
Integrations, Intellectual, 261 
Intellect, 163 
Intellectual Integrations, 261 
Conviction, 294 
Intellectualist, 96 
Intelligence, 86, 163 
Tests, 103, 188 
Interaction, 44 
Interest, 112, 113, 362 
Groups, 328 
Validity of, 230 
Interests, 77, 139, 
145, 149, 152, 
205, 209, 211, 
221, 243, 289, 
362, 363 
Balancing of, 299 
Community, 253 
Conflicting, 328 
Conflict of, 221 


302, 


140, 
179, 
213, 
349; 


142, 
190, 
215, 
350, 


Interests, Definition of, 211, 
212, 216, 222, ,230, 231 
Economic, 181, 218, 255 
Equilibrum, 350 
Financial, 258 
Group as_ representation 
of, 289 
Inclusive, 254 
Leaders, 260 
Marginal, 362 
Multiple, 251 
Mutual, 210 
Revaluation of, 351 
Specific, 254 
Validity of, 298 
Valuation of, 218 
International Relations, 234 
International Seamen’s Union, 
286 
Interpretation, 203 
Introspection, 183, 184 


James-Lange Theory, 301 
Judgments, 259, 261 
Jurisprudence, 62, 214 
Justice, 62 


Kantian, 115, 116 
Knowing, Technical, 230 
Vicarious, 230 


Labor Unions, 134, 153 
Language, 126, 130, 158, 160, 
351 

Problem, 2or 

Symbol, 202 

Symbols, 176, 207 

Use of, 205, 321-323 

Use of, Defined, 232 
Law, The, 206, 342, 343, 346, 


363 
Defined, 241 
Laws, 68, 69 
Leader, 361 
Defined, 222, 223, 261, 263 
Leaders, 154, 190, 257, 304, 
305 
Interests, 260 


371 


Leadership, 122, 126, 152, 163, 
168, 169, 223, 259, 304, 


_ 307 
Liberty, 62 
Logic, 61, 63-66, 68, 69, 72, 
73) 77, 82, 83, 95, 108, 
122, 125, 313 
Formal, 54 
Logical, Method, 106 
Presumptions, 63 
Process, 199 


Maladjustment, 17, 18 

Marginal Members, 209, 283, 
284, 287, 362 

Mathematics, 95, 96, 119 


Means, 44, 137, 338, 339, 36% 
Measuring, 85 


Measurement, Quantitative, 
88 

Measurements, 182, 186 

Memory, 40 


Mendelian Theory, 353 
Mental Processes, 186, 203 
Metaphors, 49 
Method, 119, 356, 363 
Analogical, 56-58, 107, 108 
Analytical, 73 
Historical, 105, 106, 356 
Historical-Statistical, 60 
Logical, 64, 106 
Psychological, 127, 128, 338 
Social Science, 338 
Sociological, 127 
Statistical, 85, 87, 89, 100, 
103, 107 
Synthesis of, 105-108 


Method of Social Research, 
98 

Middleman, 181, 189 

Middlemen, 247, 256, 264, 


266, 308, 315, 316, 318, 
_ 322, 328, 339, 340 
Mind, 115, 116, 128 
Group, 162, 164 
Mob, 162, 164 
Social, 163 


Mob, 81, 131 
Mind, 23, 162, 164 


330, 331 ; 
Defined, 236 } 
Motives, 77, 126, 194, 313 


National Council of Farmers’ — 
Coéperative Marketing © 
Associations, 255 

Natural Selection, 25 

Needs, 136 

Economic, 219 

Neighborhood, 248, 251 

Neighborhoods, 27 

North Carolina, Public Laws 
of, 291 

Marketing Act of, 344 

Supreme Court, 343 
Neurosis, 55, 56 
Nominalist, 140 


Observation, 183, 187, 188, 
190, 193, 199, 271 
Objective, 187, 360 
Observer, 205, 223 
Outside, 198 
Participant, 191, 192, 194, 
197,199,205 
Participant, Function of, 
192 
Participant, Defined, 223 
Observers, 271 
Opinions, 229, 308 


Organization, Administra- 
tive, 319 
Social, 330, 331, 335, 336, 
362 


Organizers, 263 
Overt Acts, 360 


Pain, 163, 333 
Parallelists, Historical, 67 


372 


Observer, 
197, 199, 


Participant 
192, 194, 


24 
Defined, 223 
Function of, 192 
Perceiving, 59 
Percept, 95 
Perception, 115 
Personality, 130, 133, 362 
Total, 171, 187, 219, 267 
Philosophy, 31, 96, 186 
Social, 364 
Physiologist, 90 
Play, 162 
Plurality, 44 
Point-of-View, 205, 317 
Defined, 231 
Long-time, 318 
Short-time, 318-320 


Ig, 
205, 


Power, 126, 205, 217, 219, 
234, 240, 324-326, 328, 
329, 342 


Defined, 233 

Ethics of, 341 

Group, 326 

Technique, 342 
Predictability, 35 
Prediction, 36, 46, 61 
Prejudice, 231, 317 
Prejudices, 193 
Premise, Major, 64, 71, 74 

Minor, 64, 71 
Press, The, 348 
Price-Fixing, 340, 341, 345 
Principles, 163 
Probability, 61 
Process, Community, 76 
Processes, Deliberative, 301 

Thought, 360 
Production, 334, 341 
Progress, 150 
Psychiatric Technique, 194 
Psychiatrist, 188 
Psycho-Analysts, 183 
Psychological, Causation, 43 

Content, 126 

Emphasis, 119 


% 


Psychological, Method, 182 
Psychologist, 127, 357 
Psychology, 21, 22, 111, 127, 
130, 135 
Abnormal, 155 
As a Social Science, 354 
Child, 129 
Collective, 127, 168, 194 
Crowd, 347 
Educational, 129 
Experimental, 43, 128 
Folk, 129, 130 
Gestalt, 187 
Group, 168 
Individual, 129 
Legal, 129 
Objective, 185, 187 
Of Animals, 129 
Of Education, 134 
Pathological, 129 
Social, 118, 129, 130, 167 
Vocational, 129 
Public Opinion, 162, 163, 206, 
243, 346, 348, 349, 350, 
352, 363 
Defined, 242 
Purpose, 194, 197, 209, 210 
Purposes, 77, 113, 126, 170, 
209 
Concealment of, 196 
Human, 361 


Qualities, 121 


Racial Groups, 58 
Rationalization, 41, 66, 294 
Rationalizations, 182, 193, 
259, 261, 262, 360 

Reality, 59 

Of Conflict, 15x 
Reason, 162 
Reasoning, 61 

Creative, 70 
Recall, 290 
Reference, 202 
Referent, 202, 203 
Referents, 204 


3 


Referendum, 290 
Relatedness, 361 
Relation, 362 
Relation, Causal, 202 
Relations, 121 
Religion, 126, 130, 219 
Representation, 126, 153, 154, 
172, 205, 252,° 253, 282- 
284, 286, 287 
Defined, 227 
Mathematical, 287 
Political, 288 
Representative Government, 
171 
Representatives, 228, 229 
Resemblance, 55 
Resemblances, 54-56 
Response, 43, 44, 164, 178, 
279, 301, 336, 337, 361 
Group, 205 
Group, Defined, 227 
Multiple, 148, 175, 190 
Specific, 174 
Stimulus-situation, 280 
Responses, 281 
Responsibilities, 218 
Responsibility, 253 
Rights, 142, 170, 215, 241 


Science, 116, 119, 186, 272 
Political, 214 
Criteria of, 28 
As Dogma, 27 
Pragmatic, 358 
Sense of Right, 339, 340, 342 
Sentiments, 162, 193 
Sherman Act, 344 
Similes, 49, 50 
Signs, 203 
Situation, 278 
Evolving, 280, 281, 362 
Stimulus-Response, 280 
Situations, Group, 275 
Sociability, 163 
Social, Analysis, 73 
Behavior, 354 
Conflicts, 75 


Social Consciousness, 
163 
Control, 234, 238, 332, 346 
Ethics, 240, 364 
Forces, 86 
Forms, 343 
Groups, 71, 112, 119, 120, 
131 , 
Institutions, 133 
Mind, 45, 80, 163 
Organization, 173, 256, 
286, 287, 329, 330, 331, 
335, 336, 362 
Pathology, 133 
Process, 133, 146, 354 
Processes, 98 
Psychologist, 127, 357 
Psychology, 22, 118, 131, 
132, 167, 235, 330 
Research, 5 
Science, 133, 354, 357 
Survey, 181 
Theory, 329, 353, 354, 355, 
356, 359 
Thinking, 68 
Values, 338, 339 
Social Sciences, 68, 70, 103, 
112 
Validity. of, 356 
Society, 20 
Sociologists, 68, 85, 127 
Sociology, 56, 57, gt, 15, 
235 
General, 133 
Speculation, 30 
Statics, 331 
Statistics, 84-104, 108, 125 
Statistical Method, 107, 309 
Stimulation, Crowd, 257 
Stimuli, 177, 219, 281 
Deferred, 280 


IIt, 


Group, 205 [Def. 226], 
277, 278 

Law of, Mutually Opposed, 
156 


Stimulus, 43, 44, 149, 164, 
178, 279, 280, 301, 361 


314 


— 


Stimulus, Specific, 174 
Subjectivism, 116, 117 
Sublimation, 18 

Suggestion, 163 | 
Suggestibility, 162 

Sun-Maid Raisin Growers, 


345 
Symbol, Expert, 258 
Fear, 257 
Fight, 257 
Justice, 257 
Language, 176, 202, 207 
Psychological, 113 
Symbolism, 203, 204 
Symbols, 24, 160, 169, 201, 
203, 204, 206, 351, 360 
Sympathy, 163 
Synthesis, 357 
Of Method, 105 


Terms, 203, 360 
Thinking, Group, 195 
Rigorous, 61, 62 
Social, 68 
Thought, 113, 163, 202, 360 
Time-Binding, 13 
Tobacco Growers’ Codpera- 
tive Association, 343, 344 
Trade Unions, 73, 196, 217, 
248, 358 
Tradition, 206 


Traditions, 162, 330, 331, 352 
Defined, 237 


Ultimate Traits, 32, 35 
United Mine Workers, 249 


United States, 42, 218 


Dept. of Agri., 309 

Dept. of Justice, 345 

Steel Corp., 123, 124 
Universals, 70, 79, 347 


Validity, of the Average, 87 
Of Consent, 298 
Of Interests, 298 
Valuation of Interests, 218 
Value, 217, 221 
Values, 32, 181, 272, 363 
Economic, 180 
Social, 338, 339 
Variables, 70, 75, 94 
Dependent and Independ- 
ent, 16 
Volition, 162 


War Finance Corporation, 


309 

Will, 113, 162 
General, 162 
Human, 357 
Popular, 163 

Wishes, 113 


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